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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to describe the way 
in which "unified action" functions within stories. 
Taking Aristotle's Poetics as a point of departure, the 
first chapter defines unified action as a disturbance, 
problem, and resolution. It draws extensively on the 
Knight's Tale and Heart of Darkness, among others, to 
illustrate these concepts. The above two stories are 
further compared with Sir Gawain and the Green Knight 
and two novels by Dostoevsky. The comparison shows how 
a story's themes lie in the circumstances of the 
disturbance and are worked out through action.
This discussion leads to an examination of the 
causes of action. The aim of unified action is to 
release powerful emotions in the audience such as pity 
and terror. Aristotle found that such release results 
when the audience can see how previous events in the 
plot cause subsequent events. He argued that the most 
effective plot-structures, then, would avoid using non­
human causes, such as chance. The plot of the Reeve's 
Tale is a near-perfect realization of such a structure.
Nevertheless, a close examination of stories such 
as the folktale "The Happy Man's Shirt", and O'Connor's 
"A Good Man Is Hard to Find", reveals that plot- 
structures with non-human causes can also release 
powerful emotions. The discussion indicates that 
release depends more on "fallibility", or the
protagonist's complicity, in his or her own fate than 
on a lucid cause-and-effect sequence.
The final chapter is an extended examination of 
action's place in The Unbearable Lightness of Being and 
Heart of Darkness, It uses the concepts set out in the 
first two chapters to define the action, identify 
themes, and account for the unity of each story. Even 
in such complex works, action forms a narrative core 
which provides keys for grasping the total structure of 
the novels.
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Introduction
Action has formed the basis upon which stories in 
the West have traditionally been constructed. ij
Therefore, an understanding of it is a useful way 
towards comprehending a wealth of stories from both the 
past and the present. An understanding of action means 
first of all grasping the plot, that is, perceiving the 
overall structure of the action as well as the means by 
which the events in it are connected. This, in turn, 
yields a grasp of the story's themes, since theme is 
determined significantly by the action. Finally, 
action provides a basis for comprehending the story's 
construction and total unity. The project of this 
thesis is to present a method of achieving the kind of 
understanding outlined above. By way of introduction I 
would like first to set out and defend some of the 
basic assumptions, methods, and sources of my thesis 
and then to outline the discussion itself.
Structure and Meaning
The subject of this study is the structure of 
stories, not their meanings. I have limited myself to 
structure and avoided discussing meaning because plot- 
structure, the arrangement of events, is susceptible to 
rational, analytic study, whereas it is highly 
questionable that the meaning of a story is
  vv;-"
introduction\
understandable at all in a discursive, rational, or 
intellectual way.
As story-tellers themselves are constantly 
reminding us, stories do not appeal exclusively or even 
primarily to the intellect but rather to the emotions. 
As Tarkovsky observed:
Understanding in a scientific sense means agreement on a cerebral, logical level; it is an intellectual act akin to the process of proving a theorem.Understanding an artistic image means an aesthetic acceptance of the beautiful, on an emotional or even supra-emotional level. (40; emphas i s added)^
Austrian novelist Robert Musil has similarly written, 
"To imaginative writing belongs, fundamentally, that 
which one does not know— reverence for it" (151; my 
translation). If it is true that acceptance of and 
reverence for a story are necessary in order to 
perceive its meaning in the full sense, it is equally 
true that such attitudes are normally considered 
anathema in the work of literary criticism. And while 
writing a thesis is by no means the same thing as 
writing a story, nevertheless, it would seem to me 
misguided to work at purposes counter to those of the 
stories I am ostensibly trying to understand.
^ The form of citation in this thesis follows the MLA 
Style Manual, The name of the citation's author, the title or section of the work, and page or line number references appear in parentheses immediately following the citation when these are not apparent from the thesis text. References to non-print sources are self- explanatory. The full publication details of each source appear in the "Works Cited" portion of this thesis.
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Furthermore, to "understand" a story in an 
absolute sense, to grasp its meaning, would entail, 
besides reverence for and acceptance of it, knowing all 
the story's parts and how they function within the 
story to form a whole. For example, the Knight's Tale,
like any other piece of imaginative writing, is a
mixture of characters, settings, metaphors, rhythms, 
images, sounds, and arguments, to name a few of its 
elements. Its meaning comes from the combined force of 
all these acting together on the reader. Therefore, 
the only way to come to the full meaning of the
Knight's Tale is to put all the elements together— in
other words to re-read (or rewrite verbatim) the 
Knight's Tale, rather like the character Pierre Menard 
does with Don Quixote in Borges's famous story (62-77). 
Since meaning comes from the combined force of elements 
in a work, any attempt to restate or even to identify 
its "meaning" abstracted from these connections is 
bound to fall short of the target.
"Style and structure are the essence of a book", 
said Nabokov, "great ideas are hogwash" (xxxiii).
Despite its rather extreme ring, this statement 
expresses the contention of this thesis that structure, 
as a subject itself, does lend itself to analytic study 
where great ideas and meanings do not. A particular 
arrangement of events can be brought to light, its 
characteristics named, its effects described, and the 
principle according to which the author organised the 
events either discovered or inferred. As Lubbock
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observed, a writer is a craftsman, and therefore the 
legitimate job of the critic is "to overtake him at his 
work and see how the book was made . . . "  (274). This 
is the aim of my discussion.
Nevertheless, my approach is not "structuralist". 
Structuralist poetics, according to Jonathan Culler, 
seeks to "discover the structures and conventions of 
literary discourse which enable them to have the 
meanings they do" (8; emphasis added). And Todorov 
declares: "The literary work does not have a form and a 
content, but a structure of significations” (41; 
emphasis added). The interest of structuralism in 
plot, then, is still ultimately an interest in how 
stories mean. My interest, on the other hand, is in 
the structure of action itself, not in story structure 
as a way toward understanding "significations". "Plot- 
structure . . .  is not a vehicle or framework for 
something else, but constitutes the primary 
significance of poetic drama" (Halliwell, Commentary 
94). This view of plot-structure is a contention in 
both Aristotle's Poetics and in this thesis. The 
structuring of action is a subject not only suitable 
for analytic study but one which demands the closest 
attention as the heart of story-telling.
Relevance and Limitations of Aristotle's Poetics
Aristotle's conceptions of unity of action as 
found in the Poetics form the theoretical basis of this 
study. There are several reasons for this. Firstly,
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Aristotle's thinking came closest to my own initial 
ideas about story structure. In particular, his 
emphasis on action as the most important ingredient in 
the structure of tragedy confirmed my own experience as 
a reader and a spectator: "The plot-structure is the 
first principle and, so to speak, the soul of 
tragedy. . ." (38; ch. 6).^ Since the Poetics focuses 
on action, it has proved the discussion most relevant 
to my approach to story structure.
Secondly, the Poetics warrants a primary place in 
a study such as this as virtually the earliest extant 
attempt in the West to formulate the principles of 
narrative structure. Although the influence of the 
Poetics has waned in this century, it is still one of 
the most enduring and historically influential studies 
of its subject. In addition, since it does not owe its 
origin to any particular movement in later European 
literary history, many of its concepts have, as I hope 
to demonstrate, application to a wide variety of 
narratives from various periods.
Thirdly, the Poetics possesses exceptional clarity 
of expression. It is written in simple language and 
appeals to common sense. The virtues, indeed the
2 Throughout the thesis I use the words "tragedy" and "story" practically interchangeably with reference to the Poetics, The characteristics of structure discussed by Aristotle often apply to narrative as well, a correspondence made explicit by Aristotle himself : "Whoever knows the difference between a good and a bad tragedy knows the same for epic too; for epic's attributes all belong to tragedy as well, though not all of tragedy's are shared by epic" (36; ch. 5). Those cases in which differing principles apply are duly designated.
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indispensability, of these two characteristics would 
appear to be self-evident, especially in a subject as 
abstract and theoretical as narrative structure. Yet 
these virtues are, sadly, all but completely absent in 
contemporary poetics and narratology. In the "hard" 
sciences an hypothesis which fits the facts and yet can 
be simply, clearly, and concisely formulated is i
considered superior to one which also fits the facts 
but is complicated and long. It is odd that in the 
study of narrative, a branch of contemporary criticism 
which so ardently aspires to the intellectual rigour of J
"hard" science, the very opposite practice appears to 
be prized. Aristotle's Poetics, by being easy to 
comprehend, is simply more practical and more useful 
than other models.
It might be objected that the simplicity of the 
Poetics means that it is also insufficiently 
sophisticated and detailed for a wide-ranging, 
contemporary study of structure. This objection has 
some validity. Indeed one of my major aims in this 
thesis is to discover where and why Aristotelian unity |
of action will not do and to suggest modifications of =|
it, as I do in chapter II. Nevertheless, as I hope to 
show, the Poetics is sophisticated enough to provide 
the basic framework and terminology for a discussion of 
plot-structure, despite its limitations.
Some of these limitations are rather obvious.
Aristotle presents a theory based largely on the 
dramatic tradition of ancient Greece. Halliwell
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reminds us of "the great cultural distance between
ourselves and the Poetics, a distance which contains
types of tragic drama never conceived of by
Àr[istotle]". He continues:
This simple fact makes one wonder why modern critics have often persisted in even considering Ar[istotle]'s definition of tragedy as a formula capable of holding together the whole history of tragic poetry. (Commentary 88)
Moreover, Aristotle stipulates the evocation of pity 
and fear as the aims of the tragedy. Types of stories 
which aim for different effects— absurdist drama, self­
reflexive "metafiction", "minimalism", and 
"experimental" fiction of various kinds, for example—  
would not necessarily follow the same structural 
principles. Indeed, the novel itself, taken as a 
genre, arguably evidences a preoccupation with 
exploring the totality of individual character more 
than with evoking pity and terror.3
It is obvious from the outset, then, that a 
conception of action derived from the Poetics can by no 
means provide a complete account of narrative action in 
all fiction. Such is not the aim of this thesis.
This study does not seek to present a universal theory 
of action based on Aristotle or on anyone else but 
rather examines how unity of action functions in 
stories or sections of stories that possess it.
The extension of Aristotelian principles to types 
of narrative other than Greek drama is not as far
^ For a similar idea, see Lukacs 75-6 and 79.
1
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removed from the intention of the Poetics as it may 
seem at first glance. The scant attention Aristotle 
devotes to exclusively theatrical elements, as well as 
his relatively lengthy discussion of epic, indicate 
that the concern of the Poetics is essentially analysis 
of plot-structure (mythos) as such, rather than of the 
tragedy as such. It goes without saying that plot- 
structure is fundamental not only to the drama but to 
everything we can call a story. Furthermore, Greek 
drama, and indeed most drama, can be seen in the first 
place as a set of conventions for telling a story— on a 
stage. So it is not at all surprising that many of the 
principles of structure which Aristotle discusses are 
common to various genres of story-telling: tragedy, 
comedy, epic, romance, short story, folktale, novel, 
film.
Furthermore, the basic techniques of story-telling 
described by Aristotle were developed, of course, many 
centuries before he came to write them down. They are 
recognizable in folktales, legends, and literatures in 
many different cultures and ages. Indeed, Holman has 
the confidence to declare that "the fundamental 
dramatic structure [of stories] seems timeless and 
impervious to change" (1 7 5).* Though this statement 
may be open to debate, the principles formulated by 
Aristotle do represent one indisputably effective and 
widespread form of structuring stories and of evoking
^ For a contrasting point of view, see Lepan 3-69 and 303-7.
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certain reactions in an audience. Naturally they are 
not the only form. However, departures from and |
variations on classical ideas about unified action will 
become clearer if the Poetics is taken as a framework 
and point of departure, or so Aristotle claimed.
It might finally be objected that finding 
Aristotle's ideas of plot-structure in medieval and ;
modern works is a somewhat spurious practice. For 
example, I have no hard evidence that Milan Kundera has 
ever read the Poetics, and it is fairly safe to assume 
that the Gawain poet did not know the Poetics in its 
classical form. But, of course, neither did Homer.
Yet his works exhibit "Aristotelian" structure. The 
Poetics is of interest in this study not because of any 
influence it may have had on the composition of the 
works in question but as a description of the way 
action works in them.
Selection of Stories
I discuss unity of action in various works—  
narrative poems, folktales, a short story, a novella, 
and several novels— from widely separate periods. The 
reasons for the selection I have made are as follows.
Firstly, I chose stories that had readily 
identifiable plot-structures, stories which I enjoy 
reading, and stories with which I was familiar without 
j^.regard to when they were written. The distance between -
the literary periods in which they were composed |
emphasises the importance of action in them as the '
w
J ' /.y/ir ..-'A/..!: ' .... . / ____
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essence of narrative. Stories which have little else 
in common may yet possess comparable plot-structures.
The structure of action is thus clearly more essential 
and less dependent on historical context than the three 
other structural elements relevant to the story 
identified by Aristotle: character, style, and thought 
(37; ch. 6). This is not to dismiss the valid 
differentiation of historical periods, genres, and 
literary conventions.® My intent is rather to discuss 
the common element of action in stories and the means 
of ordering it regardless of these distinctions.
Secondly, the prevailing characterizations of 
types of stories according to historical period (e.g. 
the "medieval" romance, the Gothic tale of the Romantic 
era, the "modern" psychological novel, etc.) are not 
discrete as is sometimes assumed. Such divisions are 
frequently more convenient than accurate. They can 
make little sense of, for example, the appearance of 
such a consummately "psychological" work as Chaucer's 
Troilus and Criseyde in the middle ages nor of Mark 
Twain's picaresque adventure. Huckleberry Finn, during 
the general mood of disillusionment in literary America 
at the close of the nineteenth century, nor of the 
appearance of Gothic tales by Flannery O'Connor in the 
mid-twentieth. And a story such as Sir Gawain and the 
Green Knight— an insightful and subtle psychological 
study of its protagonist while at the same time a
® For a well-argued defence of their distinctness, see Reed.
I
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^ In this connection see Jordan's exploration of "post- modernistic" preoccupations in Chaucer's poetics, esp. 5-22 and 169-74.
romance— must seem very puzzling indeed. And yet as
John Stevens points outs:
The concerns of medieval romance are the concerns of all narrative fiction. . . . Nor is there anything special about the way the romance writer conducts his narrative and achieves his effects.(9) #
INabokov put the similarity between modern and '-
traditional story forms even more directly: "Great 
novels are great fairy stories" (xxvi).^ Comparing 
stories primarily in terms of their plot-structures 
rather than according to the years in which they were 
written provides a way out of the problems of 
historical categorisation and points the way to more 
meaningful ways of grouping. I chose stories with 
similar plot-structures ranging from the years 458 BC 
to AD 1984 in order to underline this point.
Thirdly, I should emphasise that the stories were 
also selected on the basis of their suitability as 
illustrations, on account of their clarity or 
complexity, and, again, without regard to when they 
were produced. I have made no attempt to show any sort îÿ
of "representative" cross section of stories from major 
literary or historical divisions. Thus, in chapter 
III, for example, the discussion concentrates almost 
exclusively on two stories from the twentieth century.
This circumstance is irrelevant since the subject is 
not when the plots were structured but how. The time
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in which a story was written is but one factor 
influencing its composition. The language in which it 
was written is another and the nationality or culture 
of the author yet another. All of these 
considerations, however influential they have been in 
the construction of the stories cited, are simply 
beyond the scope of this by no means exhaustive study.
Organization
Chapter I consists of two parts. The first 
defines basic terms such as disturbance, active problem 
and super-objective. In particular, the first part 
establishes a working understanding of action as the 
doings of the characters that either complicate or work 
toward resolving the active problem. The first part 
also asserts that a story's themes are inherent in the 
initial situation and are worked out through action.
The second part of the chapter is an extended 
demonstration of this assertion, focusing on the 
Knight's Tale and Heart of Darkness as illustrations. 
Situation and theme in the Knight's Tale are compared 
with their counterparts in two novels by Dostoyevsky, 
while the same elements in Heart of Darkness are 
compared to their corollaries in Sir Gawain and the 
Green Knight. The aim of the comparison is to show how 
differing active problems, initial situations, and the 
conditions governing these situations determine 
differences in action and hence in the story's themes.
................................................introduction\ 13 g
IIWhereas chapter I sets out a basic conception of |
unity of action derived from Aristotle and extends its 
implications to theme, chapter II is a critique of the 
principles governing the connection of events in the 
plot. The Aristotelian conception of unity of action 
is shown to rest on an assumption that the causes of 
events in a story are understandable in purely human
terms. After briefly analyzing the basic components of S
plot-structure in the first part of the chapter, I 
outline the merits of the plot-structure understandable 
purely in terms of human causality— the "lucid" plot- 
structure— in the second part. These merits are, 
primarily, lucidity itself and irony. Irony is shown 
to result from the "fallibility" of the characters.
Lucidity and irony, in turn, are shown to generate the 
release of powerful emotions— e.g. mirth, pity, and 
terror. The final part of the chapter examines action 
resulting from non-human causes in the stories, "The 
Happy Man's Shirt", the Knight's Tale, The Unbearable 
Lightness of Being, and "A Good Man Is Hard to Find".
I conclude that, contrary to Aristotle's theory, plots 
which contain non-human causes are capable of releasing 
powerful emotions as long as the conditions for 
fallibility (or responsibility in the case of comedy) 
are maintained.
Having thus established a model for understanding 
action and its relation to theme, and with a modified 
conception of causation in plot-structure in the first 
two chapters, I turn in chapter III to the place and
introduction\ 14
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function of action within the total structure of two 
longer, complex, non-classically constructed stories—
The Unbearable Lightness of Being and Heart of 
Darkness. In both stories action is not the element 
unifying the entire work. Both stories are shown to be 
unified by some other element— the concept of the 
"existential code" in The Unbearable Lightness of Being 
and "effect" in Heart of Darkness. Nevertheless, 
action is shown to function in both stories as the core 
of the work.
I conclude with some remarks on the value of 
action in the study of narrative as well as a brief 
discussion of some of the pressing questions about 3
action yet to be explored.
4
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Chapter I 
Action and Theme
According to Aristotle, tragedy is the 
representation of "an action which is complete, [and] 
whole . . ." (39; ch. 7). This immediately invites 
the question: What is an action? Since every action is 
presumably the result of some previous action, how do 
we know where an action begins? To take, for example, 
a hypothetical story about, say, a king slaying a 
dragon— should it begin with the king waking on the 
morning of the battle or just before he enters the 
lair— in médias res— or should it begin when the king 
first became king, or on the day he was born, or, after J
the manner of Lawrence Sterne, at the moment of his 
conception? For that matter, why could it not begin on 
the day the dragon was born?^ What is an action?
Where does an action begin?
Terms
The answer is perhaps not as complicated as one 
might expect. In narrative terms, an action begins 
with a d i s t u r b a n c e . 2 a disturbance is the event which
^ See John Gardner's Grendel, a version of the Beowulf legend told from the monster's point of view.2 This term and definition I have from a playwriting seminar lead by Scottish playwright, Ian Heggie, St. Andrews, 13-15 Sept. 1991.
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wedding. This causes great consternation in the royal 
city, and everyone wonders how the king will react to 
his son marrying a monkey. But the king says only, "He 
chose her, so he has to marry her."
On the wedding day, to everyone's astonishment, 
Anthony's bride suddenly turns into a beautiful 
princess. The two brides then present their gifts to 
their father-in-law, and it turns out Anthony's bride's 
is indeed much finer. The king is on the point of 
proclaiming Anthony crown prince when Anthony's bride 
reveals that she has a kingdom of her own which she is
disrupts a previous state of balance and sets the rest 
of the story's action in motion.
A simple fairy tale called "Monkey Palace" may
serve as a good illustration. A certain king, unsure 
which of his twin sons, John or Anthony, should inherit 
his kingdom, sends them out into the world to find a 
bride. The son whose bride presents him with the rarer 
and finer gift will become crown prince. The twins |
ride away in different directions. After two days John
becomes engaged to the daughter of a marquis and 
returns home. Meanwhile Anthony wanders into a kingdom %
Iof monkeys. They invite him to stay for awhile. t
Anthony agrees, and he and some monkeys play a game of
bridge. During his first night in this strange land,
he is awakened by the voice of a monkey who promises 
that if he marries her, he will certainly take home the 
finer gift and win the crown. Anthony agrees and
'ibrings her back to his father's kingdom for the
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giving to Anthony. So John is made crown prince, 
everyone is satisfied, and the story ends (Calvino 222- 
5).
"Monkey Palace" begins with a problem: "Once there
was a king who had twin sons, John and Anthony. As he
was not quite sure which of the two was born
first . . . the king couldn't say who was crown prince"
(Calvino 222). However, this is not exactly the
disturbance. A disturbance is an event, and it must
change the status quo. Readers may safely assume that
the king has been unsure of which son is supposed to be
crown prince at least for some years, if not from their
birth. His uncertainty, then, is not a change, but the
status quo itself. Further, according to the
definition above, the disturbance must set the rest of
the action in motion. The king's uncertainty by itself
does not do this. It is his decision to do something
about his uncertainty that forms the disturbance:
I want you each to go out into the world and seek a wife. The one whose bride presents me with therarer and finer gift will be named crown prince.(Calvino 222)
This is the event which upsets the state of balance by 
setting John and Anthony in competition against each 
other. In addition, the rest of the story grows from 
it as the characters act in response: the princes ride 
off to search for brides, John finds a marquis's 
daughter, Anthony agrees to marry a monkey, and so 
forth.
 ..  ■ ■ V
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Similarly, the disturbance in Sophocles's Oedipus 
the King is the priests asking Oedipus to do something 
about the plague. In Hamlet it is the ghost telling 
the prince to take action. The Green Knight's "game" 
and his ability to go on living with his head severed 
form the disturbance in Sir Gawain and the Green 
Knight, In Goethe's Faust the disturbance is 
Mephisto's deal, and in Aeschylus's Agamemnon it is 
Agamemnon who causes the disruption by returning home.
The disturbance destroys a previous state of 
harmony or balance (Heggie).^ However, the initial 
state of balance can either be implied, as it is in 
"Monkey Palace", or depicted as it is in the feast 
scene from Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. Here is 
the scene just before the Green Knight bursts into the
hall;4
Thus ther stondes in stale the stif kyng hisselven,Talkande bifore the hyghe table of trifles ful hende.There gode Gawan was graythed Gwenore bisyde.And Agravayn a la dure mayn on that other syde sittes,Bothe the kynges sister sunes and ful siker knightes;Bischop Bawdewyn abof bigines the table.And Ywan, Uryn son, ette with hymselven.Thise were dight on the des and derworthly served.And sithen mony siker segge.at the sidbordes.Then the first cors come with crakkyng of trumpes,Wyth mony baner ful bryght that therbi henged;Nwe nakryn noyse with the noble pipes,Wylde werbles and wyght wakned lote.That mony hert ful highe hef at her towches.Dayntés dryven therwyth of ful dere metes,Foysoun of the fresche, and on so fele disches
 ^ For a similar idea, see Todorov 111.^ For the full effect, read also the immediately preceding lines 37-106.
3î
theme\ 19
It should be plain, from the examples I have 
given, that the potential for disturbance is inherent 
in the situation— in the equilibrium itself— before the 
disturbance occurs. In "Monkey Palace" a state of 
harmony is implied which the king disturbs by proposing 
the contest of presents. However, the king's
That pine to fynde the place the peple biforne For to sette the sylveren that sere sewes halden on clothe.Iche lede as he loved hymselve Ther laght withouten lothe;Ay two had disches twelve.Good ber and bryght wyn bothe. (107-29)
uncertainty was there before his proposal. Indeed his ÿ
uncertainty makes the disturbance likely. g
I
Likewise, in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, King 
Arthur actually invites a disturbance by refusing to 
eat or drink until he hears or experiences some 
adventure which, he makes quite plain, might well be a 
matter of life and death: "in jopardé to lay, / Lede 
lif for lyf . . . "  (97-8). In addition, the lofty J
morals and general knightly excellence of Camelot at 
large and of Gawain in particular perch the hero in a 
position which will prove impossible for him to 
maintain. Indeed, it is in order to debunk Camelot's 
assumption of moral and chivalric magnificence that 
Morgan le Faye and Bertilak cook up the ruse of the 
Green Knight in the first place. Bertilak himself #
reveals this just after Gawain's humiliation: iIFor to assay the surquidre, yif hit soth were That rennes of the grete renoun of the fRounde Table. (2457-8)
4I
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In Oedipus the King, Oedipus seems to have re­
established a balance at the beginning by marrying the 
widowed queen. However, since the queen is his own 
mother, the balance is founded on error and cannot 
possibly endure for very long. It is consequently this 
state of balance itself which brings on the 
disturbance— the plague.
In Agamemnon it is true that the initial 
situation— an adulterous affair between Clytemnestra 
and Aegisthus on the eve of her husband's return— is 
certainly not tranquil; some might balk at calling so 
shaky an arrangement "balanced". Yet, stability Is hot 
what is meant by "balance". A pair of scales, for 
example, is inherently unstable. The situation is 
wrong and cannot long continue, nevertheless it is 
balanced, that is, inactive, until Agamemnon returns. 
His return upsets the balance and forces change; 
Clytemnestra and Aegisthus must act. The instability 
was inherent in the situation, but it needed the 
disturbance— Agamemnon's return— to make it active.
Likewise, in Hamlet things are rotten before the 
curtain ever rises; the crime has already been 
committed, and Hamlet is grumpy and suspicious from the 
outset. However, he has no imperative to act uhtii:the 
ghost appears. Thus, a balance, implied or depicted, 
must exist at the beginning of a story/ but it is 
likely to be precarious. ' ..g ■
Once the initial balance is broken, the story's 
action begins. This action, however, is naturally%not
 ,
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random but related directly to the disruption, 
specifically, to the problem that the disruption 
creates. It consists of the result of the disturbance 
and the force or forces working in the opposite 
direction. The problem introduced by the disruption 
and from which all the action of the story arises is 
called the active problem.^
A story may contain many problems but, typically, 
only one which causes all the action. In "Monkey 
Palace" this is not the king's uncertainty (for the 
reasons cited above) but the contest between Anthony 
and John. The monkey's proposal to Anthony introduces 
another big problem— a human mating with a monkey, and 
since this problem is perhaps more alarming than the 
twins' contest, it might seem like the story's main 
problem.6 But in fact, it is but a dilemma (to marry a 
monkey or not) that Anthony encounters on his way to 
solving the original problem— how to become crown 
prince. Therefore, the story does not end when the 
monkey is spectacularly transformed into a beautiful 
princess, though this may well be the emotional high 
point of the story; it ends when the original problem 
is no longer a problem: "All the monkeys newly changed 
into human beings hailed Anthony as their king, John 
inherited his father's kingdom, and everybody lived in
^ Adapted from Heggie's concept of the "active question" which he defines as "the protagonist's super- objective in the form of a question".^ For a Chinese folktale on the problem of monkeys mating with humans, see Eberhard's translation,"Die grausame Affenmutter" ["The Cruel Monkey Mother"], 17- 20.
- r t i  A ' À 1  1 -A.}, ■ A ' î A î ' ; .-rs j v " . '  - i v ;  ..i.-i',
theme\ 22
peace and harmony" (Calvino 225). Anthony's struggle 
to become crown prince must be the active problem 
because it is the only problem that accounts for all 
the action in the story.
I would like to use the term "situation" to 
designate the initial balance, disturbance, and active 
problem combined. "Situation" refers to all that has 
transpired in a story up to the point at which the 
protagonist must take action against the active 
problem. Thus, situation is a part of the action, 
referring to the acts, events, and conditions of the 
story's beginning. For instance, the situation of 
"Monkey Palace" is the king's uncertainty as to which 
son is heir, the suddenly competitive relationship 
between the two sons, and the contest of presents.
What the protagonist is trying to achieve by 
attempting to change the situation is called his super- 
objective (Heggie).? The prefix "super" is to 
distinguish it from his or her other minor objectives 
that change from scene to scene. For example, in 
"Monkey Palace" Anthony's super-objective is to become 
crown prince. An objective is to find a bride.
Gawain's super-objective is to stay alive. Dimitri's 
super-objective in The Brothers Karamazov is to win 
Grushenka. It is not Macbeth's super-objective to kill 
Duncan. If it were, the play would be over in the 
second act. The super-objective must span the entire
^ For a closely related use of the term, see Stanislavsky 271-80.
■ j
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action of the story. Thus, Macbeth's super-objective 
is to become and remain king.
The active problem can only be resolved through 
action. In this thesis "action" is used in two senses. 
The first is Aristotle's sense, designating the concept 
of the complete form of what happens (39; ch. 7). It 
is roughly synonymous with the common usage of "story". 
The second is as a collective noun meaning the events 
that occur in a story, usually the acts taken by the 
characters. "Act", on the other hand, applies only to 
those doings performed by characters that either 
complicate or work towards resolving the active 
problem.8 Acts always deal directly with it or its 
consequences. For example, Anthony riding off to look 
for a bride and his agreement to the marriage proposal 
are acts.
Doings unrelated to the active problem can be 
called "behaviour" (Heggie). Anthony's game of bridge
8 Adapted from Heggie's definition of action: "Accomplishing tasks in pursuit of the super­objective . "
on his first night in the monkey kingdom, for example, |
is behaviour. Presumably Anthony's objective in 
playing bridge is to win or to divert himself. The 
bridge game does not deal with the active problem in
any way and does not affect the resolution.
Speeches and dialogue are acts when they 
complicate or help resolve the active problem, Mark
Antony's famous speech to the plebeians in Julius 
Caesar (3.2.78-234), for example, is an act not because
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the plebeians subsequently attack Caesar's assassins, 
but because it is an attempt to manipulate the crowd 
against the conspirators and thereby complicates the 
active problem of the play. Thus, Mark Antony's speech I
would have been an act even had it failed to incite the 
crowd.
On the other hand, the thoughts and opinions of 
the characters are not acts, because by themselves they 
cannot complicate or resolve the active problem. They 
may certainly give us insight into a character or into 
the reasons for his acts. Nevertheless, because on 
their own they cannot affect the outcome, they are 
inactive. For example, Hamlet discovers Claudius 
praying alone and unprotected. He makes to kill him.
Then all of a sudden it occurs to him that if he kills 
Claudius in the midst of his prayers, the king will not 
go to hell. Hamlet hates Claudius and wants him to go 
to hell, so he decides to wait until he can kill 
Claudius when the king is in a state of sin. He puts 
away his weapon and passes on, leaving his uncle |Iunmolested. Now, the reasons for which Hamlet decides ii
not to kill Claudius are extremely interesting, but 
they are irrelevant to the action of the play; his 
reasons themselves do not affect that action. Hamlet 
could have given a different reason for not killing 
Claudius without changing the outcome in the slightest.
And indeed, Shakespeare offers no guarantee that the 
motives Hamlet gives are his actual motives. The 
reasons he gives could, for example, be an elaborate
%  -- ' ' '
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process of self-delusion by which he hides his own 
indecisiveness from himself. And, in fact, one could 
think of any number of other interpretations. A 
different motive for Hamlet's forbearance would, of 
course, change the play and perhaps some of the 
impressions that it makes as well. However, what
matters in terms of the action is the act of passing on
and leaving Claudius alive. Of course it would be 
foolish to conclude that Hamlet need have no reason at
all for not killing Claudius just as long as he does
not actually do it. It is important that Hamlet give 
some reason for passing on so that his acts appear 
comprehensible and "necessary". The second and third 
chapters contain fuller discussions of motivations as 
part of the cause-and-effect sequence. The point here 
is that just what the reasons are do not particularly 
matter in terms of action, because the disturbance can 
only be solved through acts not through thoughts.
The foregoing terms and concepts are clearly 
illustrated in another old folktale known as "The Happy 
Man's Shirt". A certain king has a son who is 
completely unhappy. No one including the prince 
himself can figure out why. Neither can anyone do 
anything to relieve his melancholy. The king offers 
his son a wife, plays, balls, concerts, singing, and so 
forth, all to no avail. The king sends out a decree 
over all the world asking for wise men to come and 
advise him. The wise men gather and after much 
consultation tell the king he must find a truly happy j
1
^ For a Scottish analogue, see "The Happy Man's Shirt", Williamson and Williamson 86-92.
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man and have his son exchange shirts with him. The Â
king's henchmen scour the earth looking for a truly 
happy man. First they bring in a priest. But when the 
king offers to make him his bishop, the priest accepts, 
betraying the fact that he is not truly happy. Next
the king's men find a neighbouring king who seems like ^
a happy man because he has everything. But it turns 
out he is worried about dying and having to leave all 3his possessions. The henchmen return empty-handed. /
In desperation the king goes out hunting and 
wounds a hare. As he chases it, he hears a man singing 
so merrily at his work that he thinks he has surely 
come across a happy man. He offers the man all the 
wealth and power in his kingdom, which the man refuses, 
saying he is completely happy just as he is. Unable to 
contain himself, the king rips open the man's cloak to 
get at his shirt. But to his amazement, the happy man 
has no shirt (Calvino 117-1 9 ).^
In this tale the disturbance, of course, is the 
prince's unhappiness. However, the king is the |
-Iprotagonist as he is the one who acts to find a way to 
resolve the problem. First he throws parties and 
balls, then he calls together the wise men. He sends 
out his ambassadors to find a truly happy man. None of 
this works, so he goes hunting.
The hunting trip might at first seem like 
behaviour since the king seems to be abandoning the
t
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problem. But it is on the hunt that he discovers the 
happy man, and this discovery brings about the 
resolution— such as it is. Thus, "The Happy Man's 
Shirt" consists entirely of action. It contains no 
"behaviour" and no event could be removed without 
damaging the plot.
A much more complex story is Chaucer's Knight's 
Tale* Here the disturbance is the appearance of 
Emelye. It is not the complaint of the mourning women 
to Theseus. The first 150 or so lines of the poem that 
include this incident are not part of the complete 
unified action. They do not deal with the active 
problem: two men in love with the same woman. They 
deal with Creon's mistreatment of the mourners' dead— a 
problem which, in fact, does not belong to the same 
action.
Before Emelye's appearance, the two friends, 
Palamon and Arcite, are merely languishing in a prison 
tower without ransom. The situation is balanced and 
thus dramatically inactive: "This passeth yeer by yeer 
and day by day" (103 3). Then one morning Palamon spies 
Emelye, the Duke's sister-in-law, through the prison 
window. He is so smitten by her beauty he thinks she 
must be a goddess. Arcite, looking to see for himself, 
also falls instantly in love with Emelye. The two 
friends quarrel over her, each arguing he has the 
better right to claim her as his lady. However, they 
cannot do anything about it because they are locked up
See Aristotle 40; ch. 8.
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in a tower. No amount of love proclamations or fine
speech-making can resolve the problem or even change ?ithe situation. Arcite himself comments on the futility SIof their quarrel: $
We stryve as dide the houndes for the |boon ;They foughte al day, and yet hir part was Inoon. STher cam a kyte, whil that they were so wrothe,And baar awey the boon bitwixe hem bothe. (1177-80)
As Arcite realises, their situation borders on the
ridiculous because neither one of them can act. And
indeed the story could not continue unless they somehow
became capable of acting. Only through action can
either one succeed or fail. As Aristotle puts it:
Tragedy is a representation not of people as such but of actions and life, and both happiness and unhappiness rest on action. (37; ch. 6)
The rest of the story's action is as follows: at 
the request of a friend Theseus suddenly releases 
Arcite but decrees he must never again set foot in 
Athens on pain of death. Arcite returns home but longs 
only for Emelye. In a dream a god visits him and tells 
him to return to Athens, where Emelye awaits him.
Arcite goes back to Athens disguised as a commoner and 
works as one of Emelye's servants. Palamon escapes 
from prison, and the two meet and fight a duel.
Theseus interrupts them and sets up a tournament to 
decide the dispute once and for all. The heroes offer 
prayers to the gods. Arcite defeats Palamon in the
C M - ' - - - - - - - - - -
For a well-argued explanation of Chaucer's "episodic" structure and his tales' "public" nature, see Koff 11-36. See also Jordan 77-98 for a discussion of "disunity" in Chaucer with special reference to 
Parliament of Fowls.
theme\ 29 1fight but falls from his horse and dies. Theseus gives ?
Emelye to Palamon.
Arcite's first act is to return to Athens.
Palamon's first act is to escape from prison. But the 
first act of the story, excepting the disturbance, is I
Theseus's decision to release and banish Arcite. It 
both works in the direction of a resolution, by giving 
Arcite the power to act, and complicates the active 
problem for Arcite by making it extremely dangerous for 
him to approach his goal— Emelye.
By contrast, the relatively long "Philostrate" 
episode about Arcite's life as Emelye's servant (1413- 
45) counts entirely as behaviour, because Arcite's 
actual presence in Athens does not affect the outcome.
He is never recognised nor ever declares his love to é
Emelye. Its only active purpose is to bring Arcite,
Palamon, and Theseus into the same vicinity so as to 
set up the duel scene in the forest. However, the 
story-teller could have accomplished the same purpose 
by, for example, having Arcite merely set out for 
Athens. He could then stop in the woods to rest and 
there meet Palamon. All of the rest of the Philostrate 
story could be done away with without affecting the 
action in any way.^l
The end of a story comes soon after the resolution 
of the active problem. Typically (though not always).
  T 'Cl-
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Adapted from Heggie's definition of climax; "The last, biggest, riskiest action of the protagonist." See also Dürrenmatt 1; 193.
the situation is shown to move back into some sort of 
balance, however uneasy. Resolution of the active 
problem means that the protagonist has got to do the 
thing he most dreaded (e.g. Gawain must keep his 
appointment with the Green Knight), or that he comes 
into a final confrontation with the forces that oppose 
him (e.g. Marlow finally reaches the Inner Station).
In either case what the protagonist most values (within 
the bounds of the story) must be at risk before the 
story can end. Naturally resolution has nothing to do J
with whether or not he is successful.
The resolution and thus the end cannot come until 
the stakes are as high as possible, that is, until all 
aspects of the active problem hang in the balance.
For instance, at the beginning of Part Two of the 
Knight's Tale Palamon has escaped from prison and is 
hiding in the forest near Athens. Arcite chances into 
the same wood and the two set up their fight to the 
finish. Ostensibly one or the other of them is going 
to die. Yet no matter what the outcome, this duel 
could by no means be the end of the story because it 
does not resolve all aspects of the active problem. At 
this point Palamon and Arcite are only fighting to get 
each other out of the way. Emelye is not yet the prize 
for victory. The winner would still have to find a way 
to get her. This would still be nearly impossible with 
the circumstances as they are at this point. The form
- " - ^ .-.’J- i.. Ji V.-.’ • r . . ■ • ' ' L, I.'
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of the story would also change from that of a love 
triangle to that of a hero overcoming a series of |
obstacles before attaining his goal. His rival, then, 4
instead of forming the whole problem, as he does in the |
Knight's Tale, would simply be one of several 
obstacles. It is only when Theseus proposes the 
tournament with Emelye as the prize that all aspects of 
the active problem stand to be resolved. Arcite and 
Palamon no longer simply fight to eliminate each other; 
they fight for Emelye. The scene in the forest thus 
cannot resolve the active problem. It can, however, 
compound the stakes. Because Duke Theseus makes all 
aspects of the active problem dependent on the 
tournament, the next meeting of the two rivals can be 
the decisive one.
The end follows the resolution naturally because 
the active problem ceases, for whatever the reason, to 
be a problem. In "Monkey Palace" the active problem 
is; Which twin ought to be crown prince? In the 
resolution, Anthony's bride reveals she is giving 
Anthony her own kingdom as dowry, so the problem ceases 
to be a problem, and the story calls for nothing 
further. The last line, "John inherited his father's 
kingdom and everybody lived in peace and harmony"
(Calvino 222) , confirms that balance has been restored.
As noted above, "Monkey Palace" does not end when the 
monkey bride miraculously turns into a beautiful 
princess. Although this is arguably the climax of the 
story and solves a big worry, it leaves the active
•■-ijiîi:
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problem unresolved, and the story must continue. 
Similarly, Agamemnon ends when the disturbance—  
Agamemnon— has been destroyed and the situation returns 
to a (very uneasy) balance.
By contrast, the Knight's Tale does not end with 
Arcite's death. The Knight's Tale is, of course, not 
"The Tragedy of Arcite". His death makes the 
resolution of the active problem possible, but the 
problem is only finally resolved when Theseus gives 
Emelye to Palamon in marriage.
Due perhaps to the influence of the novel, there 
exists a certain expectation in many minds that a story 
centre on a character rather than on an action and 
hence another expectation that the end of the story 
centre on the final fate of the main character. But in 
terms of plot-structure, the protagonist's fate is 
merely incidental. A story is the record of action 
resulting from a disturbance, not the record of a 
character's life or death. Hence, to cite one of many 
possible examples, we do not find out how Odysseus dies 
in Homer's Odyssey because his death does not belong to 
the story, i.e. not to the action.
Aristotle identifies six essential elements of the 
tragedy: plot-structure, character, style, thought, 
spectacle, and lyric poetry. Of these, only the first 
four belong to a discussion of stories in general; the 
other two apply exclusively to the tragedy. Style also 
has little bearing on the subject of this thesis.
In this connection see Aristotle 40; ch. 8.
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Character and thought, however, deserve attention 
because both of them are frequently treated as if they 
were more important elements of a story, especially of 
"literary" stories, than plot-structure.
Indeed, Aristotle's blunt assertion that action is 
more important than character has caused much heated 
dispute. However, most of the arguments and counter-
Iarguments seemed to have missed Aristotle's point. As '
Butcher observed: j
liThe question . . .  is not whether one element [i.e *plot-structure] can, in logical analysis, be shown |ultimately to contain the other [i.e. character]; twe have rather to ask which of the two is the more ifundamental as regards the . . . dramatic structure of a play. (348)
If the problem is looked at in this way, plot-structure 
is obviously the more fundamental. According to the 
definitions above, a story results from activity (a 
disturbance, for example,) and not from the qualities 
of the characters, since a character's qualities alone 
can neither set in motion nor change events. It is in 
this sense that action takes precedence over character.
This is not to overlook the importance of 
characters as sources of action. Naturally, an action 
requires an agent. But is an agent the same thing as a 
character? An agent may function quite effectively 
with no more "characterization" than his or her name or 
designation; the sister, John, the man in the field.
This fact alone would seem to make Aristotle's point.
Still, it has been argued that the mere naming of a 
imaginary being is characterization. But it would be
4IÏ'à
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while men do have certain qualities by virtue of their character, it is in their actions that they achieve, or fail to achieve, happiness. (37; ch. 
6)
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hard to think of a weaker or more nebulous way to 
characterise. What does "John" tell us about a 
character except, presumably, his gender? j
Of course, many readers may prefer stories with 
detailed and individuated characters. Many readers may 
find such characters fascinating and derive much 
enjoyment from reading about their opinions and 
mannerisms and physical features and so on.
Nevertheless, even in such stories, it is only the 
characters' acts, what they do, that make any 
difference in the outcome of the active problem.
Aristotle argues that acts are more important to a '-i
story than characterization because, he asserts, 
tragedy is a mimesis of life, and;
i
J
4
Whether or not one agrees with Aristotle's 
understanding of life and "mimesis", it is self-evident 
that in a story only acts, not the qualities of the 
agents, will be capable of bringing the situation back “4
to a final state of balance in the aftermath of the 
disturbance.
Similarly, plot-structure takes precedence over 
thought. "Thought" is used by Aristotle to designate 
"passages where people [i.e. characters] show that 
something is or is not the case, or present some 
universal proposition" (38; ch. 6). In this thesis, 
the sense of thought in Aristotle's usage is maintained
1
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but also extended to include any discursive, 
contemplative (as opposed to narrative) or abstract 
passage in a story. For example, Marlow's comments 
about the Romans in Britain at the beginning of Heart 
of Darkness (30-2, pt. 1) or Theseus's "Firste Moevere" 
speech at the end of the Knight's Tale (2987-3 069) 
belong in the category of thought. Since thought, by 
this definition, is inactive, it obviously can neither 
create nor resolve a course of events by itself.
Neither can thought be regarded as being somehow the 
content of the story and plot-structure as being 
primarily the means by which this content is conveyed. 
Plot-structure is both the form and the content of a 
story. I
Care must be taken not to confuse thought with the 
term "theme". Thought is different from theme in that 
thought is expressed directly and abstractly by 
characters, narrator, or author on any number of 
subjects which may or may not bear on the action, while a
theme is always directly related to action. Indeed, |
theme arises out of the action. Although aspects of 
theme may also be explicitly expressed here and there 
in the language of the story, theme can only be found 
in the total Gestalt of the plot-structure.
For example, if I make up my mind to write a tale 
of great importance and then seize upon the two themes 
"faithfulness" and "fear of death", I obviously have 
not by any means devised a story. For, as Kundera 
points out, "themes are worked out steadily within and
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jby the story" (Art 83). However, if I create a 
situation in which the hero stands to be killed if he 
keeps a promise, the faithfulness/fear-of-death theme 
is built into my story automatically. It is implicit 
in my opening situation.
As used in this thesis, theme means, then, 
paraphrasing Kundera, an existential inquiry into 
certain key words or into the opposition of such words 
as expressed through the action (Art 84-5). 4
Theme, like thought and character, continues to 
receive relatively more scholarly attention than it 
warrants. It is often studied and discussed in the -4
greatest abstraction almost as though it existed 
independently of the plot-structure from which, for the 
reader at any rate, it logically arises. This 
inflation of theme's importance is a great obstacle 
blocking the way to grasping a story's plot-structure 
and its means of unity, and thus to an understanding of 
the story. It is therefore necessary to make the 
relationships and distinctions between theme and plot- 
structure as clear as possible before proceeding any 
further.
Most of the rest of this chapter is concerned with 
the intricate relationship between action and theme.
It defines theme at length by way of several stories, 
most particularly the Knight's Tale, Sir Gawain and the 
Green Knight,, and Heart of Darkness. It argues that 
theme, by nature, is interrogative rather than 
declarative, demonstrates how theme can be found in the
 ..............
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answer to the active question, and shows that the 
active question, in turn, depends upon the conditions 
of the situation. Finally, it examines an exception to 
these models which raises important questions about the 
structuring of action.
Theme as the Result of Action
The themes of "The Happy Man's Shirt" are 
happiness and searching. I have not arbitrarily chosen 
these words, nor arrived at them by any process of 
critical "interpretation".^^ Rather, they follow 
naturally and unequivocally from the initial situation 
and the action: the king's super-objective is happiness 
for his son, and the acts he performs in order to 
achieve it, taken together, constitute a search.
A set of opposing themes in Sir Gawain and the 
Green Knight would be "fear of death" versus 
^*trawthe^^ Again, these are concepts arising out of
the action. The moment the Green Knight picks up his 
head, the price of Gawain's "trawthe" becomes his own 
death. Due to the previous events of the situation, 
Gawain has promised to deliver himself into the hands 
of a knight who, as far as he knows, will chop off his
The root of "interpret" is the Latin "interpres".Its first sense is "intermediary or go-between". (The 
Concise Oxford Dictionary uses "go-between" to define "panderer".) The etymology of "interpres" itself is unclear but "perhaps connected to 'pretium'" which in the first sense means "a penalty or punishment", and in the last sense "money given or received for dishonourable purposes" ("Interpres").For a similar identification of themes, see Silverstein 278.
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head. Hence his dilemma: how to stay alive and at the 
same time keep "trawthe". All the rest of the story's 
events can be divided either into Gawain's attempts to 
keep good faith or his attempts to keep alive.
Naturally, any number of examples of stories in 
which this subordination of theme to plot-structure 
seems to be reversed spring to mind, that is, stories 
in which the author appears to have manipulated the %
plot so as to illustrate a certain predetermined theme.
Indeed, is it ever possible to tell if the plot- 
structure created the theme or the theme created the 
plot-structure, to know which is the chicken and which 
the egg?
If the question is which came first in a 
particular author's mind, we certainly have to admit 
that we as readers do not know unless the author has 
given some sort of indication in writings apart from 
the story proper. Beyond that, one can only 
hypothesise that a preconceived theme (granted the 
author had such) and the plot-structure changed and 
refined each other symbiotically in the process of 
writing and rewriting.
For the reader, however, theme inevitably comes 
through action. Theme expressed otherwise is 
secondary. For example, if, at the beginning of Sir 
Gawain and the Green Knight, the author had written a 
foreword stating that the story's theme was man's 
rebellion against the indifferent universe, this would 
not change the story's themes in the slightest. So 1
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long as the action remained the same, the essential
themes would not be rebellion against an indifferent
universe but still "trawthe" and fear of death. For
the same reason, even if one of the characters were to
speak at length about man's rebellion against the
indifferent universe, the themes would still be
"trawthe" and fear of death (although such a speech
might well change the context and the reader's final
evaluation of the story).
Furthermore, in purely practical terms, the first
requirement of a story is that it hold the reader's or
listener's interest. This is essential if the story is
to grip the audience at once and prevent it from
turning to something more interesting. From the
beginning a story must so captivate the readers or
hearers that they must find nothing in the world as
interesting as that story at that moment. If the story
does not do so and the audience wanders away to
something more interesting, the story is a failure no
matter how profound its t h e m e s . indeed, Aristotle
goes so far as to assert that the plot-structure should
even captivate people who only hear about the plot
second-hand:
For the plot-structure ought to be so composed that, even without seeing a performance, anyone who hears the events which occur will experience terror and pity as a result of the outcome. (45; ch. 14)
16 For a related argument, see Koff 79.
.41
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Consequently, even in cases where an author does
start from some great theme that he or she wants to
explore by means of a story, he or she will inevitably
have to devise a situation from which those questions
will arise by, at the latest, the onset of the
disturbance or else risk losing the audience. To quote
Aristotle again:
Furthermore, if a poet strings together speeches to illustrate character, even allowing he composes them well in style and thought, he will not achieve the stated aim of tragedy. Much more effective will be a play with a plot and structure of events, even if it is deficient in style and thought. (38; ch. 6)
Milan Kundera's novel, The Unbearable Lightness of 
Being, offers a helpful illustration of this principle.
The first two chapters of the book deal exclusively 
with thought. They contain not even a scrap of a plot 
nor a single character. However, discursively they 
raise the themes of part 1 of the novel: Do our actions 
in life have any significance, any weight? Are they
heavy or "unbearably light"? "Which one is positive, ,:|
weight or lightness?" (Being 3-5).
The narrative, on the other hand, first begins in 
chapter 3 with the introduction of Tomas, the main 
character, at the onset of the disturbance as follows
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(Tomas has had a short fling with a woman, Tereza, for
whom he now feels an inexplicably strong love):
Standing by the window, he looked out over the courtyard at the walls opposite him and deliberated.Should he call her back to Prague for good? He feared the responsibility. If he invited her to come, then come she would, and offer him up her life. (Being 6)
He cannot decide whether to commit himself to 
Tereza or not. This is the novel's active problem, and 
its connection to the themes made explicit in chapters 
1 and 2 is clear enough. The important point is that 
in chapters 1 and 2 the problem is abstract and 
passive. It can be discussed and considered, but no |
decision need be made. In chapter 3, and more 
especially in chapter 4, the problem becomes concrete 
and active, because Tereza shows up on Tomas's 
doorstep. Now he must decide. He must act. And, in 
contrast to the theme exploration in the first two 
chapters, whatever Tomas does now will bear |Iconsequences, will make him, in short, either happy or #
miserable. When the narrative gets going, the theme ?!!questions become more vital, since something— namely,
Tomas's happiness--is now at risk. Hence the action 
chapters are more compelling, more "effective", as 
Aristotle puts it, than the first two chapters of agile 
and recondite thought in which nothing is at risk.
Thus, regardless of the sequence of composition or 
narration, for the reader, theme inevitably becomes
vital through action. J
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Heart of Darkness provides a final example of how 
theme grows from action. As is well known, there are 
any number of differing opinions as to the themes of 
Heart of Darkness. Quite a few of them take Kurtz as |
somehow forming the thematic key to the tale. Leaving 
aside the question of whether this is true or not, it 
certainly is an odd notion considering how little Kurtz 
appears in the action.
Jacques Berthoud's Joseph Conrad: The Major Phase 
is a typical example of this kind of thinking. Despite 
admirable sophistication, his interpretation exhibits 
the consequences of abstracting thought from its 
narrative context. Berthoud, like many others, devotes 
most of his critical attention to Kurtz's thought or to 
Marlow's thought about Kurtz and thereby overlooks most 
of the action of the story (which, of course, belongs J
to Marlow, not Kurtz)— as if the action were merely a 
platform from which Kurtz and Marlow can deliver 
speeches. Consequently, Berthoud's interpretation of 
theme is preoccupied with the such things as the "hold 
of civilization", "the consequences of abstracting men 
from their native contexts", and so forth (45).
This kind of interpretation slights not only the 
action, which, after all, is immensely entertaining and 
exciting, but also the intellectual power of Conrad's 
themes. For that power can hardly reside in the 
story's vague and muddled passages of thought. Rather, 
it grows from the drama of what happens.
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In Heart of Darkness it is the themes "work” and 
"savagery"— the savagery of the wilderness, of the 
blacks and of the whites— which make up the story's 
thematic conflict. If this assertion is true, these 
themes must be in clear conflict throughout the entire 
action.
And indeed they are. Their opposition and
centrality is made crystal clear, even before the
action begins, in Marlow's preface to his story-~his
speculations about the ancient Roman colonisers Xof^
England. It is a kind of concentration of the istorÿ^^
is about to tell;
"What saves us is efficiency— the devotion to efficiency. But these chaps [the Romans] were not much account, really. They were no colonists; their administration was merely a squeeze» and nothing more, I suspect. They were conquerors, and for that you want only brute force. . . . Itwas just robbery with violence." (31; pt. 1)
On the one hand Marlow sets efficiency or work and on 
the other hand "brute force" and "robbery with', 
violence"— which I have abridged, for the sake of 
convenience, as "savagery".
Next, as Marlow begins his voyage aboard the 
French ship, it is "the idleness of a passenger" that 
first begins to sever him from "the truth of things" - 
(40; pt. 1; emphasis added). It creates a "mournful 
and senseless delusion", he says. This feeling is at 
once contrasted with the vigorous health of the hard­
working rowers in boats from the shore:
A
A)
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"You could see from afar the white of their eyeballs glistening. They shouted, sang; their bodies streamed with perspiration . . . they had bone, muscle, a wild vitality, an intense energy of movement. . . . They were a great comfort to look at. For a time I would feel I belonged still to a world of straight-forward facts." (40; pt.l)
Marlow condemns the Company men, on the other
hand, for their craving to get rich by stealing—  J
without working in other words:
"The only real feeling was a desire to get appointed to a trading post where ivory was to be had, so that they could earn percentages. They intrigued and slandered and hated each other only on that account— but as to effectually lifting a little finger— oh, no." (54; pt. 1)
Confronted by the savagery of the Company as well
as that of the wilderness, Marlow tries to puzzle out
what it is that can hold a person from turning into a
savage in the heart of darkness, in the "utter solitude
without a policeman . . . where no warning voice of a
kind neighbour can be heard whispering of public
opinion" (85; pt. 2). He concludes, significantly, it
is "the faith in your ability for the digging of
unostentatious holes . . . your power of devotion, not
to yourself, but to an obscure, back-breaking business"
(86, pt. 2)— to work, in other words.
And work is exactly what Marlow does to keep
himself human— he dredges up the sunken river boat,
repairs its ripped hull, and makes it run again:
"I went to work . . . turning, so to speak, my back on that station. In that way only it seemed to me I could keep my hold on the redeeming facts of life." (52; pt. 2)
À-1;Î
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Likewise, it is significant that, although Marlow
affirms Kurtz was a remarkable man because in his last
moment "he had something to say" (i.e. "The horror!",
112; pt 3), Marlow is not prepared to admit Kurtz was
worth even the loss of a rather unremarkable helmsman's
life. But in what sense could the helmsman have been
of greater worth than the multi-talented genius, Kurtz?
Marlow tell his listeners:
"Perhaps you will think it passing strange, this regret for a savage who was of no more account than a grain of sand in a black Sahara. Well, don't you see, he had done something, he had steered." (87; pt. 2; emphasis added.)
The helmsman's great worth is that he had done 
something; he had worked. But of Kurtz, Marlow says, 
on the other hand, that he "had never imagined him as 
doing, you know, but as discoursing" (83; pt. 2). The 
helmsman had laboured, had done a necessary, if humble, 
job; Kurtz "was very little more than a voice" (84; pt. 
2).
Most remarkably of all, Marlow gives two reasons 
for embarking on the journey in the first place, and 
they correspond exactly to the themes identified in the 
action. Marlow goes to Africa because he wanted work 
and because he was fascinated by the mystery, by the 
"darkness" of the region, by the wildness and all that 
goes with it, by savagery in other words, by "the 
fascination of the abomination . . ." (31; pt. 1). It
is these two theme, then— work and savagery— which run 
through the entire action.
theme\ 46
4!
Theme as a Question
It might be objected that the themes I have 
discovered are too general and vague in every case to
be useful. They say nothing about the meaning of the |
action. Indeed they do not. A theme is not a
statement but a question. The action of a story asks
what its themes mean. It explores the themes; it does j
not make declarative or conclusive statements about
them. For example, Sir Gawain and the Green Knight
does not declare that Gawain is guilty or not guilty of
breaking his "trawthe". As Davenport astutely observes
in The Art of the Gawain-Poet:
There is no insistence . . . that one should see the tale as illustrative of a moral maxim. Anysense of exemplification is only in what the
reader may discern in the working out of the fable. (136; emphasis added)
The tale poses the question of Gawain's guilt or 
innocence to the reader.
Theme questions, then, are posed through the 
action, and action itself does not draw any 
conclusions. If the reader nevertheless insists on 
conclusions, as Brooks points out, it will have to be 
up to him or her "to assemble the elements of the 
narrative and determine what they mean" (33). In his 
explication of Aristotle's view of the same subject 
Halliwell writes, "Universels [i.e. general insights 
into the nature of things] are implicit in poetic
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drama, but they are not there as a subject for
assertion or firm belief" (Commentary 109).
"The Happy Man's Shirt" provides a particularly
good example both of how themes are worked out in
action and of the questioning nature of themes. The
story's disturbance raises two questions. The first is
an active question: How will the prince become happy?
The second is a theme-guestion resulting from the
first: What makes people happy? The answer to the
second question, according to the wise men, is utterly
simple and clear: A happy man's shirt. The active
question, on the other hand, is never answered.
Indeed, the story does not have an end, according to
the definition given earlier, in that the active
problem is not resolved. Nevertheless, "The Happy
Man's Shirt" is effective as a story because it uses
this lack of resolution to call into question the easy
solution of the wise men. Consequently, it plants
further questions in the reader's mind about its theme-
word: happiness. It is an example of what Kundera
calls the "wisdom of the novel", which is, by
extension, the wisdom of the story in general:
A novel does not assert anything; a novel searches and poses questions. . . . The wisdom of the novel comes from having a question for everything, . . . The novelist teaches the reader to comprehend the world as a question. (Forgetting 237)
Naturally, it is possible to try and determine 
exactly what the surprise ending of "The Happy Man's 
Shirt" is supposed to mean: You cannot find happiness
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by setting out to look for it, or Happiness eludes us, 
or You cannot get happiness from someone else. But to 
make such statements is to say more— and at the same 3
time much less— than "The Happy Man's Shirt" does. An 
action does not answer life's problems, it dramatises 
them.
Theme in the Answer to the Active Question
A story's themes are often already apparent in the 
situation, as illustrated by the case of Sir Gawain and 
the Green Knight, And in every case the situation, 
that is, the action at the story's beginning, greatly |
affects, if it does not determine outright, the theme.
As a further illustration, I shall consider how themes 
are determined by the situation in the Knight's Tale.
As with Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, I shall look 
first of all at the disturbance, since this is the 
point where the active problem is introduced and where 
the conflict becomes clear.
In the Knight's Tale the disturbance occurs when 
Emelye shows up. Note that the disturbance could not 
be the imprisonment ofArcite and Palamon— no action 
follows from it. Furthermore, for all the reader knows 
their imprisonment is a restorationf not a disturbance, 
of order— maybe they deserve to be there. In any case, 
their imprisonment is not the disturbance but the 
initial balance. Things get going only because Arcite 
and Palamon both fall in love with the same woman.
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This state of affairs, as everyone recognises, cannot 
continue. It must change. Says Theseus: 1"Ye woot yourself she may nat wedden twoAtones, though ye tighten everemo.That oon of you, al be hym looth or lief.He moot go pipen in an yvy leef;This is to seyn, she may nat now han bothe."(1835-9) ii
And yet it is impossible for either hero willingly to 
give her up. For both of them the thing is a matter of 
life and death.
Palamon: "My lady, whom I love and serve.And evere shal til that myn herte sterve."(1143-4)Arcite: "Syn that I may nat seen you Emelye,I nam but deed; ther nys no remedye."(1273-4)
This situation is, of course, the ubiquitous love 
triangle. It builds tragedy, or at least conditions 
for tragedy, into the plot right from the beginning 
since it leaves no way for everybody to get what he or 
she wants. Someone has to lose. This is, in fact, the 
same predicament as in "Monkey Palace". Just as 
Anthony and John desired the same kingdom, so Palamon 
and Arcite desire the same woman. In "Monkey Palace" 
the problem was resolved only when the object of desire 
was, in effect, duplicated: Anthony's bride had a spare 
kingdom on her hands. Both sons were satisfied, but 
only because they no longer wanted exactly the same 
thing. Anthony ceased to care about his father's 
kingdom. The situation changed, in other words. Had 
it remained the same, someone would have to have lost.
'loSp     " •   - -- --  .
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and there would have been no happy ending. In the 
Knight's Tale, of course, the situation does not 
change. To the last Arcite and Palamon still want the 
same thing— Emelye— and there cannot be two Emelyes.
Thus, the situation stipulates, there will have to be 
one less hero. jl
Tension and suspense build immediately from this 
kind of beginning. Someone has to lose, but who will 
it be and how? Furthermore, the disturbance in the 
Knight's Tale has disrupted order in two other ways.
First, it breaks a bond of loyalty since Palamon and 
Arcite are cousins and, additionally, brothers "ysworn 
ful depe" (1132), bound to help each other. Instead of 
this, they do their utmost to destroy each other.
Second, it ruptures the peace and order of Theseus's 
realm (which keeps him busy trying to moderate and 
regulate the controversy right to the end). Theseus is 
absolutely right to view the two crazed lovers as a 
threat. They feel their passion sets them above all 
law, as Arcite asks bluntly:
"'who shal yeve a lovere any lawe?'Love is a gretter lawe, by my pan.Than may be yeve to any erthely man;And therefore positif lawe and swich decree Is broken al day for love in ech degree." >1!(1164-9) I
Thus, a triple-disturbance drives the Knight's Tale, 
creating and propelling all the action like a Big Bang 
in the microcosm of the story.
The active question that this triple-disturbance 
raises is not just: Who is going to win— Palamon or
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Arcite? More importantly, it is: How will the winner 
win? How will he succeed, by what merit? The answers 
to these questions, as contained in the action, are the 
themes of the story.
Normally the question of how the winner will win 
would be decided by one of the two rivals proving 
himself in some way superior to, or more deserving of 
the woman than, the other. He would be stronger, or 
more honest, or more in love, or more virtuous, and so 
forth, than the other. However, in the Knight's Tale 
the question is made especially difficult since the two 
heroes are shown to be nearly equal. Each has a case 
for being the first to love Emelye. And on the 
evidence of their duel in the forest, they seem to be 
evenly matched in strength, fighting skill, and valour. 
Each seems to suffer just as much pain for Emelye as 
the other, and both are willing to risk everything to 
win her. Even the gods argue about which one should 
prevail.
Of course Palamon and Arcite are not 
indistinguishable. For example, they pray for very 
different things. And, arguably, Palamon does seem to 
enjoy a slight edge throughout, no doubt confirmed by 
his ultimate victory. But surely an interpretation 
such as William Frost's goes far too far in claiming 
that "the heroes are significantly differentiated from 
each other and a valid preference between them is 
implied by the poem" (290). If the suitors were not 
equal (nearly) there would be no difficulty deciding
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between them. The good guy would simply wed Emelye 
after whipping the bad guy. But is the Knight's Tale a 
story about the conflict of good and evil? Clearly it 
is not.
How, then, is the problem resolved? After the 
interrupted fight to the death in the forest, Theseus 
undertakes to resolve the dispute by setting up what he 
intends to be a fair and civilised tournament with 
Emelye's hand as the prize. Under these conditions, 
the rivalry would have been decided by physical 
strength and fighting skill after all. However, during 
the prayer scene, each hero enlists the help of a 
different god. When each god, in turn, promises aid, 
the decision passes beyond the power of the human 
agents. No longer can the outcome be seen as being up 
to Palamon and Arcite; it becomes predetermined, or 
destined.
Consequently, according to the plan worked out in 
advance by Saturn, Palamon is overpowered in the event, 
and Arcite has apparently won Emelye as his wife. But 
his fatal fall from the horse decides the dispute at 
last in Palamon's favour. All of this is destiny, 
decreed by the gods, but to the characters themselves 
it looks like chance. Hence Arcite seems to have died 
and lost Emelye by a mishap (i.e. bad luck, chance), 
and the winner, Palamon, has won by what appears to all 
the characters to be chance but which, the reader is 
shown, is actually destiny.
" '  '  '
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Thus, "chance" and "destiny" become two themes of 
the Knight's Tale, for they emerge as two descriptions 
for the resolution of the active problem as well as the 
cause of many of the story's events.
Judging by the action of the Knight's Tale, there 
is finally no reasonable or knowable explanation for 
why Palamon wins and Arcite loses other than J
destiny/chance/gods. It is apparent at once that these 
themes, these answers to the active question, seem 
themselves to be more like questions than explanations, 
for, if Arcite was destined to lose, why was he 
destined to lose? However, this refusal to provide a 
final explanation is only in keeping with the inquiring 
nature of theme, and perhaps of action, itself. This 
topic will pursued further in the second chapter.
Active Question and Conditions of the Situation
With a more thorough definition of theme, and 
after a close look at examples of theme being worked 
out "within and by the story", stories with the same 
basic type of situation can now be compared. The point 
of the comparison is to see how variations in the 
conditions of the situation determine which questions 
the action is capable of posing.
For example, one might compare Sir Gawain's 
dilemma to that of Prince Myshkin in Dostoyevsky's The 
Idiot, Prince Myshkin loves both Aglaya and Nastasya 
Filipovna but cannot have both, while Gawain wants to 
keep his word and keep alive but cannot have both.
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Myshkin has a free choice between two women that he if
IIloves but does not know which choice to make. He does |
not know what to do. I
Gawain on the other hand has, in effect, no u
choice. He is bound by chivalry to keep his 
appointment with the Green Knight, and he never 
seriously considers not keeping it. Indeed the 
possibility is only even raised once when Gawain's 
guide to the Green Chapel urges Gawain to run away and 
then swears to hush the whole thing up. But Gawain 
never falters:
Bot helde thou hit never so holde, and I here passed.Founded for ferde for to fie, in fourme that thou telles,I were a knyght kowarde, I myght not be excused.(2129-31)
What Gawain should do, then, is quite clear; the 
question is whether or not he will do it.
To state the difference in other words, Myshkin 
must try to find out what is right and what it is he 
wants; the questions are: What is right? and: What does 
Myshkin really want? Gawain on the other hand must try 
to do the right; the question is: Will he be able to do 
it? Thus, conditions in the situation, in this case 
uncertainty or certainty of what is "right" on the part 
of the protagonist, determine that The Idiot is full of 
Myshkin's thoughts and inner struggles, while Sir 
Gawain and the Green Knight focuses on exterior 
struggles— Gawain's temptations and his deeds.
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This comparison can be extended by examining the 
love triangles in Dostoyevsky's novels The Idiot and 
The Brothers Karamazov and contrasting them to the love 
triangle in the Knight''s Tale, Naturally, not all of 
the differences between the three stories come from the 
differences between the three situations. For 
instance, it is a commonplace that Dostoyevsky was 
intent on understanding the souls and minds of his 
characters, their "psychological" motivations, a 
conception which is mostly absent from the Knight's 
Tale. Nevertheless, to a great degree, the depths of 
the psychological explorations within his novels are 
made possible by the extreme situations in which he 
places those characters in the first place.
In The Brothers Karamazov, for example, there are 
in fact two overlapping love triangles, not just one. 
They can be diagrammed and compared with the Knight's 
Tale as follows (solid lines indicating love, dashed 
lines rivalry):
D i m i t r i
Emelye
A r c i t e Palamon
K a t e r i n a
G ru s h e n k a
Fyod o r
Now, we know, without having to think much about 
it, that the Dimitri-Grushenka-Fyodor triangle is the
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captivated and shocked by a situation in which a father 
and his son compete so fiercely for the same woman that 
they are ready to murder each other.1? And we would 
have this reaction no matter what the characters were 
like.
In effect, this condition adds a second archetypal 
conflict— rivalry between father and son— to the first 
(the love triangle),^® The Katerina-Dimitri-Grushenka 
triangle has no such tension because Katerina Ivanovna
For a similar line of reasoning, see Holquist 176-91. See Belknap 69-70 for a short discussion of the archetypal aspect of the conflict.
main interest of the story. This is due to the ï
situation and does not result from the qualities of the 
characters. Dimitri, Grushenka, and Fyodor do not make 
an inherently more interesting trio than Katerina 
Ivanovna, Dimitri, and Grushenka. Katerina Ivanovna, 
for example, is certainly a more fully developed and 
more complex character than Fyodor. The motives behind 
her dealings with Grushenka and Dimitri, to say nothing 
of her ambiguous feelings towards Alyosha, in short her 
"psychology", are extremely complex. Yet her role in .|
the story remains secondary. What happens between her 
and Dimitri is less important than what happens, for 
example, between Dimitri and Fyodor. The reason for 
this lies not in "psychology" or character but simply 
in the circumstance that Dimitri is Fyodor's son.
This condition itself makes the situation 
inherently dramatic and compelling. We are naturally |
J
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and Grushenka have no relationship other than their 
rivalry nor any desire to kill each other. Or, to put 
it in different terms, the Dimitri-Grushenka-Fyodor 
triangle is not only impossible (two men love the same 
woman), but intolerable as well (they are father and 
son). When the two rivals in the triangle have a close 
relationship apart from rivalry (e.g. father and son, 
lord and vassal, husband and wife, two friends), the 
outcome becomes far more crucial, because the stakes 
are higher.
What must be sought are cases where suffering befalls bonded relations— when brother kills brother . . . son kills father, mother kills son, or son kills mother. (Aristotle 46; Ch. 14.)^^
In other words, such cases imbue the action with a 
universality and importance similar to that of myth. 
This is exactly the effect that Dostoyevsky has 
achieved. Bakhtin calls The Brothers Karamazov, for 
example, "a maximally intensified and universalized 
treatment of the theme of patricide" (144; emphasis 
added).
By comparison, the triangle in the Knight's Tale 
contains no such condition (e.g. no "bonded relation") 
to create further thematic complexity. It is true that 
Palamon and Arcite are cousins who have sworn 
brotherhood to each other. Nevertheless, familial 
loyalty and disloyalty do not belong to the themes of 
the story. Palamon and Arcite appear first and
See also Scholes and Kellogg 234. See also 149.
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foremost as rivals and that is the only active 
relationship they have for the reader. Although 
Palamon makes much of the sworn brotherhood during the 
situation, any sort of brotherhood quickly disappears 
from the story and is never an active force in the way 
the Fyodor-Dimitri relationship is. Why is this so?
Again the answer lies in the conditions of the 
situation. Friendship, let alone brotherhood, between 
Palamon and Arcite is not mentioned until after the 
disturbance has set them at each other's throat. They 
begin to quarrel in their very first scene. In 
addition, the first and only mention of their 
friendship and brotherhood comes as Palamon tries to 
bolster the validity of his claim to have Emelye for 
himself. Therefore this condition never really 
develops into a conflict, much less a theme. In his 
book The Birth of Expectation, Don Lepan has suggested 
that "the difference between . . . plots that are 
'adequately motivated' and plots which we feel are 
'inadequately motivated' is that in the former case 
intentions are revealed before action . . . "  (177),
The same point may be applied to the "brotherhood" of 
Palamon and Arcite in this case. We do not take it 
seriously because it comes after the fighting has 
already started. Besides, whatever Palamon says about 
friendship is as nothing compared to the enmity being 
fought out in gory detail throughout the story.
Neither is the breach of a sworn brotherhood as 
intolerable as, say, the enmity of two blood brothers
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would be. Of course it is difficult, not to say 
impossible, to know how seriously Chaucer intended 
Palamon's allusion to their oath to be taken. A sworn 
brotherhood and the duties it required no doubt meant 
more to a medieval reader than they do to a modern one. 
Still, Palamon clearly manipulates their oath of 
brotherhood to serve his own ends.
Of course no great love is ever established 
between Dimitri and Fyodor Karamazov either. But it 
does not need to be because a natural bond already 
exists in that Dimitri is Fyodor's son. Furthermore, 
Dostoyevsky takes three whole chapters detailing family 
relations among the Karamazovs, including one chapter 
exclusively about Dimitri and his father, before ever 
introducing the disturbance— their quarrel. 
Consequently, we take the conflict seriously, and it 
can stand at the centre of the plot.
The situation of the The Brothers Karamazov is 
extremely complex and includes other triangles, most 
notably a hate triangle:
F y o d o r
IvanD i m i t r i
This situation, on the first level, poses the 
question. Which brother will kill Fyodor? On a 
different level it asks the question: For what reason 
might each of the brothers murder his father? Here
theme\ 60
again the situation is inherently compelling because 
the potential killers and victim are not just any three 
men, but a father and his sons.21 Although the appeal 
of Dostoyevsky's novels is often said to lie in their 
profound grasp of human "psychology", it does not seem 
likely readers would care so much about the psychology 
of Ivan and Dimitri if they were not involved in a hate 
triangle with their father and one of them bound to 
kill him. In other words, it is because the characters 
are placed in a compelling situation involving sex and 
murder— acts— that their psychology begins to matter.22
In The Idiot the conditions of the triangular 
situation stipulate a different set of questions. As 
noted above, it presents the dilemma: Should Prince 
Myshkin marry the wicked woman he hopes he can rescue 
(Nastasya Filipovna) or the good girl who would make 
him happy (Aglaya)? The active question is: How will 
he choose the one or the other? What are his motives? 
We care about his motives because he is in a position 
in which he has to choose between two very different 
women. He has agency.
No one in the Knight's Tale is in the same 
position. Emelye has two suitors, but they are very 
much alike, and which one she will marry is not up to 
her. Palamon and Arcite have already irreversibly 
chosen Emelye, and therefore their reasons for doing so 
are peripheral. The Knight's Tale asks: Who will win
21 See Mochulsky 569 for a similar point of opinion.22 pqj- a contrasting view of situation and character, cf. Lodge 17,
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Emelye? The Idiot asks: Whom will Myshkin choose?
Consequently, The Idiot must take on the whys and 
wherefores of choice. The Knight's Tale does not 
because no one is choosing. Its situation pits two 
virtually equal contenders against one another. One 
must win and one must lose. "'Ye shul noon oother ende 
with me maken, / That oon of yow ne shal be deed or 
taken'" (1865-66). Thus, situation decides that the |
Knight's Tale deal with the mysterious how and why of 
things happening. The Idiot with the equally mysterious 
how and why of a character making a choice. Clearly it 
is the difference in the conditions of the initial 
situation— specifically the characters' ability or lack 
of ability to choose— which determines a difference in 
the theme.
Alternative Development of Action: Journey Stories
It has been demonstrated that the conditions of 
the situation determine what sort of question the 
action is capable of posing and that theme, in turn, 
can be found in the answer to this active question.
This model works well with plot-structures that have a 
clear disturbance which makes an active problem and 
poses an active question. I call this traditional and 
very prevalent type of plot-structure "dramatic"— due 
to its similarity to classical drama. Its merits are 
obvious enough from the stories discussed thus far.
Naturally, the dramatic plot-structure is not the 
only way of developing action. Aristotle, for example.
I
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refers to an "episodic" plot-structure which he 
understandably deems inferior to the dramatic because 
the order of its events "is neither probable nor 
necessary" (41; ch. 9). In the Poetics, then, there 
are plots that are unified by necessary and probable 
causation and those that are not. The next chapter 
will return to this issue.
However, it is also possible to think of story 
genres in which action, by the very nature of the 
genre, develops neither dramatically nor episodically. 
The journey story is such a genre. In the journey 
story the parameters of the action may be imprecise, 
the active question vague, and the theme unclear until 
well into the story. Nevertheless it typically still 
possesses a beginning, middle, and end and is still 
able to centre on the resolution of a problem rather 
than, say, on the life of a character, or even on the 
mere sequential recounting of what happened on the 
trip. In other words, it possesses unity of action.
In this final section of the chapter I compare and 
contrast the way in which disturbance and theme develop 
in two journey stories: Sir Gawain and the Green Knight 
and Heart of Darkness. Despite the great chronological 
distance separating them, they invite comparison, for 
they share some rather striking characteristics.
The most notable of these is the nature of the 
journey in each story. Both Gawain and Marlow leave 
civilization far behind and travel deep into a hostile 
and forbidding wilderness:
—  • ■ » y
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Rivers, streams of death in life, whose banks were rotting into mud, whose waters, thickened into slime, invaded the contorted mangroves, that seemed to writhe . . . (Darkness 41; pt. 1)
The hasel and the hawthorne were harled al samen With roghe raged mosse rayled aywhere,
Brokes byled and breke bi bonkkes aboute, Schyre schaterande on schores ther thay doun schowved.
(Gawain 744-5, 2082-3 )
Further, both Gawain and Marlow are tryihgitb fiihd 
a strange, elusive, and powerful man. Both the Greeh 
Knight and Kurtz have the power and the tendency^tp : ;
behead people. The physical search for their i yi I
antagonists leads both Gawain and Marlow to a journey , 
deep into his own heart. Both prove their courage in 
the face of violent death, and yet each finds himself 
morally lacking in the end. And in both cases this 
moral weakness comes through the telling of a lie.
Gawain and Marlow are, of course, the protagonists 
in each tale. Kurtz and the Green Knight fulfill 
similar functions as the objects towards whigh -
protagonists respectively journey. Gawain's stay at 
the castle corresponds in some respects to Marlow's J
sojourn at the Central Station, Finally, the Green 
Chapel corresponds to the Inner Station as the location
of the denouement and the "heart of darkness", so to
speak, for each protagonist.
Yet despite all these similarities, the plot- , 
structures themselves are essentially different, again 
reflecting, above all, significant differences in the 
nature of thé situations. The plot-structure of Sir
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Gawain and the Green Knight is dramatic, that of Heart 
of Darkness non-dramatic.
As noted earlier, the disturbance in Sir Gawain 
and the Green Knight can be precisely located:
If any so hardy in this hous holdes hymselven.Be so bolde in his blod, brayn in hys hede.That dar stifly strike a strok for an other,I schal gif hym of my gyft thys giserne ryche.This ax, that is heve innogh, to hondele as hym lykes.And I schal bide the fyrst bur, as bare as I sitte.If any freke be so felle to fonde that I telle, Lepe lyghtly me to, and lach this weppen—I quit-clayme hit for ever, kepe hit as his auen. And I schal stonde hym a strok, stif on this flet, Elies thou wyl dight me the dom to dele hym an other, barlay;And yet gif hym respite A twelmonyth and a day. (285-98)
Since everyone is too frightened by this "aghlich 
mayster" to stir. King Arthur himself accepts the 
challenge. Gawain, entering, significantly, the story 
for the first time in response to the disturbance, 
beseeches the king to let him play the Green Knight's 
game. The Green Knight then adds a further condition—  
that Gawain must seek him out "'whère-so thou hopes /
1 may be funde upon folde'" (395-6) and there receive 
the return blow. Gawain agrees, takes up the axe and 
chops off the Green Knight's head with a single blow. 
But to everyone's amazement, the body of the Green 
Knight simply picks up the severed head and climbs back 
into the saddle. At precisely the moment in which the 
Green Knight picks up his head the conflict is clear: 
Gawain's trawthe and life are the stakes. As Burrow
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puts it; "Once the Green Knight has survived the blow, 
it seems clear that the hero has bound himself 'by his 
seker trawthe' to seek out his own death . . . "
(25).23 Thus, Gawain's position is immediately 
desperate. The active problem comes upon him in one 
fell swoop.
In stark contrast to the situation in Sir Gawain
and the Green Knight, the conflict in Heart of Darkness
emerges very slowly. Indeed it is not at first
identifiable in the situation at all. What is Marlow
up against? Who or what is opposing him? What is at
stake? These questions cannot be answered until one
has read far into the story. Heart of Darkness does
not begin with a disturbance per se posing an active
problem. Rather, the active problem grows by degrees
out of a continuing action, and the active problem only
becomes clearly identifiable at the Central Station.
Nevertheless, as noted above, the situation does
indeed introduce a problem— lack of a job. And the
resolution of this problem— going to Africa— introduces
the thematic conflict: work versus savagery. The
situation as Marlow tells it is this:
I had . . . just returned to London after a lot of Indian Ocean, Pacific, China Seas . . . and I wasloafing about. . . .  It was very fine for a time, but after a bit I did get tired of resting. Then I began to look for a ship— I should think the hardest work on earth. But the ships wouldn't even look at me. And I got tired of that game, too. (32; pt. 1)
23 See also 23-4 and 161.
.'J .'■•'’■‘'■‘i  ^ ..... ...____ ____
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24 For a recent interpretation of this disturbance in terms of myth, see Guth 156.
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Next, Marlow happens across a map of Africa in a shop 
window. He remembers he has always wanted to go to 
Africa; since he was a boy it had seemed to him a blank 
space, ”a delightful mystery". He notices a certain 
large river "resembling an immense snake uncoiled, with 
its head in the sea. . . .  it fascinated me as a snake 
would a bird," (33; pt. 1).24 so he sets about getting 
a job as a river boat captain from the trading company 
that operates on this river.
Yet this initial problem of Marlow's is not an 
active problem by my definition because it cannot 
account for all of the story's action. And it 
certainly does not form a disturbance in the sense used 
so far. The situation does not make Marlow desperate; 
he is not caught between loss of his virtue and loss of 
his life like Gawain. He is just fed up with resting 
and with unemployment. Marlow's unemployment is a kind 
of mini-disturbance because it puts him on the road to 
the Inner Station, so to speak, where the main conflict 
becomes clear.
To put it another way, unlike Gawain, Marlow has 
no super-objective at this point in the story. The 
objectives resulting from the situation— find work, get
to Africa— he accomplishes relatively quickly. It is
1obvious they can in no way account for the entire
action of the story. Nevertheless, this situation does !
start Marlow moving gradually into a situation that
1
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becomes more and more unpleasant and corrupt and that
will have become intolerable and require action by the
time he has reached the Central Station.
This progression can be traced as follows. It
begins when, after securing a post with the Company,
Marlow travels to the continent to meet his employers.
The city there seems to him "a whited sepulchre" (35).
At the Company headquarters he runs into the two dark
and menacing knitting women and is examined by a
somewhat sinister doctor. "I began to feel slightly
uneasy", he says, and "An eerie feeling came over me"
(36, 37; pt. 1). Approved for the journey, Marlow sets
out for the river in a French steamer which unloadèf^^
soldiers and customs officers all down the African
coast. It seems depressing and futile to Marlow and,
along with the "monotonous grimness" of the coast,
increases his unease (39; pt. 1). In fact, he begihs
to feel he is losing contact with reality;
The idleness of a passenger, my isolation amongst all these men with whom I had no point of contact,the oily and languid sea, the uniform sombrenessof the coast, seemed to keep me away from the truth of things, within the toil of a mournful and senseless delusion. (40; pt.i) /  ^ . i - ;
This mood does not improve:
The general sense of vague and oppressive wonder - ' grew upon me. It was like a weary pilgrimage Iamongst hints for nightmares. (41; pt, 1) < s -
At the first company station he finds chain gangs, ^
chaos, disease, and a grove of death. He foresees that
in this land he will "become acquainted with a flabby/
  '
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pretending, weak-eyed devil of a rapacious and pitiless 
folly” (43; pt. 1). On the trek into the Central 
Station he passes abandoned villages, and the carriers 
in his caravan die from exhaustion or run away. But at 
the Central Station itself, where he must spend three 
months, Marlow's revulsion grows even worse: ”A taint 
of imbecile rapacity blew through it all, like a whiff 
from some corpse. . . . I've never seen anything so 
unreal in my life” (52; pt. 1).
Thus, Marlow falls gradually into the intolerable, 
evil situation he winds up in at the Central Station. 
And an active problem emerges slowly and hazily as a 
result. The problem is: How to find Kurtz? Marlow 
comes to believe that talking with Kurtz will bring 
relief from his spiritual oppression at the hands of 
the Company as well as some illumination as to the 
meaning of this suffering. Thus, the physical struggle 
to reach the Inner Station and Marlow's search for 
relief become the same problem, the active problem.
Nevertheless, it differs from the active problem 
of a dramatic plot-structure in that it covers only the 
events from Marlow's arrival at the Central Station 
onward, whereas the active problem in a dramatic plot- 
structure covers the entire action.
The effect of this slow complication and slow 
revelation of the active problem is that attention is 
bound to focus on it, on the problem, on the evil, on 
the darkness, on its "horror” . So much of the book is 
given over to establishing the problem that, in a
theine\ 69
sense, the disturbance itself nearly becomes the centre
of attention.
The Gawain story-teller, on the other hand,
creates the disturbance— an evil— very quickly: the
Green Knight just busts in the door. There is no time
for Gawain to brood over the nature of evil; he has to
jump up and face the Green Knight. Thus, the
wrongfulness of the disturbance and its meaning are
simply taken for granted. For Gawain, the disturbance
is a simple case of the good guys (Camelot) versus the
bad guy, or at least the discourteous guy. The action
does not focus on what makes the disturbance wrong but
on how to resolve it. Thus, "trawthe" and "fear”—
words relating to Gawain— are the themes, not
"darkness” or "horror"— words relating to the
disturbance.
For the same reason, the crucial events in Sir
Gawain and the Green Knight— the temptation and the
meeting at the Green Chapel— come when Gawain has
already reached the end of the journey, when he has
arrived. His travels are a kind of accompaniment to
them, a setting for them. Thus, his adventures along
the way are mentioned far more hurriedly than in
Marlow's journey up the river, and only in passing:
At uche warthe other water ther the wyye passed He fonde a foo hym byfore, bot ferly hit were.And that so foule and so felle that feght hym byhode.So mony mervayl bi mount ther the mon fyndes,Hit were to tore for to telle of the tenthe dole. (715-19)
?
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Since the problem is so clear from the situation, we 
know from the start that the resolution is bound to 
come in a direct encounter with the Green Knight, not 
with some minor monster along the way.
On the other hand, Marlow's trials— raising the 
boat, enduring the "vile" moral atmosphere of the 
Central Station, the attack on the river boat— come 
while he is actually still an route. Indeed most of 
the events that resolve the active problem happen on 
board the boat. To put the difference succinctly, in
i
Sir Gawain and the Green Knight it is the disturbance 
that forces the journey; in Heart of Darkness it is the 
journey that gradually brings on the disturbance. |
Nevertheless, the plot-structure of Heart of 1
Darkness is just as much unified by action as that of 
Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. It tells the story of 
the resolution of an active problem— how to find 
Kurtz/relief/illumination. Though this problem only 
crystallises somewhere in the middle of the tale, it 
nevertheless has its origin, as with the other plot- 
structures examined above, in the situation, not at the 
point where the active problem becomes clear.
Consequently, the thematic conflict also springs from 
the situation just as in dramatic plot-structure.
It is clear, then, that unity of action is not 
limited to the dramatic plot-structure as formulated by 
Aristotle. The Poetics stipulates the necessity of an 
exclusively cause-and-effeet sequence as the basis for 
a unified action. But a story like Heart of Darkness,
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with a clear, unified action which is nevertheless 
developed on a basis other than strict cause and 
effect, puts this requirement into some doubt. Why did 
Aristotle hold cause and effect to be so vital to the 
concept of unity of action? What are its merits and 
drawbacks? These questions belong to the next chapter.
■
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Chapter II 
Causation, Lucidity, and Fallibility
The action of the dramatic plot-structure, as 
defined above, is causal by nature. Chapter I 
established the disturbance as the first cause from 
which the conflict, the theme, and the rest of the 
events result. According to Aristotle, this causal 
plot-structure, in which each event clearly results 
from a previous event inside the story, produces an 
action which is lucid and understandable to the 
spectators. Lucidity, in turn, is necessary in order 
to generate the release of powerful emotions in the 
audience. Aristotle takes this release to be the aim 
of tragedy.1
However, Aristotle's conception of causal unity 
rests on the assumption that the causes of action as 
well as its results are in fact human. Many stories, 
including Greek tragedies, call this assumption into 
question by dealing with events and causes which are 
not human, for example, with chance and the will of the 
gods. In other words, many plot-structures that make 
use of events with no human cause still achieve the 
effects of tragedy that Aristotle specifies— the 
release of powerful emotions including pity and fear.
•I
^ See Aristotle 37; ch. 6.
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In this chapter I will argue that the use or 
exclusion of non-human causes is not the most important 
factor determining the effectiveness of a story's 
action. More decisive is the protagonist's 
fallibility, that is, the degree to which he transforms 
his fortunes from prosperity to adversity or vice versa 
through his own acts.2 Fallibility ensures that the 
action remains essentially lucid and causal even when 
the plot-structure includes obscure, non-human causes. 
Further, it generates the release of powerful emotions 
through irony. Irony here refers to conditions in 
which the characters themselves bring about a 
transformation from good to bad fortune. The plot- 
structure itself will be able to elicit pity, fear, 
mirth, and so forth from the audience when it is clear 
that the protagonist has played a key role in bringing 
about this transformation. Under such circumstances, 
plot-structures can, in fact, accommodate a fair amount 
of irrational or non-human causes; indeed the 
supernatural itself can function towards achieving the 
aforementioned emotional effects.
This chapter begins by analyzing how action 
functions in the dramatic plot-structure that Aristotle 
recommends in order to comprehend its merits. I turn 
then to stories with plot-structures which contain non- 
humanly caused events. However, first I will need to 
briefly define further terms of plot-structure. The 
following are essentially Aristotelian usages with
2 See Halliwell, Glossary: "Hamartia” 190.
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occasional modifications and additions as noted. These 
terms are, of course, particularly derived from Greek 
tragic practice and therefore not always applicable to 
modern and medieval stories. Nevertheless they provide 
clear, basic distinctions which will come in handy at 
least as reference points in comparing various kinds of 
plot-structures.
Terms
"Plot" is the arrangement of events in a story.^
This is a broad and admittedly simple definition of the 
term but has therefore the advantages that Edwin Muir 
pointed out: "It can be used in the widest popular 
sense. It designates for everyone, not merely for the 
critic, the chain of events in a story and the 
principle which knits it together" (16).
The action which a plot organises consists of two 
parts: "complication" and "denouement" (Aristotle 51-2; 
ch. 18). The complication stretches from the beginning 
of the story to the beginning of the transformation.
The denouement extends from the beginning of the 
transformation to the end. This is a somewhat more 
inclusive definition of denouement than that common in 
contemporary usage. Holman, for example, defines it as 
"the final unravelling of the plot" (150).
"Transformation", in turn, is the sequence of action in
:
 ^ See Aristotle 37; ch. 6.
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which the protagonist moves from prosperity to 
adversity or vice versa (Aristotle 40; ch. 7 ).^
Although these definitions may seem somewhat 
complicated at first glance, their sense is in fact 
fairly close to the everyday usages of the words. The 
complication, for example, is that portion of the 
action in which the active problem becomes more and 
more complicated and in which problems multiply. In 
Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, for instance, it 
includes everything up to Gawain's arrival at the Green 
Chapel, for up to this point his problems only get more 
complex.
Denouement means, of course, "unravelling", that 
is, outcome or resolution of the active problem.
Aristotle is right to locate its beginning at the 
transformation, since, plainly, it is the resolution of 
the active problem that will determine the 
protagonist's ultimate fate.
For example, as noted earlier, Gawain's active 
problem can only be solved when he reaches the Green 
Chapel and meets the Green Knight for the second time. 
Therefore the transformation of his fortunes can only 
begin there, marking— according to the definition 
above— the beginning of the denouement. There is a 
sense in which the transformation begins at Bertilak's 
castle, since the acceptance of the green girdle is 
vital to the transformation of Gawain's fortunes.
^ For a similar treatment of the notion of transformation, see Todorov 232-3.
: .... .
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However, in Gawain's mind, and in the mind of the 
unsuspecting reader, events at the castle are not 
connected to the active problem until the final 
revelations are made at the Green Chapel.
Aristotle also distinguishes between the "complex" 
and the "simple" plot-structure (42-3; ch. 11). The 
complex plot is one in which the transformation 
involves a recognition or a reversal, while the simple ^
plot contains neither. Aristotle defines recognition 
as
a change from ignorance to knowledge, bringing the characters into either a close bond, or enmity, with one another, and concerning matters which bear on their prosperity or affliction. The finest recognition occurs in direct conjunction with reversal. (43; ch. 11)
The Green Knight's revelation of his identity with 
Bertilak, the lord of the castle and Gawain's erstwhile 
host, is a recognition that makes the plot-structure of 
Sir Gawain and the Green Knight complex, since it is 
closely connected to Gawain's final transformation to a 
state of nagging unhappiness.
Reversal (peripeteia), on the other hand, is a 
somewhat more complicated concept. Aristotle defines 
it as "a complete swing in the direction of the action 
. . ." (42; ch. 11). Halliwell glosses the term as "a
complete and startling twist in the direction of a 
dramatic action" (Glossary 195). In his commentary he 
clarifies ;
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Reversal entails a complete contradiction of expectation and intention on the part of the agents (and also, to the extent that they sympathise imaginatively, on that of an audience). . . .. . . the crucial factor is that the direction 
of the action is tragically overturned, and gives |rise to the very opposite of what it seemed set to produce. (116-17)
!
IGawain's acceptance of the green girdle is a
reversal in this sense. By taking it, he hopes to
triumph, but, of course, this act does just the
opposite. It brings about his apparently lasting
unhappiness. The example which Aristotle himself cites
comes from Sophocles's Oedipus the King
where the person comes to bring Oedipus happiness, and intends to free him from his fear about his mother; but he produces the opposite effect, by revealing Oedipus' identity. (42; ch. 11)
The direction of Oedipus's action is toward finding out 
who he is. His unhappiness is brought about not 
because the action suddenly goes in the opposite
direction— toward ignorance— but because it continues |
in the direction he wishes. This is what is meant by 
reversal.
Since Aristotle's terms are derived primarily from %
Greek dramatic practice, it is natural that not all 
stories contain recognitions and reversals nor always 
lend themselves to the complication— transformation—  
denouement model. Yet, as will be seen, plot- 
structures frequently do contain elements which, if not 
conforming exactly to Aristotle's conceptions, are at 
least analogous.
f
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The words "crisis" and "climax" are not found in 
the Poetics but will nevertheless be useful for my 
purposes. "Crisis", according to Holman's definition, 
is "the episode or incident wherein the situation in 
which the protagonist finds himself is sure either to 
improve or grow worse" (129). It is thus closely 
related to the transformation and sometimes identical 
to it but is usually more specific, more limiting. It 
is a single event. In Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, 
it is Gawain's acceptance of the green girdle, since 
with it Gawain's situation is sure to improve— he now 
has a hope of not having his head chopped off— and also 
grow worse— he becomes blameworthy.
Climax differs from crisis in that climax 
designates "the point of highest interest, the point at 
which the reader makes his greatest emotional response" 
(Holman 102). The climax is the most exciting point in 
the story.
Crisis and climax do not always occur in the same 
place. In Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, for 
example, the climax is, of course, the Green Knight's 
apparently earnest attempt to chop off Gawain's head.
It is the high point of tension and excitement;
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However, this scene could by no means be the crisis, 
since everything in terms of Gawain's problem has 
already been decided at this point (although Gawain 
himself is still in the dark).
At the beginning of this chapter, I stated that 
the release of powerful emotions was, for Aristotle, 
the aim of tragedy. Aristotle himself uses the term 
katharsis in this connection. The meaning of this word 
has been much discussed and debated through several 
centuries, yet Halliwell points out that "we do not 
really know what Ar[istotle] meant in this context by 
katharsis," and refers to it as "an idea of which 
Ar[istotle] gives no direct elucidation at all in the 
work itself" (Commentary 89-90). According to 
Halliwell's own "very tentative" interpretation, 
katharsis is
5
He lyftes lyghtly his lome and let hit doun fayre. With the barbe of the bitte bi the bare nek.Thagh he homered heterly, hurt hym no more,Bot snyrt hym on that on syde, that severed the hyde.The scharp schrank to the flesche thrugh the schyre grece.That the schene blod over his schulderes shot to the erthe.And quen the burne sey the blode blenk on the snawe,He sprit forth spenne-fote more then a spere 1enthe,Hent heterly his helme and on his hed cast,Schot with his schulderes his fayre schelde under, Braydes out a bryght sworde, and bremely he Spekes—
"Blynne, burne, of thy bur, bede me no moi I haf a stroke in this sted withoute stryf hent, And if thow reches me any mo, I redyly schal quyte And yelde yederly ayayn— and therto ye tryst—  and foo. (2309-25)
ri
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a powerful emotional experience which not only gives our natural feelings of pity and fear full play, but does so in a way which conduces to their rightful functioning as part of our understanding of, and response to, events in the human world.(Commentary 90)
Tarkovsky declares similarly that "the aim of art . . . 
is to plow and harrow [a person's] soul, rendering it 
capable of turning to good" (43). And playwright David 
Mamet, describing the same experience, says that "it 
purifies and cleanses through enabling the auditor to 
respond on other than a conscious level" (VerMeulen 
16).
All three of the above explanations have in common 
the idea of an unusually forceful release of emotions 
in response to an artistic portrayal of some sort. In 
this thesis I would like to designate this powerful 
emotional experience simply with the word "release".
But I would also like to expand its application beyond 
pity and fear to include the release of the emotions 
and responses elicited by comedy, e.g. mirth, 
happiness, laughter, relief, satisfaction, and so 
forth. For the purposes of this study, release will be 
taken be the aim of the dramatic plot-structure.
Finally, "non-human" is a word I will use often to 
describe a variety of causes that lie beyond the human, 
the ordinary, or the "natural", such as chance. Fate, 
the gods, the will of God, and so on. For the sake of 
convenience I sometimes use the word "supernatural" in 
the same sense. Although it might be argued that 
chance is in fact quite natural, it could also be
-.à
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argued that chance is simply a word for that causation 
which lies outside our understanding of the laws of 
nature.
Lucidity 4s
with the terms now defined, a discussion of the 
merits of the causal plot-structure as conceived by 
Aristotle can now be undertaken. As previously 
remarked, Aristotle distinguishes between episodic and 
causal plot-structures; "Of simple plot-structures and 
actions the worst are episodic. I call an 'episodic' 
plot-structure one in which the episodes follow in a 
succession which is neither probable nor necessary"
(41; ch. 9).
For example, the first two parts of the Knight's 
Tale are, strictly speaking, episodic. The succession 
of events— Arcite's release, Palamon's escape, their 
meeting in the woods, and Theseus's arrival— are 
neither probable nor necessary results of previous 
acts. They do not cause or result from one another. A 
causal plot-structure is superior to such an episodic 
sequence by virtue of two great strengths: lucidity and 
irony. I shall examine lucidity first.
Aristotle argues that events "should arise from 
the intrinsic structure of the plot, so that what 
results follows by either necessity or probability from 
the preceding events . . ." (42; ch. 10). Such a ]
structure will command more "emotional power," he says 
(38; ch. 6). The words "necessity" and "probability"
3
-a
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here imply that the audience be able to follow and
understand how events have caused each other. The
cause-and-effeet sequence is lucid:
A sense of wonder [e.g. pity and terror] will be more likely to be aroused in this way than as a result of the arbitrary or fortuitous, since even chance events make the greatest impact of wonder when they appear to have a purpose. (42; ch. 9)
In other words, powerful emotions are released when 
events happen which are surprising and yet, in the same 
moment, seem inevitable due to previous causes the 
audience has "witnessed" in the story. For Aristotle, 
the audience can only "witness" events which have been 
humanly caused. Thus, lucidity, for Aristotle, 
presupposes exclusively human causation. In this 
thesis, lucidity means the quality that a plot- 
structure possesses when its events have human causes 
and when the causal connections between these events 
are apparent. Of course for readers and writers of 
certain cultures and periods, the supernatural and the 
divine were not regarded as unintelligible or obscure 
causes, but perfectly rational and understandable ones.
My use of the word "intelligibility" is not meant to 
dismiss or ignore this way of thinking, but merely to 
characterise the plot-structure of human causes with a 
word that does justice to Aristotle's own view and 
would not have been alien to him.
A particularly clear illustration of how the idea 
of lucidity works can be found in the following comic 
episode from Mel Brooks's recent film Life Stinks (for.
® See, for example, Heinrich von Kleist's Der 
zerbrochne Krug [The Shattered Jug], a play with the same essential plot-structure as that of Oedipus the 
King— a judge uncovering his own misdeed— but which is, by contrast, a very funny comedy.
«
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in fact, Aristotle's principle applies as well to 
comedy as to t r a g e d y ) A l t h o u g h  very brief, the 
episode does actually contain a unified action. It has 3
its own situation, active problem, beginning, middle, 
end, and transformation.
The scene opens with the protagonist, played by 
Mel Brooks, approaching a raised, freight loading-dock 
at the back of a restaurant. He is homeless, |
exhausted, and discouraged after a long, humiliating 
day. It is very late and, despite a long search, he X
has been unable to find a place to sleep. He wearily 
climbs the steps up to the dock. It is about five feet 
above ground level, four or five yards long, and just 
wide enough to sleep on.
However, as the exhausted man reaches the top of 
the steps, he notices there are already two other 
homeless people sleeping on the dock. The only place 
left in which to sleep is a small space in front of a 
door. He looks at the sleepers, then at the door, then 
at the drop. He hesitates but decides to lie down in 
front of it after all. He tries to make himself 
comfortable, lays his head on his arm and shuts his 
eyes. In front of him is the five foot drop to the 
ground, behind him the door.
Suddenly a man bursts out of the door. The 
protagonist is thrown, not to the pavement below, but
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into a rubbish skip to the left of the door. The man 
in the doorway, a beefy worker in the restaurant |
completely unaware of the presence of the protagonist, I
Iwalks to the skip, dumps a bucket of slop into it, and |
goes back inside, slamming the door. |
The members of the audience laugh at this episode ^
because what happens is a surprise, while at the same 
time the natural result of previous conditions and 
events which they have been able to see. Because these 
events and the connections between them are 
intelligible in terms of human causality, the climax 
appears inevitable or necessary. This is what is meant 
by lucidity.
The surprise or sense of "wonder" comes because 
the protagonist does not drop to the pavement but flies 
into the skip. One expects him to be knocked off the 
dock onto the pavement because of the "build-up": his 
hesitation, his doubtful glances at the door and the 
drop. But this surprise alone would not make for such 
a funny scene. As Aristotle observed, powerful M
emotional effects "can best be achieved when things 
occur contrary to expectation yet still on account of 
one another" (42; ch. 9). Having shown how the 
surprise is achieved, I shall briefly reconstruct the 
scene to trace how the events occurred "on account of 
one another" and thus became a lucid sequence.
First of all. Brooks the film-maker has 
effectively excluded everything arbitrary and 
fortuitous from the scene. Everything happens I
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explicably and naturally. The protagonist lies down in 
front of the door for a purpose. As the audience knows 
from events they have seen previously in the film, he 
is exhausted, and the place in front of the door is the 
only place left. The two other sleepers function both 
to reassure the protagonist that this loading-dock is a 
good place to sleep and at the same time to limit his 
choice to the space in front of the door. It is 
perfectly likely that a restaurant worker would come 
out of the back door late at night: he is cleaning up.
The great force he uses to open the door and which 
sends the protagonist flying into the skip is plausible 
because the audience can immediately perceive the 
worker's massive build and angry demeanour. The skip 
also is clearly visible sitting to the left of the door 
and has been so from the start of the scene. The door 
(naturally) opens outward. All these conditions 
combine to make the protagonist's flight into the skip 
seem plausible and inevitable.
However, this sense of plausibility, and hence the 
humour which, in this case, is the release would not be 
present if all the events and conditions were not 
lucid. By this I mean, to reiterate, visible and 
understandable in human terms. For instance, the scene 
would not be very funny had the skip not been visible 
from the beginning but only appeared when the 
protagonist flew into it. This is because the audience 
would not understand where the skip had come from nor 
see any reason for its appearance apart from the joke.
^ For a discussion of the effects of "pattern" on the emotions, see Halliwell, Commentary 117-18.
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Likewise, the climax would not be so funny if the 
restaurant employee were not seen to open the door for 
an understandable reason. The result would be the 
same: the protagonist would still wind up in the bin; 
but the causal connection would be lacking. Because 
the restaurant employee has a visible, plausible, 
understandable reason for going outside— dumping the 
garbage— the action "makes sense", and the audience 
laughs.
Incidentally, the episode's humour is greatly 
increased by virtue of the fact that the same, single 
event— the opening of the door— causes both of the 
protagonist's misfortunes. Not only does he wind up in 
the skip, he has garbage dumped on top of him. Thus, 
the audience sees a lucid and plausible pattern 
emerging which connects previous and present e v e n t s . ^
The obvious objection to this scene is that it is 
simply outlandish; it is too patterned, too coherent; 
it is far more lucid than events in real life ever are.
In real life, for instance, the protagonist would be 
just as likely, if not more likely, to land in front of 
or behind the skip as inside it. However, the purpose 
of a story, in Aristotle's view, is not to record life,
"not to speak of things which have occurred", for this 
is history, but to present a mimesis— a representation 
of "the kinds of events that could occur" (40). As Î
Halliwell points out, Aristotle does not believe that
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real life itself can often produce unified actions
capable of release:
So in contemplating poetry (or other works of mimetic art) we draw on our real experience of the world, but we do so in order to understand events which possess a special degree of coherence and, therefore, significance. (Commentary 107)?
In other words, this episode is more coherent than real
life. And it must be so if the audience is to grasp
the "special significance" inherent in the action,
which is, in this case, that life stinks.
This "special degree of coherence" becomes even
more effective when the depicted events appear to be
chaotic. For example, the killing of the helmsman in
Heart of Darkness, is a scene depicting the most
intense physical action;
Something big appeared in the air before the shutter, the rifle went overboard, and the man stepped back swiftly, looked at me over his shoulder in an extraordinary, profound, familiar manner, and fell upon my feet. The side of his head hit the wheel twice, and the end of what appeared to be a long cane clattered round andknocked over a little campstool. It looked asthough after wrenching that thing from somebody ashore he had lost his balance in the effort. (81; pt. 2)
What has actually happened, of course, is that the
helmsman has been speared. This scene is the climax of
the story in the sense I have given— the point of 
highest emotional response from the reader. As in Sir 
Gawain and the Green Knight, Conrad's intensely 
accurate rendering of detail provides much of the
^ For a related line of argument, but in a different context, see Hardy 3 2-3.
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emotional impact, since it allows readers to imagine 
they are actually seeing the action as it happens. But 
this sense of verisimilitude would quickly evaporate if 
the helmsman's death were not also the natural result 
of the lucidity of the events and circumstances within 
the story.
How, then, does the helmsman come to be killed?
From what does his death result? Here is what happens
immediately before the helmsman gets hit;
I caught sight of a V-shaped ripple on the waterahead. . . . Another snag! A fusillade burstout under my feet. The pilgrims had opened up with their Winchesters, and were simply squirting lead into that bush. A deuce of a lot of smoke came up and drove slowly forward. . . . Now I couldn't see the ripple or the snag either. I stood in the doorway, peering, and the arrows came in swarms. . . .  The bush began to howl. . . .  the report of a rifle just at my back deafened me. JI glanced over my shoulder, and the pilot-house was yet full of noise and smoke when I made a dash at the wheel. The fool-nigger had dropped yeverything, to throw the shutter open and let off Xthat Martini-Henry. He stood before the wide opening, glaring . . . while I straightened the sudden twist out of that steamboat. There was no room to turn even if I had wanted to, the snag was somewhere very near ahead in that confounded smoke, there was no time to lose, so I just crowded her into the bank— right into the bank, where I knew the water was deep. (80-1; pt. 2)
In this passage the events happen at such a furious
pace that they seem like chaos, having no connection
other than their proximity in time and space. But if 
the events are gone over slowly in reverse, a strong 
cause-and-effeet chain ending in the helmsman's death 
becomes plain.
The helmsman gets hit with the spear for two 
reasons; 1) he is standing unprotected in the cabin
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door and 2) Marlow has "crowded her [the boat] into the 
bank". The helmsman went to the doorway in order to 
shoot at the attackers with his rifle. Because he 
abandoned the wheel, Marlow had to straighten the 
boat's course. He decided to steer into the shore 
because he could no longer see where the snag was in 
the river. He could no longer spot the snag because of 
the smoke from the pilgrims' rifles. The snag and the 
narrowness of the channel came, in turn, as 
consequences of Marlow's original decision to take the 
western passage when the river divided at a sandbank.
When the events are gone over in reverse like 
this, the causal structure of the scene becomes 
apparent, and one can, perhaps, make out Conrad's hand 
steering the events towards his intended climax. 
Nevertheless, it is this structure that creates 
release. When the events are read in order, they build 
to a kind of crescendo of peril, each hazard bringing 
on a worse danger, so that the scene simulates the 
commotion and confusion, the sensory overload, of an 
actual attack. Thus, although very rigidly plotted, 
the helmsman's death comes as a shock, happening 
"contrary to expectation yet still on account of 
[previous events]" (42; ch. 9). Paradoxically, it is 
the cause-and-effeet structure— the most overtly 
devised plot of all— that gives the greatest illusion 
of reality.
,1
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Irony
I have attempted to show above how human causes 
make for lucidity, which in turn generates release.
The other great strength of Aristotle's causal plot- 
structure— irony— also generates release but in a more 
profound way. Primarily, this is the irony that comes, 
in both comedy and tragedy, from characters bringing 
misfortunes on themselves. For example, much of the 
pity and sadness at the death of the helmsman comes 
from the knowledge that it was, ironically, his own 
decision to stand in the open doorway and fire the 
rifle. His death would be less moving if he had been 
ordered to stand there or if he had been hit simply by 
chance. Aristotle terms a character's share in his own 
transformation hamartia, which Halliwell translates as 
fallibility.8 It moves the spectator to fear and pity 
in the tragedy and to laughter in the comedy.
Chaucer's Reeve's Tale provides a fine 
illustration of this type of irony as it results from 
the cause-effect sequence. Indeed, it is a near­
perfect example of all the strengths of the 
Aristotelian-style plot-structure discussed thus far.
I shall consider the plot-structure as whole, then, 
before looking specifically at the irony of 
fallibility.
The tale can be diagrammed as follows (Causal 
connections are indicated by italics. Numbers in
® Aristotle 44; ch. 13. See also Halliwell, Commentary 138-40.
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parentheses refer to a cause other than the one 
immediately preceding.);
1. The miller routinely steals grain from his customers. One of them— the manciple at Cambridge— is ill, so
2. Two students, John and Aleyn go to the mill, determined not to let the miller steal from them, 
so
3. John stands at the hopper and Aleyn at the trough while the miller grinds their corn, so
4. In order to cheat them all the same, the miller unties their horse, so
5. It runs into a nearby field chasing mares, so
6. John and Aleyn have to go chase it, so g
7. The miller can and does steal half a bushel of their flour and has his wife bake a cake with it.
8. John and Aleyn cannot catch the horse until very late (5), so
9. They ask the miller to put them up, so
10. He agrees and has his daughter buy food and ale, so
11. Everybody has a lot to drink, so
12. When they go to sleep, the miller's familysnore a lot, so
13. John and Aleyn cannot sleep (everyone has to sleep in the same room because the house is small), so
14. Aleyn decides to sleep with the miller'sdaughter and gets into her bed, so
15. John fears he will be laughed at for sleeping alone when the story gets told back at Cambridge, so
16. He moves the baby's cradle to the foot of his bed.
17. The wife goes to the toilet (11).
...
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18. When she comes back, she feels for the cradle in the dark and, finding it at the foot of John's bed, mistakenly gets into bed with him (16 also 11), so
19. John "swyves" her (15).
20. When morning comes Aleyn decides to go back to his bed, (so as not to be caught by the miller), and the daughter, having fallen in love with him, tells him about the cake, but
21. Missing the cradle, he mistakenly gets into bed with the miller (16), so
22. Believing the miller to be John, Aleyn recounts to him how he slept with his daughter all night, so
23. They have a fist fight, so
24. The wife, still unaware of her mistake (18), believes it is the two students who are fighting and mistakenly knocks her husband unconscious with a staff, so
25. John and Aleyn escape, taking the cake with them.
The Reeve's Tale has a "complex" plot in 
Aristotle's terms because it contains both a reversal 
and a recognition. The reversal occurs in events 4, 8, 
and 9. By losing their horse John and Aleyn seem to 
have been bested by the miller. Being dependent on his 
good graces for food and lodging is humiliating to 
them, but it is precisely this circumstance that 
creates the opportunity for them to sleep with his wife 
and daughter and so to humiliate him.
The recognition occurs, of course, in event 23 
when Aleyn inadvertently discovers himself to the
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miller. Indeed, this is the superior kind of 
recognition commended by Aristotle;
The best of all recognitions is the type which arises from the events themselves, where the emotional impact comes about through a probable sequence of action. . . . Such instances alone avoid contrived tokens. (49-50; ch. 16)
(By "contrived tokens" Aristotle means external devices
for recognition such as scars.) However, Aristotle
also finds the recognition that occurs in direct
conjunction with the reversal to be the most effective, |
and this is not the case in the Reeve's Tale. The
reversal occurs at events 4, 5, and 6, and the
recognition much later at event 23. Nevertheless,
Aleyn's revelation of his identity is similar to a
reversal in that it threatens a disastrous swing in the
students' fortunes as the vicious miller strikes back:
And by the throte-bolle he caughte Alayn,And he hente hym despitously agayn.And on the nose he smoot hym with his fest.Doun ran the blody streem upon his brest;And in the floor, with nose and mouth to- broke,They walwe as doon two pigges in a poke. (4273-7)
Complete disaster is only avoided by the timely 
intervention of the miller's wife with staff (event 
24) .
The recognition does quite deftly conform to 
Aristotle's requirement that it result from "the events 
themselves". It is likely that Aleyn would want to 
return to his own bed before dawn, and, finding the 
cradle at the end of his bed, he has reason to get in
IÉ
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bed with the miller. He then quite naturally boasts 
about his adventures with the daughter to the man he g
takes to be John and so reveals himself.
Here again, as in Life Stinks, every single event 
results from a previous one or from the very plausible 
circumstances of the story. Thus, everything seems to 
happen naturally. Even events which would normally 
seem improbable, like event 20, are explained by 
reference to previous events and conditions in the 
cause-effeet chain: it is dark, the crib is in the 
wrong place, and the wife has been drinking. Again 
there is nothing arbitrary or fortuitous; every event 
has a lucid, human cause. Nevertheless, the overall 
situation is almost farcical. As with the episode from 
Life Stinks, this artificially coherent pattern 
actually increases the (comic) effect.
The effect is greatly intensified through the use 
of irony. The two students are only able to end up 
"swyving" the Miller's wife and daughter because the 
Miller cheated them. Likewise, by moving the cradle,
John gets to sleep with the miller's wife, but also 
brings about the situation through which he and Aleyn 
are discovered. Finally, it is Aleyn himself who tells |
the miller about his frolics with the daughter.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of this kind of 
irony in a story, I have imagined an alternative plot |
as follows. Events transpire in the original down to 
event 4. Then the miller manages to cheat the two 
students out of their wheat, not by untying their
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horse, but by getting them drunk. Thus, the hour does 
not grow so late, and they do not need to stay 
overnight in the miller's house. They simply set off 
dejectedly for home. However, they suddenly decide, 
for no particular reason, that they would like to sleep 
with the miller's daughter. They return in the middle 
of the night. She lets them in through the bedroom 
window and events continue as in the original.
Needless to say, this version is flat and clumsy 
compared to the original. Why?
For one thing there is no "inevitability". John 
and Aleyn might just as well have ridden on home and 
"swyved" someone else. My plot-structure is sequence, 
not consequence.
Much more importantly, my revised plot-structure 
lacks irony. Chaucer's version is infinitely funnier 
simply because readers see the Miller bringing his 
misfortune on himself. He is the one who drove off the 
students' horse in the first place. It is his own 
fault. Likewise the story would be less funny if Aleyn 
had climbed into bed with the Miller because he got 
confused in the dark rather than as a result of John's 
trick, or if the miller had discovered Aleyn some other 
way, by feeling his beard, for example. It is because 
Aleyn reveals himself and tells the miller of his own 
free will (and in detail) what he has done that the 
recognition is so funny,
"The Happy Man's Shirt" provides a counter­
example, by being a story in which the protagonist does
i
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not exhibit fallibility but in which the transformation 
occurs totally by chance. As with the other stories 
examined above, it has an essentially causal,
Aristotelian-style structure as outlined below:
1. The prince was unhappy, so
2. The king tried everything to make him happy, so
3. The prince was still unhappy, so
4. The king asked his wise men what to do, so
15. They said the prince should exchange shirts 1with a happy man, so •
6. The king tried to find a happy man, but f
7. He could not, so
8. At his wit's end, he went hunting.
9. He chanced upon a truly happy man, so
10. He tried to get his shirt, but
11. The happy man had no shirt.
Here each event, with the exception of numbers nine and 
eleven, is the natural result of an event that precedes 
it. However, at event 8 the causal link is missing.
The king's failure to find a happy man does not make it 
necessary for him to hunt 7 he might have taken a bath 
instead. Still it is as a result of repeated failure 
that he gives up looking for the happy man and does 
something else.
Event 8 is in fact the plot's most important event 
so far, its turning point, its crisis. It marks the 
place where the king's fortunes can begin to change.
However, it is not only a crisis, marking the beginning
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of the transformation, but is also something like a 
reversal. The king quits looking for the happy man and 
goes off hunting. He does not expect to find what he 
has been searching for; in fact he has given up 
searching. This would seem likely to do nothing to 
solve the active problem. Yet it is the very event 
that brings him to his goal— the happy man.
Nevertheless, this reversal differs from a strict 
Aristotelian reversal in that it happens by chance, 
whereas Aristotle insists that a reversal "conform to 
probability or necessity" (42; ch.11). While it is 
perfectly plausible that the king, at his wit's end, 
would go hunting, it is neither necessary nor probable 
that he find a happy man while doing it. The king 
chances upon the happy man, and it is a very lucky 
chance. The problem, then, from the Aristotelian point 
of view, is that the story's most important event, the 
event that brings on the transformation, crisis, and 
reversal, seems to happen purely by chance and not as 
the inevitable result of previous action. After all, 
it is easy enough to pull any hero out of his 
predicament by having him just happen to run right into 
the solution.
Undoubtedly this plot-structure would have more 
power to release if event 9 seemed like an inevitable 
consequence and not just a lucky chance. It would 
possess the powerful irony created when the 
protagonist's fallibility is responsible for the 
transformation.
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However, as previously noted, the unresolved 
active problem of "The Happy Man's Shirt" makes it an 
unusual kind of story. Indeed, the purpose of the 
story seems not to be creating an emotional effect but, 
rather, presenting a puzzle, a paradox, that provides 
some insight into its great subject: happiness. When 
we read it we do not feel any great release of fear or 
pity for the king or the prince. We do feel curiosity; 
we want to know how the problem was solved. Did 
changing shirts with the happy man work?
Regardless of how one may wish to interpret the 
significance of the ending, the tale does deliver some 
insight into the search for happiness. The king, for 
example, is unable to find a happy man no matter how 
hard he tries. But when he stops trying and just goes 
on with life as usual (hunting) he finds what he seeks. 
Consequently the plot-structure might be seen to 
underline a kind of common folk wisdom: happiness 
cannot be found by direct pursuit but comes while we 
are pursuing something else. (Note, for example, that 
the happy man himself is not pursuing happiness either, 
but is at his work in the vineyard.) It is perhaps for 
this reason that "The Happy Man's Shirt" does not 
contain a complete transformation. The fate of the 
protagonist is secondary to the questions it asks about 
the search for happiness.
By contrast, the type of plot Aristotle had in 
mind— Aeschylus's Agamemnon, for example— aims above 
all else to evoke powerful emotions in the audience.
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Our curiosity as to what will befall Agamemnon 
certainly does not matter at all after the prophetess, 
Cassandra, quite early in the play, reveals that 
Clytemnestra and Aegisthus will certainly kill him. We 
are not expecting the play so much to give us some 
wisdom about life (although it may well do so) as to 
make us feel something about it. This difference in 
aim seems to me to account generally for most of the 
structural differences between a story like "The Happy 
Man's Shirt" and the other plot-structures examined in 
this chapter.
Fallibility and Non-Human Causation
As Aristotle recognised, an arbitrary or 
fortuitous transformation is simply not as effective as 
the ironic, humanly caused transformations seen in 
stories like the Reeve's Tale, Heart of Darkness, and 
Life Stinks,
However, the merits of Aristotle's cause-effect 
structure are, at the same time, its great flaw.
Strict observance of the rules described by Aristotle 
would appear to exclude chance and the divine, for 
example, as causes or explanations for the events in 
stories, yet these are some of the most important and
^  See Halliwell, Commentary 111-12.See Frakes 1-2 regarding the non-human in the 
Knight's Tale,
fallibilityX 100
recurrent materials of stories from all ages including
Aristotle's own. As Halliwell observes:
By equating unity of plot-structure with unity of action, Ar[istotle] presupposes that poetic drama can always afford to present an internally perspicuous and intelligible sequence of events.Tragedy can pose a challenge for such an assumption by dealing with obscure events whose underlying causes may not be accessible to our ordinary powers of comprehension. (Commentary 111)
Aristotle's reluctance to allow the non-human as a 
cause in plot-structure stems above all from his 
concern that the plot itself be capable of r e l e a s e . ^
However, this capability depends more on fallibility 
than on a sequence of human causes. The plot-structure 
need not exclude every non-human cause so long as the 
plot remains lucid enough for the audience to recognise 
that the protagonist is playing a key role in bringing 
about his own transformation. A comparison of the 
plot-structures of the Knight's Tale and Oedipus the 
King provides a useful illustration of this assertion.
The Knight's Tale has a plot-structure which 
relies heavily on the non-human as cause and 
explanation of events. It seeks to show both the 
inexplicable and the explicable as having their
ultimate causes beyond the human. Consequently, it |
makes a good place to begin an examination of the use |
of non-human causes in plot.^O |IThe following is a diagram of the structure of the I
Knight's Tale : |
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Disturbance
Complication
Crisis
1. Palamon and Arcite see Emelye and fall in love. ^
2. Theseus releases Arcite but bans him from Athens.
3. Arcite returns in disguise and serves Emelye.
4. Palamon escapes from prison.
5. The two rivals meet and fight in the woods.
6. Theseus interrupts, sets up the tournament with Emelye as the prize.
7. So Arcite, Palamon, and Emelye supplicate the Gods and receive promises.
8. So Arcite defeats Palamon in the tournament.
9. Then Arcite dies.
10. So Theseus gives Emelye to Palamon in marriage.
The diagram reveals that it is only the events of the 
complication which happen purely by chance with no 
further explanation. Of these, seeing Emelye (event 
1), Palamon's escape from prison (event 4), the rivals' 
meeting in the woods (event 5), and Theseus' arrival 
during the duel (event 6) happen with no causal link to 
prior events. Arcite's release from prison (event 2)
Denouement
Events before this are not part of the action of Palamon and Arcite and function primarily to give their story a context. Aristotle defines a "beginning" as "that which does not have a necessary connection with a preceding event, but which can itself give rise naturally to some further fact or occurrence" (39; ch 
7) .
I
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is the result of Perotheus's intervention, but 
Perotheus's arrival on the scene also happens by 
chance: "It happed on a day" (1189). Only Arcite's 
return in disguise (event 3) has a causal connection to 
a previous event, but this connection, in turn, is non- 
human— the intervention of a god. In any case,
Arcite's return has no subsequent effect on the rest of 
the plot.
By contrast, all the events of the denouement, 
including the crisis (event 7), form a causal chain.
Arcite, Palamon, and Emelye go to the temples and make 
their sacrifices because Theseus has caused three 
temples to be built as part of his attempts to regulate 
the conflict. Because these prayers are accepted,
Arcite prevails in the contest (event 8) but also falls 
from his horse (event 9). And Arcite's death opens the 
way for Theseus to give Emelye to Palamon (10). Events 
of the denouement are therefore made lucid to the 
reader but occur in a realm beyond that of the human.
Thus, the ultimate causes are called by names such as 
"aventure" and "destinee" by the characters. Likewise,
Theseus's decision to give Emelye to Palamon is given a 
rationally understandable explanation in human terms—  
politics— but is "actually" the result of the 
compromise forged by Saturn (244 3-6).
Furthermore, the denouement is in fact carefully 
plotted by cause-and-effect. It also contains, if not 
a strict Aristotelian reversal, something very similar j
to it in events 9 and 10. Arcite fully expects to win ^
._____  j
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Emelye by defeating Palamon. But, instead, the victory 
gives rise to his death. Thus, though he seems to be 
moving from woe to weal by winning the contest, he is 
actually moving in the opposite direction towards his 
death. Strictly speaking, it is not Arcite's fall 
which is the ultimate cause of his death. The real 
roots of the reversal are in the prayer episode.
Arcite prays for victory in the contest not for Emelye.
When his prayer is accepted, he is certain this also 
means Emelye will be his, but, of course, the opposite 
takes place, partly because he asked for victory rather 
than specifically for Emelye. Of course the reader is 
not completely surprised, since he or she already knows 
about the prayers, the gods' conflicting promises, and 
that Saturn has come up with some solution that "hath 
plesed every part" (2446).
The complication, then, is "episodically" 
organised with all the major events occurring by 
chance, while from the beginning of the denouement on 
to the end, the plot is structured very much like 
classical Greek tragedy. Naturally, this plot- 
structure reflects the dual nature of the tale, a 
medieval romance based on a classical story. The 
prevalence of chance and "aventure" as well as the 
"episodic" plot-structure are, of course, typical of 
medieval romance. The events of the complication in 
the Knight's Tale would seem right at home in Malory's 
Morte Darthur, for example. On the other hand, the
i
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plot's similarities to Greek tragedy have already been 
noted.
Chaucer's dualistic treatment of causation here 
may seem contradictory, as if the structure of events 
were a house divided against itself. But as John 
Bayley suggests, this kind of division is not 
necessarily a fault in itself: "What matters is the 
extent to which disunity and division may themselves 
become aspects— indispensable and irremovable ones— of 
the artistic whole" (12).^2 The abruptness and 
completeness of the shift from the episodic to the 
causal, along with the fact that it occurs precisely at 
the crisis, at the very turning point of the action, 
indicates that the dual structure in the Knight's Tale 
is a deliberate device. Its purpose is to further the 
exploration of the story's themes.
As I argued in Chapter I , the story is an 
examination of the words "chance", "fortune", and 
"destiny". These themes are overtly discussed in the 
long and famous speeches about fortune and destiny by 
Arcite, Palamon, and to a lesser extent Theseus.
Further, the story-teller himself actually plays up the 
fortuitousness of the events. Palamon first spies 
Emelye "by aventure or cas" (1074). "It happed on a 
day" that Perotheus visits Theseus and secures Arcite's
See Ryding's discussion of the typical "bipartite" structure of medieval narrative. See esp. 115-61.Arcite (1251-72), Palamon (1303-80), Theseus (2987- 3015) .
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release (1189). Palamon's escape is "by aventure or 
destynee—  / As, whan a thyng is shapen, it shal be" 
(1465-6). Palamon and Arcite meet "as by aventure" 
(1516) . And Theseus is drawn to the wood by "The 
destinee, ministre general" (1663). Finally, as I 
noted earlier, Palamon and Arcite are shown to be so 
nearly equal in merit that chance seems to be the only 
fair way of deciding which one will be victorious, that 
is, the only answer to the active question.
To take another example, it is preposterous that 
Palamon, Arcite, Emelye, and Theseus would all end up 
in the same wood on the same morning. However, by 
relating an event so utterly unlikely, the story-teller 
attempts to show just how powerful and inescapable 
destiny is. The more unlikely it is that the four 
meet, the more powerful destiny proves itself to be by 
bringing them together;
The destinee, ministre general.That executeth in the world over al The purveiaunce that God hath seyn biforn.So strong it is that, though the world had swornThe contrarie of a thyng by ye or nay.Yet somtyme it shal fallen on a day That falleth nat eft withinne a thousand yeer. (1663-9)
In this same connection, Kundera makes the following
relevant observation:
■-i
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Is not an event in fact more significant and noteworthy the greater the number of fortuities necessary to bring it about?Chance and chance alone has a message for us. Everything that occurs out of necessity, everything expected, repeated day in and day out, is mute. Only chance can speak to us. We read its message much as gypsies read the images made by coffee grounds at the bottom of a cup. (Being 48-9)
To borrow Kundera's metaphor, then, the structure of 
the Knight's Tale can be seen as presenting, in the 
complication, first the patterns in the coffee mug 
without any "reading", and then, after the prayer 
sequence, the patterns along with their interpretation. 
With no "reading" of the meaning of the events in the 
first half, all the coincidences and chance meetings 
seem arbitrary, forced, and contrived. Consequently 
the action begins to seem random, arbitrary, and 
futile. However, after the prayer sequence, when we 
are allowed to see destiny at work, we find that the 
"chance" events were really significant after all.
For the reasons I stated in my introduction, this 
significance cannot be iterated outside the story but 
must remain in the form of the question posed by the 
action itself. Nevertheless, it is safe to say the 
story structure implies that the apparently arbitrary 
nature of Palamon's defeat and Arcite's death are in 
fact due to causes that are understandable enough in 
human terms (the gods seem just as temperamental as 
mortals) could we only perceive them. Events such as 
Arcite's fall seem accidental only when our perception 
is confined to the human sphere. The Knight's Tale
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uses the non-human as causes because the story itself 
is an exploration of the supernatural as the resolution 
of a human problem.
Even leaving aside the question of the medieval 
world view, the story's plot-structure cannot be 
faulted for reflecting the story's theme. However, the 
objection, from an Aristotelian point of view, is not 
that the Knight's Tale examines what is supernatural, 
but that the sequence of events itself is not 
scrutable, not comprehensible enough to lend the plot- 
structure itself the power to release.
As McGilchrist observes, Chaucer portrays Fortune 
as "blind with respect to persons, not designing a 
particular course for an individual, but turning her 
wheel, ensuring that life is inherently unstable" (50).
Arcite and Palamon are shown not to be in control of 
their acts (in the sense of "act" earlier established). 
Rather, they are driven along by a blind and 
inexplicable passion for Emelye and by superhuman 
forces, either by "destinee the ministre general", or 
by the gods (1663).
Consequently, the transformation of their fortunes 
inevitably appears arbitrary or predetermined rather 
than as a natural consequence of their own acts, of 
their fallibility. This exclusion of the character's 
fallibility in his own fate is what makes the plot- 
structure of the Knight's Tale inferior on Aristotle's 
terms.
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The spectators must be able to see in the
transformation the consequences of acts, not
coincidence, in order to experience release.
Dürrenmatt, after establishing that the object of
tragedy is to grip us, asserts that "only something
that matters to us, with which we are capable of
identifying in some way, can grip us" (2; 129; my
translation). And Lessing explains that the fear and
pity of which Aristotle was speaking "is the fear that
we might become the pitied object ourselves" (76; my
translation).14 This fear is likely to be less
powerful if, as in the Knight's Tale, the
transformation to unhappiness appears to have happened
rather arbitrarily, indeed by chance.
In fairness to Chaucer, it should be noted that
the Knight's Tale was, of course, not intended as a
classical tragedy. Its total form— which is not
apparent in the mere sequence of events above— is much
more descriptive, more discursive, more rhetorical than
a classical drama. As Robert M. Jordan has suggested:
It is not that Chaucer is uninterested or unskilled in persuasive and "dramatic" representation— far from it— but that he incorporates the illusion of reality into the larger dimensions of a conscious literary artistry. (169 emphasis added)
Furthermore, I have somewhat overstated the lack 
of fallibility in the Knight's Tale in order to make my 
point clearer. Arcite's transformation does, after
14 See Halliwell's discussion of this point in 
Aristotle's 183.
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all, come through a conjunction of the gods' will and 
his own error. He does make a mistake by praying for 
victory rather than for Emelye. And, as in Creon's 
case in Sophocles's Antigone, the disaster is out of 
all proportion to the size of the mistake. Thus, the 
denouement does partake, to a degree, of the irony 
mentioned earlier, and this gives it at least a whiff 
of classical-style tragedy. Nevertheless, the plot- 
structure of the Knight's Tale alone does not achieve 
the emotional force of an action such as that in 
Oedipus the King,
Oedipus the King, like the Knight's Tale, explores 
themes such as fate and the will of the gods in human 
affairs. In both stories things happen on an ultimate 
level because of fate or destiny or the will of the 
gods. The great difference between them is that for 
every supernatural cause Sophocles also provides a non­
religious, human cause for each event. Things do not 
happen purely by chance or destiny, without reference 
to the human. Each event is the result of some 
previous, humanly caused event carefully plotted in the 
story.
The difference between the two stories can be
diagrammed as follows:
Complication of the
Knight's Tale Oedipus the King
Destiny/The Gods Fate/The Gods
Events Rational Causes
Events
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The plot-structure in the complication of the 
Knight's Tale allows no room for human cause and 
effect; the events are simply direct results of 
destiny. In Oedipus the King they have an ultimate 
supernatural cause but are plotted as a sequence of 
human causes and effects in the story. To view the 
difference another way, the supernatural in Oedipus the 
King explains why Oedipus's fate befalls him. The 
lucid, human causality of the plot explains how it 
happened. It is the "how" that is relatively missing 
from the complication of the Knight's Tale.
Consequently, although Oedipus the King contains 
events as astonishing, if not more so, than events in 
the Knight's Tale, they happen as plausible results of 
previous events dramatised or related in the play. 
Hence, we find them understandable and inevitable. 
Indeed, a good part of the effect of Oedipus the King 
comes from the way in which these astounding events are 
shown to follow naturally and understandably from 
previous actions in the play, i.e. from its lucidity. 
And, of course, on the human level it is Oedipus 
himself who brings about his own misfortunes. He is, 
thus, far more pitiable than Arcite, even though Arcite 
is killed and Oedipus only blinded.
To summarise the discussion so far, then, the plot 
of Oedipus the King, and indeed the denouement of the 
Knight's Tale, indicate that the supernatural can 
function in plot-structures of essentially human cause
For a short but trenchant discussion of a chance as first cause in unified action, see Butcher 181-2.
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■!Iand effect. However, if the greatest emotional effects 1
are to be achieved, the transformation itself must not 
occur through non-human or inexplicable means but be 
seen to be brought on by the protagonist's own 
fallibility.
Naturally, the non-human can be effectively 
incorporated into the dramatic plot-structure in many 
ways, and there are many examples, not just those in 
Oedipus the King, from which to choose. I shall 
briefly discuss two such examples which incorporate the 
non-human in different ways. They will serve to hint
at how variously the non-human cause may function in |
dramatic plot-structures. And they will offer support 
to my argument that the plot-structure's ability to 
release depends primarily on the connection between 
fallibility and transformation.
Chance as the Impetus for Action
In The Unbearable Lightness of Being the 
supernatural, specifically chance, functions as the 
impetus for the acts of Tereza— one of the two main 
characters— which form the disturbance.^^ In contrast 
to the characters in the Knight's Tale, Tereza is aware 
that she is involved in fortuitous circumstances but 
chooses to interpret and act on them in her own way.
She is thus responsible to a large degree (though not 
entirely) for the chain of events leading to her
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transformation. Consequently, at least in her case, 
the plot-structure possesses an irony capable of 
generating release.
The circumstances surrounding the first meeting of 
Tomas and Tereza, the novel's main characters, are as 
follows. Tomas, a doctor from Prague, has gone on 
business to a small, provincial town. He happens to 
make acquaintance with Tereza, a waitress in the small 
restaurant at his hotel. They meet once briefly after 
her shift and he gives her his address in Praguè. The 
reader learns the sequence of events that led to thd^ 
first encounter when Tomas goes over it in his .mind'" 
seven years later (during which time they have 
married);
A complex neurological case happened to have been discovered at the hospital in Tereza's town. They called in the chief surgeon of Tomas's hospital in Prague for consultation, but the chief surgeon . . . happened to be suffering from sciatica, and because he could not move he sent Tomas. . . . The town had several hotels/ but Tomas happened to be given a room in the Tereza was employed. He happened to have Onou^ free time before his train left to stop at the hotel restaurant. Tereza happened to be on diity, and happened to be serving Tomas's table. It had taken six chance happenings to push Tomas towards Tereza, as if he had little inclination to g o t o  her on his own. (Being 35) ’
The fact that it took so many chance events to 
bring about a relationship that now seems absolutely 
essential makes Tomas uneasy. This thought is ;
thematically connected to an earlier unhappy memory of 
how Tereza once remarked that had she not met him, she
r4
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would certainly have fallen in love with a certain
friend of his:
He realized it was only a matter of chance that Tereza loved him and not his friend Z. . . .We all reject but of hand the idea that thelove of our life may be something light or Jweightless; we presume our love is what must be.
(Being 34-5)
Later in the novel, the story-teller considers the
coincidences of the first meeting from Tereza's point
of view as follows. A stranger (Tomas) sat at a table
reading a book. He smiled at her and asked for a
cognac. As she went behind the bar to get it, she
noticed Beethoven was playing on the radio. For
Tereza, as illustrated in episodes from her past, both
Beethoven and books are images of "the world on the
other side", an exciting world of heart and mind for
which she Ibngs. So,
rounding the corner with Tomas's cognac, she tried to read chance's message: How was it possible that at the very moment she was taking an order o f ' cognac to a stranger she found attractive, at that very moment she heard Beethoven? (Being 49)
After Tomas finished the drink he asked to have the 
drink charged to his room:
He showed her his key, which was attached to a piece of wood.with a red six drawn on it."That's odd," she said. "Six.""What's so odd about that?" he asked.She had suddenly recalled that thé house where they had lived in Prague before her parents were divorced was number six. But she answered something else (which we may credit to her wiles):"You're in room six and my shift ends at six."
(Being 50)
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And after her shift Tereza finds Tomas waiting for her, 
sitting on a yellow park bench, "The very same bench 
she had sat on the day before with a book in her lap!
She knew then . . . that this stranger was her fate"
(Being 50).
The story-teller, then, explains that it was this 
string of coincidences— the book, Beethoven, the number 
six, and the yellow park bench— more than Tomas's 
invitation to visit him in Prague that gave her the 
courage to actually go to the city and look him; tip-^ - 
which, in the order of the telling, is the story's 
first event as well as the disturbance. Because Tereza 
noticed these coincidences and acted upon them, the 
love story of Tereza and Tomas begins. It is worth 
noting again how different Tereza is from Palamon and 
Arcite, who are portrayed for the most part as 
unwitting pawns in a game played by Fortune and the 
gods.
In The Unbearable Lightness of Being, then, a 
cluster of fortuities becomes the first cause of the 
plot. The fortuities themselves are no more rationally 
comprehensible, indeed less so, than chance is in the 
Knight's Tale, but they are made part of a lucid, human 
chain of action: the motivations for Tereza's acts.
They give her the courage to go to Tomas.
This pattern is repeated later in the story at the . 
crisis. Tereza responds to another chance event— the
1
■ :iX"  jX. ■ \
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Russian invasion of her country— again by acting.
She takes the invasion as an opportunity to break off
the painful relationship with Tomas by leaving
Czechoslovakia. And it is this event, in turn, which
marks the beginning of the transformation.
Kundera justifies this use of coincidence in the
novel by observing that in real life people organise
their lives in response to chance in the same way. He
grants that such organization
may seem quite "novelistic" to you, and I am willing to agree, but only on condition that you refrain from reading such notions as "fictive," "fabricated," and "untrue to life" into the word "novelistic." Because human lives are composed in precisely such a fashion. . . .. . . Without realizing it, the individual composes his life according to the laws of beauty even in times of greatest distress. (Being 52)
Novels, indeed stories in general, cannot but deal 
with the supernatural, chance, coincidence, fate, 
destiny, and so forth, since these are not only 
conditions of life, but principles by which people 
order or "compose" life. However, the important point 
for this discussion is that in Kundera's novel, human 
characters— not coincidence, not the gods, not 
"aventure"— are seen to do the composing.
This ability to "compose" is what allows for 
fallibility, although, strictly speaking, "fallibility" 
is not the right word in Tereza's case, for she and 
Tomas move ultimately from adversity to prosperity.
The Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia is a chance event in terms of the plot. That is, it is not the result of any previous cause appearing in the plot. Of course it is not a chance event in historical terms.
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Nevertheless, one can speak of her degree of 
responsibility. It is enough for this comparison to 
establish that the structure of events in the 
Unbearable Lightness of Being is lucid and based after 
all on the acts of the characters, though these grow 
from the mysteries of chance and coincidence.
The Supernatural as Revelation - V
Like the Unbearable. Lightness pf Being, Flannery :
O'Connor's short story, "A Good Màn-Is''HardxtbiFindK^^^
has a fundamentally lucid plotfstructüre.% -
of its events except the crisis are meticulously
chained together by human cause and effect. However,
by making a mysterious chance event the story's crisis,
O'Connor abruptly reveals a profoundly religious
dimension underneath the surface of the action. In
striking contradiction to Aristotle's requirements,
this non-humanly caused event actually increases the
plot-structure's power to release.
The structure of the story's events càri be
diagrammed as follows:
1. The grandmother does not want to travel to Florida for vacation. She reads in the paper that the murderer, "The Misfit,** has escaped from jail > , and is heading towards Florida* But the family ' travels to Florida anyway. The grandmother brings '/ along her cat, so ^
r  ' ^  ,
3. They pass near an old plantation that the^ grandmother remembers from her youth, so ‘ .
4. She convinces her son, Bailey;'to turn around ' 'and take the family there but ; ~ I
5. It is the wrong road; the grandmother realises/^ she is mistaken, so ' ' ' , rl
J 1
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6. She becomes embarrassed and fidgets, so
7. She startles the cat, so
8. The cat jumps up on Bailey's shoulder, so.
9. He runs off the road, overturning the car.
10. The Misfit and his boys find them there.
11. The grandmother recognises them (1), so
12. The criminals murder her and the family.
Before I discuss the role of the non-human, I shall 
indicate how close the rest of the story is to the 
ideal Aristotelian plot-structure.
The diagram shows that the story contains a 
recognition, at event 11, and a reversal, or at least 
something like one, also at event 11. The recognition 
is the superior kind designated by Aristotle— it 
results from the events themselves. The grandmother 
recognises The Misfit from his picture in the paper.
Event 11 is also a reversal with the condition 
that the grandmother believes that by telling The 
Misfit that she recognises him she will save the 
family. If this is the case, then by performing an act 
she reckons will save the family, she actually dooms 
it. But without the grandmother's deliberate 
intention, the act lacks the irony necessary for a 
reversal in Aristotle's terms. It is characteristic of 
the grandmother that her acts have consequences quite 
opposite to her intentions but also that she acts 
impulsively. Thus, her intentions are not clear from 
the story:
.'I
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"Look here now," Bailey began suddenly, "we're in a predicament! We're in . . ."The grandmother shrieked. She scrambled to her feet and stood staring. "You're The Misfit!" she said. "I recognized you at once !" (21-2)
In either case, it is this event which suddenly
decides the family's fate:
"Yes'm," the man said, smiling slightly as if he were pleased in spite of himself to be known,"but it would have been better for all of you,lady, if you hadn't of reckernized me." (22)
The recognition scene and the reversal are thus in 
"direct conjugation", as Aristotle requires of the 
finest plots; they are the immediate causes of the 
final disaster.
Likewise, the plot has a meticulously crafted 
cause-effect structure. Even the almost slapstick 
accident follows neatly and naturally through a string 
of plausible causes:
"It's not much farther," the grandmother said and just as she said it, a horrible thought came to her. The thought was so embarrassing that she turned red in the face and her eyes dilated and her feet jumped up, upsetting her valise in the corner. The instant the valise moved, the newspaper top she had over the basket under it rose with a snarl and Pitty Sing, the cat, sprang onto Bailey's shoulder.The children were thrown to the floor and their mother, clutching the baby, was thrown out the door onto the ground; the old lady was thrown into the front seat. The car turned over once and landed right-side-up in a gulch off the side of the road. (18-19)
In stark contrast to this nearly perfect dramatic 
structure, event 10 appears to happen for no reason at 
all. The Misfit just happens to find the grandmother. 
There is no reason or cause given for The Misfit to be
j?
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on the same road. His arrival is described without 
the slightest explanation or reference to previous 
events :
They saw a car some distance away on top of a hill, coming slowly as if the occupants were watching them. The grandmother stood up and waved both arms dramatically to attract their attention.The car continued to come on slowly, disappeared around a bend and appeared again, moving evenslower, on top of the hill they had gone over. Itwas a big black battered hearse-like automobile.There were three men in it. (20)
The Misfit's arrival is conspicuous, then, for 
being the only event not part of the cause-and-effect 
chain. It inevitably leads the reader to question it, 
to wonder what it is doing in the story and why. Thus, 
it must bear a special degree of stress within the
plot-structure.
It also shifts the tone of the story. Up until 
his arrival the tone is decidedly comic, if not 
farcical. For example, the grandmother's family seems 
indestructible. The car is a total wreck, yet Bailey's 
wife, the sole casualty, sustains only,
a cut down her face and a broken shoulder."We've had an ACCIDENT!" the children cried in a frenzy of delight."But nobody's killed," June Star said with disappointment as the grandmother limped out of the car, her hat still pinned to her head but the broken front brim standing up at a jaunty angle and the violet spray hanging off the side. (19)
After The Misfit's arrival this kind of comedy 
disappears and the story becomes a very grim tale 
indeed.
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Event 10 is thus highly conspicuous for abruptly
changing a funny story into a grave and violent one,
for changing the stakes at one blow from the
grandmother's loss or retention of her petty dignity to
life or death, and for being the crisis, the turning
point of the entire action. Why, then, is it the
story's one and only chance event?
As I suggested above, there is a deeper, religious
dimension to the story, and this dimension first breaks
into the action at event 10— the arrival of The Misfit.
Given O'Connor's well known religious pre-occupation
this suggestion of a religious dimension to the story
is not at all far-fetched. O'Connor herself wrote;
I see from the standpoint of Christian Orthodoxy.This means that for me the meaning of life is centered in our Redemption by Christ, and what I see in the world I see in relation to that.
(Mystery 32)
Even critic André Bleikasten, whose strongly secular 
cast of mind gives him the confidence to contest some 
of O'Connor's own statements about her work, grants 
that
fall and redemption, nature and grace, sin and innocence— every one of her stories and novels revolves around these traditional Christian themes. (138)1?
In "A Good Man Is Hard to Find" these 
supernatural, Christian elements are largely hidden 
behind a meticulously realistic, almost naturalistic, 
reproduction of the everyday. O'Connor provides the
1? For a similar opinion, see Hoffman 32
I
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key to this aspect of her poetics in the following 
statement:
The novelist is required to create the illusion of a whole world with believable people in it, and the chief difference between the novelist who is an orthodox Christian and the novelist who is merely a naturalist is that the Christian novelist believes in a larger universe. He believes the natural world contains the super-natural. And this doesn't mean that his obligation to portray the natural is less; it means it is greater, (quoted in Pickett and Gilbert 126)
In " A Good Man Is Hard to Find" this larger frame of 
the supernatural containing the action may be only 
vaguely sensed during the first reading. However, once 
the action is defined, an unmistakable pattern becomes 
clear.
Indeed, it is noticeable from the very first 
paragraph as the grandmother first reads about the 
sinister Misfit in the newspaper. "I wouldn't take my 
children in any direction with a criminal like that 
aloose in it. I couldn't answer to my conscience if I 
did", she remarks (9). This is an odd thing for her to 
say, upon reflection, because she is sitting safely at |
the breakfast table hundreds of miles away from The |
Misfit and the chance of her ever meeting with him must 
be extremely remote. However, the remark works on the 
surface level as an example of the grandmother's 
ridiculous, self-important manner. Also, we know she 
is desperately trying to magnify the obstacles to the 
trip, "seizing every chance to change Bailey's mind"
(9) .
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Then, oddly, she brings up The Misfit again at the 
gas station, this time while talking with Red Sammy and 
his wife:
"Did you read about that criminal. The Misfit, that's escaped?" asked the grandmother."I wouldn't be a bit surprised if he didn't attack this place right here," said the woman."If he hears about it being here, I wouldn't be none surprised to see him. If he hears it's two cent in the cash register, I wouldn't be a tall surprised if he . . .""That'll do," Red Sam said. "Go bring these people their Co'Colas." (15-16)
Again the scene works on the literal level as simply 
more idle chatter from the gabby old grandmother and a 
realistic portrait of two silly Southerners. And yet 
the humour is undercut by the sudden, strange, and 
uncalled for seriousness of Red Sammy's gruff "That'll 
do". Again there is a fleeting presentiment of 
danger, a feeling that there is more to O'Connor's 
picture than meets the eye. Such hints prepare the 
reader for the revelation of the supernatural to come.
When the grandmother first sees The Misfit, she
finds that "his face was familiar to her as if she had |tknown him all her life" (21). And just before he
shoots her she experiences a deeper, mysterious
recognition, a kind of epiphany:
The grandmother's head cleared for an instant.She saw the man's face twisted close to her own as if he were going to cry and she murmured, "Why you're one of my babies. You're one of my own children!" (29)
This scene carries at least the undertone of a 
religious awakening or recognition for the grandmother
*
1
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as she seems to comprehend that on some level she is 
responsible for The Misfit. (Just how she might be so 
is the subject for another study.)
Finally, when The Misfit speaks, he speaks, 
astonishingly, about religion— specifically, about sin 
and redemption. In fact, the entire, long, climactic 
conversation between the grandmother and The Misfit is 
about, of all things, Jesus.
Taken together these passages indicate that the 
grandmother and The Misfit do indeed have some 
inevitable, although mysterious, connection. The 
apparent randomness of their encounter and its position 
in the plot call attention to this inevitability. The 
mere arrival of The Misfit out of the blue, as it were, 
implies some higher, supernatural cause bringing the 
two of them together. Indeed, The Misfit himself half- 
perceives this when— in his twisted way— he implies 
that he has acted as an instrument for the Good on the 
old woman's behalf: "'She would of been a good woman,'
The Misfit said, 'if it had been somebody there to 
shoot her every minute of her life'" (29).
Such a structure, like that of Oedipus the King, 
again presents two levels of explanation— the human and 
the supernatural. By giving the central event alone no 
rational cause, it calls into question our usual way of 
accounting for events solely in terms of the material 
and the human. It is thus just the reverse of the 
plot-structure of the familiar mystery story in which a 
clever sleuth of some sort finds a simple, easily
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intelligible cause-and-effeet chain of everyday events 
to explain away what before had seemed dark and 
mysterious. Indeed "A Good Man Is Hard to Find" could 
be seen as an anti-detective story leading away from 
the explicable into that which is mysterious and beyond 
explanation.
This violent reversal from the everyday and the 
banal into the eternal makes the plot-structure capable 
of an unusually powerful release of fear and awe. It 
presents a vision of drastic, unexpected, and 
inexorable transformation by way of divine Iintervention. At the same time, the action seems |
absolutely plausible, because, as I have tried to show 
above, all other events are carefully linked by cause 
and effect, and because O'Connor has hinted at the 
presence of a non-human causation from the beginning.
Yet whatever the role of the divine in bringing 
The Misfit and the grandmother together, and however 
powerfully it affects the reader, it is the grandmother 
herself who seals her fate by telling The Misfit that 
she knows who he is. Again, it is fallibility that is 
the most basic condition for release.
The discussion so far has made clear that unity of 
action can indeed function, and function powerfully, in 
the way Aristotle describes. Nevertheless, the 
examination of Heart of Darkness in Chapter I revealed 
that although an active problem may remain unspecified 
until well into the story, the plot may still possess
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unity of action. And this chapter has argued that the 
great merit of unity of action— release— depends 
primarily on fallibility, not on an the absolutely 
lucid sequence of exclusively human causes as described 
by Aristotle.
It has become apparent, then, that unity of action 
is a more open and flexible kind of unity than that 
created by exclusively human causes as conceived in the 
Poetics, The next chapter uses this understanding as a 
basis for considering the role of action within the 
greater unity of the story as a whole.
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Chapter III 
Action and Unity
Action, as effective and powerful a means of unity 
as it is, is certainly not the only way to unify a 
story, as even the most cursory glance at a random 
selection of stories will show. The modern novel in 
particular has looked for and found its own ways of 
unifying such disparate material as dreams, reportage, 
speculative essays, and interior monologue. Obviously, 
the classical conception of unity of action is simply 
too restrictive to provide the overall means of 
coherence in such cases. Some other means of unity 
must be in operation. Yet even highly complex and 
"experimental" works by authors like Franz Kafka, 
Hermann Broch, James Joyce, and William Faulkner seem 
to contain a narrative core of unified action, whatever 
the greater unifying principle of the work as a whole 
may be. Indeed, the more complex and disparate the 
various parts of a novel are, the more useful the 
concept of unified action becomes in unlocking the 
relationships of these parts to the whole, and thus to 
an understanding of the work. The dependence of theme 
on the active question, as established in chapter I, 
proves a particularly helpful conception in 
comprehending the unity of complex stories.
"a
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In this chapter I attempt to account for the 
greater unity of an entire work by means of this 
narrative core of action in two complex and 
unconventionally structured stories: The Unbearable 
Lightness of Being and Heart of Darkness. Both stories 
have a strong, unified action containing many features 
of the classical dramatic plot-structure I have defined 
it above. In both stories action forms the basis of 
the work's structure. Yet in each story the relation 
of the action is not an end in itself but, rather, the 
means to another end. In The Unbearable Lightness of 
Being this end is grasping "the enigma of the self"
(Art 23). In Heart of Darkness it is transmitting the 
enigma of an experience.
The Action of The Unbearable Lightness of Being
The Unbearable Lightness of Being is built on the 
foundation of a single unified action with a beginning, 
a middle, and an end. However, since the novel's 
compositional complexity may make it seem like anything 
but a dramatic plot-structure, my assertion could do 
with some evidence.
To begin with, I shall briefly summarise the 
action alone, leaving out all other elements. The 
single unified action related by the plot is the story 
of how the two main characters move from spiritual 
separation to monogamous union. In the beginning Tomas 
and Tereza fall in love, live together, and are soon 
married. But they are unhappy because Tomas cannot
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stop womanizing and Tereza cannot put up with it. The 
Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia forces them to 
emigrate. After a few months Tereza returns to 
Czechoslovakia on her own. Tomas quickly follows 
because he is miserable without her. Back in 
Czechoslovakia he loses his job and becomes a window- 
washer, which makes his womanizing more active than 
ever. In a final effort to accommodate Tomas, Tereza 
tries to have an affair herself with a man who turns 
out to be (probably) an agent for the secret police.
In order to escape from this affair as well as from 
Tomas's ever-multiplying "erotic friendships", they 
move to the country. There, in their isolation, the 
problem resolves itself, and the two at last find 
contentment.
My next task is to identify the elements of the plot. 
The active problem is Tomas's womanizing. Tomas is a 
believer in "erotic friendship", afraid of the 
oppression of love. He has lived most of his adult 
life in the understanding that he "was not born to live 
side by side with any woman and could be fully himself 
only as a bachelor. He tried to design his life in 
such a way that no woman could move in with a suitcase" 
(Being 10). Tereza on the other hand is completely 
committed to Tomas from the start. She feels no 
indecision about living with him. She knows this is 
exactly what she wants. Although Tomas finds, for 
reasons he cannot grasp, that he actually loves Tereza, 
he cannot give up his erotic friendships. This hurts
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Tereza almost unbearably, a pain which, through a 
process which Kundera terms "compassion", Tomas 
experiences himself
Was he genuinely incapable of abandoning his erotic friendships? He was. It would have torn him apart. He lacked the strength to control his taste for other women. . . .But was it still a matter of pleasure? Even as he set out to visit another woman, he found her distasteful and promised himself he would not see her again. He constantly had Tereza's image before his eyes, and the only way he could erase it was by quickly getting drunk. (Being 21)
Thus, the situation is intolerable for both Tomas and 
Tereza. Both of them have an irresistible need for the 
other, but she cannot live with his womanizing and he 
cannot live without it.
The disturbance, then, is Tereza's arrival. For 
this reason the action begins at the moment Tomas 
starts to realise both the implications of inviting 
Tereza to stay with him on the one hand and the 
implications of never seeing her again on the other.
It does not begin, as a novel very well might, in 
Tomas's or Tereza's childhood or with earlier love 
affairs or with the story of how they met, though 
incidents from all of these appear in the novel.
Since The Unbearable Lightness of Being is not the 
story of Tomas or of Tereza, the "middle" does not 
relate everything of interest that has happened to or 
between them. Rather, as the story of an action— their 
movement from separation to union— it contains only
^ See Being 19-21.
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those events and acts which change Tomas and Tereza and 
allow the spiritual gulf between them to be bridged.
This spiritual movement from separation to union 
is most strikingly reflected in terms of physical 
distance. In chapter 3, at the very beginning of the 
narrative, Tereza is literally some hundred and twenty- 
five miles from Tomas (6), The last chapter, near its 
close, has an image of Tomas and Tereza as close as 
they can be, dancing in each other's arms; "On they 
danced to the strains of the piano and violin. Tereza 
leaned her head on Tomas's shoulder" (313). The book 
ends with a similar vivid picture of unity as things 
again achieve a state of balance.
The book does not end with the death of Tomas and 
Tereza, although their death is indeed narrated nearly 
200 pages before the last chapter. If this seems like 
an odd circumstance, it is due to thinking of plot in 
terms of character rather than of a c t i o n . ^ The 
deciding factor in this regard is relevance to the 
active problem. The death of Tomas and Tereza has no 
bearing on their active problem. However, it does have 
bearing on Sabina's active problem, and, consequently, 
it is narrated in the sub-plot of Franz and Sabina.
In the conventional poetics of the novel of 
character, the death of the protagonist, if it appears 
in the narrative, forms the end of the story. But, 
again. The Unbearable Lightness of Being is not the 
story of the life of Tomas and Tereza; it is the story
2 See, for example, Becher 154.
^ For helpful insights on distinguishing story subjects, see Lammert 42.
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of their love,^ At the point where their death is 
narrated the active problem is still a long way from 
resolution, and therefore the plot must continue. It 
is only when the active problem has been resolved that 
the story calls for nothing more. |
"4 $Unity through Existential Code
Clearly The Unbearable Lightness of Being relates 
a single unified action with a definite beginning, 
middle, and end. Yet if one were to take into account 
only those parts of the novel that relate these events, X
■Ione would have a much thinner novel indeed. There is j
the sub-plot of Sabina and Franz, which makes up the 
whole of part 3. None of part 6 seems connected to the 
action either.
In the profusion of brief chapters, some tell the 
story of Tereza and Tomas, some tell Franz's story, 
some tell Sabina's, and some are not narrative at all.
Some seem like small, abstract essays on various 
themes. Others relate episodes from the characters' 
lives which, although interesting and informative, 
often have no clear bearing on the action. (For the 
sake of convenience, I will refer to these three major 
types of expression in the novel as action, thought, 
and biographical episode from now on.) How are all
these unified with the action I identified above?
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It is easy enough to declare that the short essay­
like sections are connected to the action thematically. 
For instance, the thoughts on Parmenides, lightness, 
and weight in chapter two have very clear thematic 
connections to the story of Tomas and Tereza which 
Kundera makes quite explicit.* However, I have been 
contending that action— not thought— is the soul of 
this novel. Therefore, should not the essential 
connection of these essay chapters to the rest of the 
story be found in terms of action? Likewise, there 
are facile connections between the biographical 
episodes and the story proper: Tereza's relationship to 
her mother helps explain her relationship to Tomas, for 
instance. But is it possible to do more than just 
reveal these connections? Is it possible to account 
for their arrangement in the novel by looking at 
action?
The principle of unity on which Kundera has 
arranged the novel is his concept of the "existential 
code" of the characters. The term "existential code" 
means the conditions and perceptions of the world by 
which the character lives. The overall aim of The 
Unbearable Lightness of Being is to understand the 
"enigma of the self" of his characters by revealing 
their existential codes.
This aim may seem like a character-centered 
approach to the novel. And indeed it is. In his non-
^ See, for example. Being 29-35, 193-8, 222-3, 236-40,
J:
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fiction volume, The Art of the Novel, Kundera asserts 
that
all novels, of every age, are concerned with the enigma of the self. As soon as you create an imaginary being, a character, you are automatically confronted by the question: What is the self? How can the self be grasped? (Art 23)
He finds there have been various responses to this 
question. Early prose stories centered on action 
because
it is through action that man steps forth from the repetitive universe of the everyday where each person resembles every other person; it is through action that he distinguishes himself from others and becomes an individual. (Art 23)
Another possibility for grasping the enigma of the
self, which developed in reaction to the novel of
action, is to reveal the invisible, interior life of
the characters. This is the so-called "psychological
novel", for want of a more precise category.
However, Kundera himself chooses neither of these
solutions. For Kundera,
to apprehend the self . . . means to grasp the essence of its existential problem. To grasp its 
existential code. As I was writing The Unbearable 
Lightness of Being, I realized that the code of this or that character is made up of certain key words. For Tereza: body, soul, vertigo, weakness, idyll. Paradise. For Tomas: lightness, weight. (Art 29)
This differs from merely portraying the interior life 
of a character. To reveal a character's existential 
code means to understand both the character's interior 
life and the "trap" of the situation in which he finds 
himself (Being 25-7). "Situation", as established in
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chapter I, is the beginning of an action, and "trap" or 
"existential problem" are analogues for "active 
problem"— the problem or dilemma forced upon the 
protagonist through the disturbance and the conditions 
of the situation. For instance, to apply Kundera's 
ideas to Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, Gawain's I
existential code would consist of everything in the 
story about his interior life (relatively little) and 
the "trap" of his situation— the wish to keep his 
trawthe, the wish to stay alive, the expectations 
placed on him by chivalry and by religion as evidenced i
at Bertilak's castle, and so forth. Thus, Kundera's i
4approach to the novel— revealing the characters' 1
existential code— synthesises the novel of character '
(the "psychological novel") and the novel of action. |1Nevertheless, for Kundera, action is still "the j
eternal question of the novel" (Art 58). Action makes '
up the bulk of The Unbearable Lightness of Being, and j
Inon-narrative passages appear when they have some j
bearing on or connection to events of the plot, not |
vice versa. Thus, The Unbearable Lightness of Being |
can be said to possess unity of action in the sense 
that its various elements are organised around the
action. However, the relation of the action alone is j
not the aim of the novel but rather the search for the 
characters' existential codes. It is this aim that j
accounts for the inclusion of the various elements. In I
]the following two sections I examine the relation of J
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the non-narrative passages to the action with respect 
to the existential code as the means of unity.
Thought
Kundera states that the existential code cannot be
"examined in abstractor it reveals itself progressively
in the action, in the situations" (Art 30). In other
words, they are the relatively abstract formulations or
examinations of a character's existential code which
then reveals itself in the action. For instance,
chapter 2 of part 5 begins:
Anyone who thinks that the Communist regimes of Central Europe are exclusively the work of criminals is overlooking a basic truth: the criminal regimes were made not by criminals but by enthusiasts convinced they had discovered the only road to paradise. (Being 176)
The first part of the chapter becomes a short 
essay on whether or not a man is innocent because he 
did not know he was committing a crime. Written in the 
language and tone of a speculative essay, this segment 
does not appear related to the action of the story. On 
the surface it is merely an interesting question 
related only tangentially to Tereza and Tomas because 
they happen to be living under a Communist regime many 
members of which claim to be innocent of wrong-doing 
through ignorance. Then, halfway through the chapter a 
connection emerges:
?
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When Tomas heard Communists shouting in defense of their inner purity, he said to himself. As a result of your "not knowing," this country has lost its freedom, lost it for centuries, perhaps, and you shout that you feel no guilt? How can you stand the sight of what you've done? How is it you aren't horrified? . . .  If you had eyes, you would have to put them out and wander away from Thebes' {Being 177)
At this point the action of Tomas and Tereza, which the 
essay has temporarily suspended, is taken up again, for 
it is Tomas's creation of this analogy which leads him 
to write an article comparing the ignorance of the 
Communist leaders to Oedipus's ignorance. For writing 
the article Tomas eventually gets fired from his job.
This leads to him becoming a window-washer, which, in 
turn, leads to a substantial increase in his 
womanizing. And with this event the novel is right 
back in the middle of the active problem.
Thus, what seems at first to be a topical 
political issue (Were the Czech Communist Party 
officials guilty of the country's misfortunes or did 
they act in good faith?) becomes an ethical issue (Is a 
person innocent because ignorant?) which then links up 
with the action on a political level (Tomas is told by 
the government authorities to retract the article or 
lose his job) and finally becomes an event in the 
action of the love story of Tomas and Tereza, Indeed, X
it brings about the crisis. This transformation of a 
public issue into a private one shows the relation of 
the context of the thought segment beginning chapter 2 
to the action proper. But why is it necessary? Why 
could the thought segment not be omitted?
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Again, the key to the thought passage's relation 
to the action is to be found in the idea of the 
existential code. As noted above, for Kundera, the 
purpose of the plot is not just to depict acts but to 
seek out their causes in the conditions of the 
situation under which the character exists. In this 
case, the six or seven paragraphs written in the style 
of an essay illuminate, in abstract terms, the 
situation that causes Tomas to write the article and to 
be persecuted for it. They identify the relevant 
themes in his mind: guilt, ignorance, innocence, and 
knowledge. These in turn have connections to the most 
important poles in Tomas's existential code: lightness 
and weight. Does ignorance of the atrocities being 
committed absolve the officials of responsibility 
(lightness) or are they, even in ignorance, burdened 
with accountability (weight)? And these are the 
considerations and conditions from which Tomas acts.
Narrative alone could not accomplish this purpose. 
If the essay segment were omitted, the reader would see 
only events; Tomas wrote an article comparing the 
government officials' claims of innocence to Oedipus's, 
he got fired, and so forth. The causal link— that is, 
the existential code— would be missing, and events 
(such as Tomas's writing the letter) would appear 
causeless and arbitrary. In this light the thought 
segments are not departures from the plot at all; they 
are further links in the chain of cause and effect.
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Furthermore, the speculative nature of the essay 
style allows Kundera to reintroduce the Oedipus motif—  
another component of Tomas's existential c o d e . 5  in 
Tomas's mind the Oedipus story, as well as other myths 
concerning an abandoned child, is a symbol for his 
relation to Tereza. This perception of his, in turn, 
has a causal link with the writing of the article:
"What I wonder is what made me write the thing in the first place," said Tomas, and just then he remembered: She had landed at his bedside like a child sent downstream in a bulrush basket. Yes, that was why he had picked up the book [i.e. 
Oedipus] and gone back to the stories of Romulus, Moses, and Oedipus. {Being 218-19)
Thus, "Oedipus", as a part of Tomas's existential 
code, has a direct bearing on his acts which bring 
about the final resolution of the active problem. And 
it is the thought passage which brings this connection 
to light.
It should be pointed out, however, that Kundera 
believes any character's self could never be completely 
grasped and must ultimately remain an enigma (Art 25).
Most of the thought passages in the novel function 
in the two ways identified above. The one conspicuous
^ Kundera defines "motif" as "an element of the theme or of the story that appears several times over the course of the novel, always in à different context" (Art 84).
X
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and troublesome exception is the whole of part 6. It 
can be outlined as follows:
Chapters 1-2 
Chapters 3-5
Chapters 6-7
Chapter 8 
Chapters 9-10 
Chapters 11-12
Chapter 13
Chapters 14-15
Chapter 16
An episode about the death of Stalin's son.
A definition of kitsch (i.e. the aesthetic ideal of the categorical agreement with being).
Two episodes from Sabina's life, dealing with kitsch.
Characteristics of kitsch.
Varieties of kitsch.
Two further episodes from Sabina's life dealing with kitsch.
The Grand March defined as political kitsch.
The story of Franz and the march on Cambodia.
Reflections on national strain of kitsch.
Chapters 17-22 The story of Franz and the march on Cambodia continued.
Chapter 23
Chapter 24
Chapter 25
Chapter 26
Chapter 27 
Chapter 28
Chapter 29
An essay on Franz's motivation for going to Cambodia.
A comparison of Franz to Tomas's son in terms of kitsch.
A short narration from Sabina's later life.
The story of Franz and the march on Cambodia completed.
Franz's death and burial.
The burial of Franz and Tomas as examples of kitsch.
A further definition of kitsch (i.e. The stopover between being and oblivion)
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The outline reveals that the dominant topic of 
part 6 is kitsch. Eleven of the chapters are wholly 
non-narrative and deal with kitsch reflectively, seven 
clearly serve as illustrations of the ideas discussed 
in the non-narrative segments, ten tell the story of 
Franz in Cambodia, and the remaining chapter, chapter 
23, seems not to conveniently fit into any of the other 
categories. However, none of these chapters seems 
related to the novel's action.
For example, chapter 3 of part 6 is a short essay 
on God and shit. Kundera observes that shit is 
incompatible with the idea of a perfect God:
Shit is a more onerous theological problem than is evil. Since God gave man freedom, we can, if need be, accept the idea that He is not responsible for man's crimes. The responsibility for shit, however, rests entirely with Him, the Creator of man. (Being 246)
Kundera reasons, therefore, that either God and his
world are not perfect, or there is nothing wrong with
shit. The chapter is humorous and the tone clearly
playful, but can humour be the only reason for its
inclusion? What is its place in the otherwise rigorous
structure of this novel?
Part 6, as Kundera explains, is a digression:
Digression means; abandoning the story for a moment. All of the reflection on kitsch in The 
Unbearable Lightness of Being . . .  is a digression: I leave off telling the novel's story to go at ray theme (kitsch) directly. (Art 84)
The connection to the action, then, is thematic. For 
instance, part 6, titled The Grand March, is a critique
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of the liberal idea of the brotherhood of man. The 
participants in the kitsch-ridden Grand March to 
Cambodia along the "only road to paradise" are shown to 
be the Western counterparts of the people who forced 
Tomas out of his job. Similarly, Tomas is tormented by 
the thought that pursuing an exclusive love for one 
woman— and indeed marriage itself— might well be 
kitsch. Certainly Sabina, his mistress, considers his 
feelings for Tereza to be kitsch. But apart from these 
thematic connections, part 6 has no relation to the 
action.
The difference between a digression like part 6 
and a thought segment as in chapter 2, part 5, is that 
the thought segment never abandons the action. It is 
not connected to the main action through theme, but as 
above, by cause and effect. Part 6, on the other hand, 
could be omitted from The Unbearable Lightness of Being 
with no harm whatsoever to the action of the story, 
since it is not part of the cause-and-effeet sequence.
What happens to Franz in Cambodia, for example, has no
'ibearing at all on Tomas or Tereza. It is not linked in 
:^any way to the chain of cause and effect— not even as 
an exploration of their "existential codes". It is 'Itrue that kitsch does figure as a key word in the
existential situation in which Tomas and Tereza find \1themselves, but no event from part 6 functions as j
either a cause or an effect in the main story. This is
1true even of the one event in part 6 in which Tomas and J
Tereza appear (or rather, disappear): their burial. As Jj
i
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shown above, the deaths of Tomas and Tereza are not 
part of the unified action since this is the story of 
their love, not of their lives. Again, to make the 
contrast clear, a reflective yet non-digressive segment 
like the beginning of chapter 2, part 5, is part of the 
unified action because it functions as a cause for 
subsequent events in the story.
Biographical Episodes
After the action and the thought segments, there 
is the third category— the biographical. These are 
generally short, narrative episodes from the lives of 
the characters.® However, they do not belong to the 
plot as such in that they relate events outside the 
main action. What, then, is their function and how are 
they unified with the action?
All of the biographical episodes can be subdivided 
into three general types with differing functions: 1) 
those that illustrate an abstract formulation of an 
existential condition of a particular character, 2) 
those that enrich the reader's general understanding of 
the "self" of a particular character, 3) those that 
illustrate thought.
An example of the first type occurs in chapter 10 
of part 3. While living in Paris, Sabina learns of the 
deaths of Tomas and Tereza and goes to the Montparnasse 
cemetery to calm herself :
® For a more or less representative cross-section in 
Being, see: 55-6, 62-6, 85, 109-10, 195-6, 201-4, and249-50.
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Walking along a row of graves, she noticed people gathering for a burial. The funeral director had an armful of flowers and was giving one to each mourner. He handed one to Sabina as well. She joined the group. They made a detour past many monuments before they came to the grave, free for the moment of its heavy gravestone. She leaned over the hole. It was extremely deep. . . .  In Bohemia the graves were not so deep. In Paris the graves were deeper, just as the buildings were taller. Her eye fell on the stone, which lay next to the grave. It chilled her and she hurried home. {Being 123)
This episode takes place approximately a year 
after the main action of the main story has ended, and 
is not causally connected to it. It does not in any 
way advance the plot and could be omitted without any 
effect on the sequence of events. Neither does it have 
any effect on the sub-plot— the story of Sabina and 
Franz— since that has finished some three years 
previous to the episode in the graveyard. Its purpose 
lies elsewhere. For the moment I shall grant the 
character Sabina's relevance to the main action and 
concentrate only on this episode's purpose outside the 
plot. Sabina, as the reader learns in the beginning of 
part 3, has a long history of betrayal which means, for 
her, "breaking ranks and going off into the unknown. 
Sabina knew of nothing more magnificent than going off 
into the unknown" {Being 91).
"Betrayal", then, is a word in Sabina's 
existential code and is associated with lightness. The 
episode in the graveyard functions as an illustration 
of this part of her existential condition, which 
Kundera has formulated in a thought segment at the 
beginning of the chapter:
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Her drama was not a drama of heaviness but of lightness. What fell to her lot was not the burden but the unbearable lightness of being.Until that time, her betrayals had filled her with excitement and joy, because they opened up new paths to new adventures of betrayal. But what if the paths came to an end? One could betray one's parents, husband, country, love, but when parents, husband, country, and love were gone—  what was left to betray? (Being 122)
Kundera explains the relationship of the graveyard 
episode to this condition as follows. The image of the 
stone she has seen sitting beside the grave stays with 
her. She thinks of it all day. "Why had it horrified 
her so? She answered herself : When graves are covered 
with stones, the dead can no longer get out" (Being 
123). And this thought is unbearable for Sabina 
because she is a woman who is constantly betraying, 
breaking ranks, going off into the unknown. The 
heaviness of the stone— having to stay put— is the 
antithesis of her existential condition. Thus, the 
graveyard episode illustrates by means of a visual 
image (the deep hole and the stone) the conditions and 
perceptions under which Sabina acts. However, it is 
not essential to the Sabina-Franz sub-plot nor to the 
Tomas-Tereza plot.
An example of the second type of biographical 
episode— those that increase general knowledge of the 
character's "self"— occurs in chapter 6 of part 2.
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It happens many years before Tereza meets Tomas while 
she is still a girl:
Once her mother decided to go naked in the winter when the lights were on. Tereza quickly ran to pull the curtains so that no one could see her from across the street. . . . The following day her mother had some friends over. . . .Tereza and the sixteen-year-old son of one of them came in at one point to say hello, and her mother immediately took advantage of their presence to tell how Tereza had tried to protect her mother's modesty. She laughed, and all the women laughed with her. "Tereza can't reconcile herself to the idea that the human body pisses and farts," she said. Tereza turned bright red, but her mother would not stop. "What's so terrible about that?" and in answer to her own question she broke wind loudly. All the women laughed again. (Being 45)
The purpose of this episode is not, as it might at 
first glance seem, exactly like that of Sabina's 
graveyard episode, for it is not a depiction of a 
particular existential state. Kundera gives no 
abstract formulation of what this episode means, as he 
does at the end of the graveyard episode. Neither is 
this a psychological analysis with a Freudian emphasis 
on the mother; Kundera does not trace the effect of the 
episode on Tereza's personality. Rather, this episode 
from Tereza's youth stands without any interpretation—  
as pure incident the significance of which lies 
imbedded in the action itself and its position in the 
novel.
This is not to say that Kundera gives the reader 
no direction. The episode comes early in part 2 which 
is entitled "Soul and Body". Two chapters earlier 
Kundera remarks:
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She took after her mother, and not only physically. I sometimes have the feeling that her entire life was merely a continuation of her mother's, much as the course of a ball on the billiard table is merely the continuation of the player's arm movement. (Being 41) I
This is vital information, not in order to understand a 
specific situation (i.e. the one existing between 
Tereza and her mother), but in order to better 
understand Tereza's "self", in order to be able to 
account for her enigmatic feelings towards Tomas and 
towards his womanizing, for example.
Two chapters after the curtain-pulling episode,
Tereza first meets Tomas: "He called to her in a kind 
voice, and Tereza felt her soul rushing up to the 
surface through her blood vessels and pores to show 
itself to him" (Being 48). It would be impossible to 
understand this figure without the episode from chapter 
6 (and several others like it), for the reader would 
not have seen how Tereza regarded her body and soul and 
why she thinks it necessary to keep her soul "below 
decks" like the crew of a ship. Tereza feels her soul 
drawn to Tomas; she feels he is calling to her soul.
This aspect of her love for him, this cause, would also 
be obscure without the contrast to her mother's 
vulgarity. Thus, the episode is causally connected to 
the chain of events belonging to the main action.
However, the link is quite distant. One could hardly 
regard this incident as part of the cause-effect 
sequence. Rather its main function is to depict 
Tereza's "self".
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The third type of biographical episode functions 
as the illustration of thought— of an abstract idea.
One of the most interesting examples comes at the 
beginning of part 6, "The Grand March"— the extended 
definition of kitsch already discussed. As a 
digression, "The Grand March" is not connected to the 
main action, so to demonstrate how this type of 
biographical episode works in it, I shall treat it as 
if it were a story unto itself, separate from The 
Unbearable Lightness of Being.
The episode tells of the death of Stalin's son 
Yakov:
Captured by the Germans during the Second World War, he was placed in a camp together with a group of British officers. They shared a latrine. Stalin's son habitually left a foul mess. The British officers resented having their latrine smeared with shit, even if it was the shit of the son of the most powerful man in the world. . . , They brought [the matter] to his attention again and again, and tried to make him clean the latrine. He raged, argued, and fought. Finally, he demanded a hearing with the camp commander. He wanted the commander to act as arbiter. But the arrogant German refused to talk about shit. Stalin's son could not stand the humiliation. Crying out to heaven the most terrifying of Russian curses, he took a running jump into the electrified barbed-wire fence that surrounded the camp. He hit the target. His body, which would never again make a mess of the Britishers' latrine, was pinned to the wire. (Being 243)
After this episode come eleven chapters on kitsch which 
are related to the episode of Yakov's death through the 
word "shit". Then, abruptly, the action of Franz's 
adventure in Cambodia begins. To illustrate how 
completely unrelated to the beginning of part 6 it 
seems, I recount some of the action below:
• - r f' ' - ' . ' ..k. - " - .. . 4 • -. .. ’ - ' T
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IA group of important Western intellectuals will |
travel to Thailand and march to the Cambodia border, 
thereby hoping to force the Cambodian authorities to |
allow an international medical committee to enter the 
famine-racked country. Franz (one of Sabina's lovers) 
has agreed to join the march and finds himself in 
Bangkok at the group's press conference.
The French intellectuals arrive, dismayed to find 
that a group of American intellectuals is already 
presiding over the proceedings and conducting the press 
conference in English. The French feel slighted and 
humiliated since the march was their idea anyway. They 
protest:
So high were their principles that they refused to protest in English, and made their case . . .  in their mother tongue. The Americans, not understanding a word, reacted with friendly, agreeing smiles. In the end, the French had no choice but to frame their objection in English. . . .Though amazed at so curious an objection, the Americans, still smiling, acquiesced: the meeting would be runbilingually. . . . Then, every sentence had toresound in both English and French, which made the discussion take twice as long, or rather more than twice as long, since all the French . . . kept interrupting the interpreter to correct him.
(Being 260)
The meeting proceeds and an American actress makes an 
impassioned speech in which she mentions President 
Carter. An angry French doctor jumps up shouting:
"We're here to cure dying people, not to pay homage to President Carter I Let's not turn this into an American propaganda circus! We're not here to protest against Communism! We're here to save lives!" (Being 260-1)
;
 .■-— V..L .. .
unity\ 149
What is the connection of these episodes? What 
does Yakov's son have to do with the American actress 
or the French doctor? Obviously the two episodes are 
in no way part of the same plot. There is no unity of 
action to "The Grand March". And, even with the 
understanding that the whole of "The Grand March" is 
about kitsch, the connection between these episodes 
remains obscure. The press conference in the hotel is 
perhaps an illustration of kitsch, but what does 
Yakov's death have to do with that concept?
Kundera does not clarify the connection until 
chapter 22. At this point, the marchers have marched
to the Cambodian border and are at one end of a bridge
separating the two countries. They shout their demand 
to be let into the country three times but are met only 
by silence from the Cambodian guards. Standing at the 
border waiting, Franz suddenly feels an urge to run 
screaming onto the bridge and die in a hail of bullets.
That sudden desire of Franz's reminds us of something; yes, it reminds us of Stalin's son, whoran to electrocute himself on the barbed wire whenhe could no longer stand to watch the poles of human existence come so close to each other as to touch, when there was no longer any difference between sublime and squalid, angel and fly, God and shit.Franz could not accept the fact that the glory of the Grand March was equal to the comic vanity of its marchers. (Being 268)
Franz's desire to die is the wish to deny shit and 
affirm kitsch. And the function of the short episode 
about Yakov's death is to illustrate precisely the same 
idea. Franz's death wish also forms the unifying link
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between the episode of Yakov's death (shit) and the 
episode of the press conference ("the comic vanity of 
the marchers"). Thus, despite its narrative cast, the 
main function of this type of episode is the 
exploration of thought.
To summarise this analysis of unity in The 
Unbearable Lightness of Being, then, the major portion 
of the novel tells the action of the love story of 
Tomas and Tereza. It is a unified action with a 
dramatic plot-structure. Nevertheless, the principle 
of unity at work within the novel as a whole is not 
action but Kundera's attempt to grasp the "enigma of 
the self" of his characters through the concept of the 
existential code.
Within the main action, I have differentiated two 
means of expression: narrative and thought. Though the 
thought sections seem digressive, they are in fact 
links in the cause-effect chain and thus part of the 
plot. The reflective style is necessary since Kundera 
sees a character's actions as resulting from its 
existential code, which must be elucidated both 
discursively through thought and concretely through 
narrative.
Further, the novel contains numerous episodes from 
the characters' lives which occur outside the main 
action. These function either to illustrate an 
abstract formulation of a component of a character's 
existential code, to increase understanding of the 
character generally, or to illustrate thought.
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In addition, part 3 of the novel relates the sub­
plot of Sabina's and Franz's affair. Part 3 is 
tangentially related to the main action through 
Sabina's appearance in both plots, and more importantly 
through its treatment of the same themes as the main 
action. Internally, it is organised according to these 
themes, although it also simultaneously presents an 
action. Part 6, on the other hand, is a digression.
Its subject is kitsch, and thus it maintains a loose 
thematic connection to the main action. Internally, 
the episodes of part 6 are connected only through 
theme,
The unity of action in The Unbearable Lightness of 
Being, then, is a much less restrictive kind than that 
put forth in the Poetics. It allows the author not
only to bring in many episodes outside the strict -ï
;îcause-effect sequence of the main action but also to 
stop the story altogether and to digress both 
narratively and discursively on themes of the main :;j
action.
More significantly, Kundera has relied heavily on 
what is, in essence, an Aristotelian plot-structure for 
the main action. Yet his aim— to understand the 
existential problem of his characters— is obviously at 
odds with Aristotle's assertion that "both happiness 
and unhappiness rest on action" (37; ch. 6). For 
Kundera, happiness and unhappiness are rooted neither 
in character as such, nor in action as the movement 
from prosperity to adversity or vice versa, but in the
    ' "
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existential situation in which the character finds 
himself. And where Aristotle maintains that "the 
events and plot-structure are the goal" (37; ch. 6), 
Kundera finds the delineation of the existential 
situation to be the ultimate goal. That Kundera's aims 
should diverge so sharply from those set down by 
Aristotle and yet still be responsible for a novel with 
an essentially classical plot-structure is an 
indication of the flexibility and power of the dramatic 
plot-structure based on action.
The Action of Heart of Darkness
Heart of Darkness contains, generally speaking, 
three different means of expression. The first is the 
straightforward narrative of the main action. The 
second is Marlow's discursive commentary on the 
(usually metaphysical) significance of the events of 
his story. The third is the descriptive episodes that 
do not figure in the cause-and-effect sequence of the 
main action. Again, I will begin with the narrative of 
the main action and then attempt to show how the other 
two elements are unified with it.
Since, as noted in chapter I of this thesis, there 
is a persistent strain of Conrad criticism that 
confuses the story's active problem with Kurtz and his 
mysterious last words, "The horror!" (113; pt. 3), it
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might be well to establish first of all what the action 
of Heart of Darkness is not.?
A careful look at the story in terms of plot- 
structure reveals it simply cannot be Kurtz's action.
Conrad never gives nearly enough information about 
Kurtz to say what his main problem might be or might 
have been. Hence, it is also unclear what his super- 
objective might be. Further, if Kurtz is the main 
character, the story lacks a disturbance. Consequently 
it is impossible to locate any denouement or indeed any 
plot in the story; the action is completely episodic 
and unstructured.
Yet even assuming, for the sake of argument, that 
the above were not true, if the main conflict of the 
story is to be about Kurtz, it follows that the 
complication and denouement cannot even begin until 
Kurtz figures in the story. Since Kurtz is not 
mentioned, however, even in passing, until Marlow gets 
to the Company Station, at least a third of the entire 
story would become irrelevant to the real problem.
More accurately, nearly half of it would become 
irrelevant, since Kurtz only functions as part of the 
cause-effect chain from roughly the middle of the tale.
Such a slack and meandering structure would run 
entirely counter to Conrad's insistence, according to 
Ford Madox Ford, that "every word set on paper— every %
word set on paper— must carry the story forward" (210).
? For an extended and typical example of the "The horror 1" strain of Heart of Darkness criticism, see Berthoud.
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As long ago as 1958, Albert J. Guerard wrote:
It is time to recognize that the story is not primarily about Kurtz or about the brutality of Belgian officials, but about Marlow its narrator (20)
And yet (in 1984), Peter Brooks still overlooks the
plot of Marlow's story in favour of the non-existent,
yet somehow inferable plot of Kurtz's story:
Marlow is in a state of belatedness or secondariness in relation to the forerunner; his journey is a repetition, which gains its meaning from its attachment to the prior journey. . . . Marlow's narrative is not primary: it attaches itself to another's story, seeking there its authority; it retraces another's path, repeats a journey already undertaken. (244-5)
Brooks concludes that Marlow's own story "has become
narratable only in relation to Kurtz's" (245). Such a
conclusion is only possible to the extent that Marlow,
the teller of his own tale, is ignored. Brooks
directly contradicts, among other things, Marlow's own
statement of what the story is about:
To understand the effect of it on me you ought to know how I got out there, what I saw, how I went up that river to the place where I first met the poor chap. (32; pt. 1; emphasis added.)
Marlow's intent is clearly not to "retell" Kurtz's 
story, but, just as he says, to tell his own story in 
order to re-create for his listeners the effect the 
journey had on him.
The encounter with Kurtz is indeed, as Marlow 
says, the climax of the experience. But a climax, by 
nature, is only meaningful as part of a larger action 
containing it. The narrator makes very clear that the
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meaning of Marlow's tales does not lie on the inside 
like the kernel of a nut, as Kurtz lies at the Inner 
Station, but envelops the entire story. It stands to 
reason, then, that the meaning of Heart of Darkness is 
to be found less in the parts of the story involving 
Kurtz, than the much larger action surrounding him, 
that is, the journey itself.
Of course there is nothing that requires the 
events of Heart of Darkness to have been structured 
according to the model, disturbance-active problem- 
resolution. It is, theoretically, perfectly possible 
for Conrad to have had no such structure in mind as he 
composed the story. But it would seem highly unlikely, 
to say the least, that Conrad set out to tell the story 
of Kurtz with no particular structure in mind and while 
so doing inadvertently composed a highly Aristotelian 
plot-structure telling a story about Marlow. On the 
other hand, if Marlow is taken to be the protagonist, a 
strong, meaningful plot-structure is obviously present. 
In contrast to the cluttered, disconnected structure 
that a Kurtz-centred action would require, there is a 
single, unified action with a beginning, a middle, and 
an end.
The plot-structure as a whole is similar to the 
dramatic plot with some notable exceptions. It begins 
in London when Marlow finds himself out of work. The 
"middle" includes his visit to the company's 
headquarters on the Continent and all the events at 
least until he leaves the Inner Station.
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The end of the action is more problematic. Is it 
Kurtz's death? Is it actually the interview with the 
Intended? According to the given definition, the end 
of an action comes after the resolution of the active
problem. To be able to locate the end of the action in |
Heart of Darkness, one must first know what the active 
problem is.
As I suggested in chapter I, Marlow's first 
problem, arising from the situation, is: How to find 
work? "Work" becomes an increasingly important theme 
word as Marlow progresses towards the heart of 
darkness, and, indeed, work versus savagery becomes one 
of the story's main oppositions. His second problem is 
a physical one which falls to him as his first 
assignment as skipper of the steamer: how to reach 
Kurtz. His third problem is metaphysical and personal : 
how to find some answer to the challenge that the 
company and the "darkness" he encounters present to his 
values.
If these are the problems that the plot solves,
Marlow's return to Europe forms the end of the action.
By the time Marlow leaves Africa, all three problems 
have been resolved to the extent they can be.
The plot-structure of Heart of Darkness does” 
possess unity of action, then. Nevertheless, this 
narrative unity is not always easy to see, because, as 
noted above, Marlow does not confine himself to merely 
narrating the events of his journey. He is continually 
interrupting the story in order to reflect and comment J
unity\ 157
on what his experiences mean, or to relate other 
episodes on the side. The following diagram shows only 
the cause-and-effeet sequence of the action:
1. Marlow finds himself out of work and
2. He is reminded of his old desire to go to Africa so
3. He uses his aunt's connections to get command of a river boat in Africa, so
4. He arrives and first hears of Kurtz but
5. In order to get his boat he has to tramp 200 miles inland, so
6. He sets off and eventually reaches the Central Station where his boat should be, but
7. The boat is on the bottom of the river, so
8. He has to send for rivets and wait, so
9. He becomes disgusted with the life of the Europeans at the Central Station, learns much more about Kurtz, about his "irregularities", and about company politics, so
10. The manager's uncle arrives with the rivets (9), so
11. Marlow overhears the manager and uncle discussing Kurtz, so
12. He develops a wish to meet Mr. Kurtz, and
13. He repairs the boat and starts upriver, so
14. He comes across the Russian trader's hut and his note: "Hurry up and approach cautiously", so
15. The manager decides they should not approach the Central Station that night but wait until the following day, so
16. The next morning the fog is dense, and they must wait.
17. After the fog lifts they continue up the river and are attacked just before reaching the Inner Station, but the attackers are driven off, so
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18. They finally reach the Inner Station and bring Kurtz on board with the intention of taking him back, but
19. Kurtz escapes, so
20. Marlow catches him and brings him back on board.
21. They make the return journey, but Kurtz dies.
22. Marlow also falls ill and arrives back in Europe.
The action so defined excludes, of course, the 
interview with the Intended. I will return to the 
place of this somewhat puzzling episode within the 
story later in the chapter. I continue now by noting 
the strong Aristotelian characteristics of the plot- 
structure I identified.
With Marlow as the protagonist, the plot describes 
a transformation whereby Marlow gains insight both into 
the evil in the world and in his own heart as well as 
into his ability to resist it. He undergoes a 
transformation from a state of relative ignorance to 
one of increased knowledge but also from relative 
happiness to grief.
The long complication includes events 1-12. The 
three problems identified above— finding, work, Kurtz, 
and relief— are fully knotted together at the Central 
station. The denouement begins as Marlow starts 
upriver at event 13. Marlow's arrival at the Inner 
Station is a reversal. Marlow has been thinking all 
along that meeting Kurtz will provide him with some 
answers and some relief from his disgust with the 
Company. It does just the opposite; the darkness is
..V,,,.,  ■ , . -
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worst of all at its heart. Indeed this is the central
irony of the work: having risked his life to reach the
Inner Station, Marlow does not find illumination; he
finds even greater confusion. As Guetti has observed:
"Heart of Darkness", then, as an account of a journey into the center of things— of Africa, of Kurtz, of Marlow, and of human existence— poses itself as the refutation of such a journey and as the refutation of the general metaphorical conception that meaning may be found within, beneath, at the center. (502)
The climax of Heart of Darkness is the attack on 
the boat at event 17. Strangely enough, this riveting 
and crucial scene has been largely neglected in the 
critical literature.® Yet it is the scene which 
depicts the final obstacle between Marlow and his 
super-objective, one of the longest and perhaps the 
most meticulously detailed scene in the story, and the 
only scene depicting physical violence. For these 
reasons, it demands serious attention in any study of 
the story's action. Hence a short detour on the 
subject will not be out of place.
What is it, then, that characterises this scene as 
the high-point of excitement? Firstly, there is an 
increase of tension and a feeling of impending menace 
through Conrad's use of familiar, suspense-building 
techniques such as the forced halt just below the Inner
® For one of the few studies redressing this lack of attention, though in a somewhat different context from mine, see Stewart 321-3.
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Station, thick fog, an inhuman scream from the bank, an
invisible enemy, and an unnatural silence:
It was not sleep— it seemed unnatural, like a state of trance. Not the faintest sound of any kind could be heard. You looked on amazed, and began to suspect yourself of being deaf— then the night came suddenly, and struck you blind as well. (73; pt. 2)
Second, as the plot diagram reveals, both the 
seriousness and the rate of appearance of obstacles to 
Marlow's progress increase the closer he gets to Kurtz. 
By the eve of the attack (event 16) the situation has 
become life-threatening for the first time. The rate 
at which the obstacles appear begins to accelerate 
drastically at event 15, so that four major obstacles 
arise within about 18 hours. Elsewhere in the sequence, 
many days or weeks or months elapse between obstacles. 
In other words, around event 17 the action happens 
faster.
Simultaneously, time becomes increasingly 
distended. As Lâmmert has shown, the appearance of 
time distortion is frequently a key to identifying 
"core" elements of the narrative (32). The section 
from nightfall the previous evening to the end of the 
attack takes up eight pages in my edition (with 
digressions subtracted). The actual fight itself takes 
over four pages although it could not have lasted more 
than five minutes.
Finally, the attack is described, with but one 
digression, in minute, sensory detail and in scenes.
It is thus more graphic than the rest of the tale.
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This intensifies the excitement, since the subject of
the description is physical violence and a savage
killing. The following passage typifies the use of
concrete, sensory detail— its "graphicality"—
throughout the entire section:
My feet felt so very warm and wet that I had to look down. The man had rolled on his back and stared straight up at me; both his hands clutched that cane. It was the shaft of a spear that, either thrown or lunged through the opening, had caught him in the side just below the ribs; the blade had gone in out of sight, after making a frightful gash; my shoes were full; a pool of blood lay very still, gleaming dark-red under the wheel; his eyes shone with an amazing lustre. . . .  He looked at me anxiously, gripping the spear like something precious, with an air of being afraid I would try to take it away from him. (81-2 pt. 2)
Besides the accumulation of stark visual images, there 
is the shocking tactility of the warm blood and, in the 
instant before the passage just quoted, the "clatter" 
of the spear in the cabin as the helmsman falls.
These characteristics establish the scene as the 
story's climax. The subsequent scenes at the Inner 
Station are anti-climax in the literal sense: the 
scenes are not rendered in such acute detail and lack 
the intense, sensuous imagery. There is no distension 
of time and no violence. Marlow has reached his goal. 
The situation remains threatening, but the danger is 
more related than depicted and therefore not as 
exciting.
It might be objected that the climax as the 
"emotional high point" must be a rather subjective 
thing and will vary from person to person, that, for
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instance, Kurtz's last words, "The horror!" (113; pt.
3) or that the "grove of death" with its description of 
the workers as "bundles of acute angles" (45; pt. 2) 
might be more emotionally affecting to this or that 
reader than the death of the helmsman. This is 
indisputable.
However, the criteria for identifying the climax 
do not have to do primarily with reader response but 
with structure. Two of these criteria are the 
construction of the scene— its "graphicality"— and its 
position in the plot. As I noted above, the attack on 
the boat is climactic by its very position as the last 
obstacle between Marlow and his super-objective. The 
stakes— the super-objective and life itself— are as 
high as possible at this point, hence, the level of 
excitement is high. The scene also has a vital 
function in the cause-effect sequence and could not be 
omitted without damage to the plot.
On the other hand, the scene at the grove of 
death, though indeed full of shocking and painful 
images with a high degree of "graphicality", 
nevertheless occupies a relatively unimportant position 
in the plot. There is little at stake for Marlow at 
the grove of death. Indeed it is here that the active 
problem first begins to become clear.
Likewise, Kurtz's last words, as devastating as 
they may be, are a poor candidate for the climax, since 
they utterly lack any "graphicality", "The horror!" 
(113; pt. 3) is a fairly abstract phrase compared to
' %
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the sentence, "A pool of blood lay very still, gleaming 
dark-red under the wheel" (82; pt. 2). It lacks 
sensory detail. Its impact does not come from its 
effect on the senses; it rests on what one chooses to 
infer from Kurtz's words rather than on any concrete 
image. Whatever fear it may provoke comes after one 
has first decided to what it refers.
By comparison, the death of the helmsman is shown 
to us as an immediately fearful image. We "witness" 
it. In this respect, I suggest that Kurtz's "The 
horror!" is to the stabbing of the helmsman what 
Hamlet's "The rest is silence" is to the stabbing of 
Laertes and Claudius. Hamlet's last words may be 
profound, may offer a dark and devastating final 
vision, but they do not put the spectators on the edge 
of their seats, as does the immediately preceding sword 
fight. Kurtz's last words may well be the climax of 
the story's meaning, but in no way are they the climax 
of the action.
To return to the analysis of the composition of 
the action, the scenes at the Inner Station, then, form 
the resolution of the active problem. This is why the 
return trip down the river is almost entirely narration 
with very few scenes. This is also the reason why 
Kurtz's death and Marlow's illness receive rather short 
shrift— e.g. "Mistah Kurtz— he dead" (112; pt. 3): they 
are not part of the action. In the same way, the 
deaths of Tomas and Tereza in The Unbearable Lightness
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of Being are not part of the action and are mentioned 
only in passing.
Since Marlow's first problem— finding a job— is 
solved very early, the action mainly concerns the 
remaining problems: the physical struggle to get to 
Kurtz and the metaphysical struggle for answers. Thus, 
the action as a whole can be divided into two parts, 
the physical and the metaphysical. I shall first 
consider the physical struggle. Marlow must make the 
200-mile tramp, raise the sunken boat, find rivets, 
withstand the apathy and climate at the Central 
Station, live with the Manager's ill will, and so 
forth. All of these barriers stand in the way of his 
meeting Kurtz while at the same time making him more 
and more desperate to do so.
The physical and metaphysical quests are gradually 
joined together. Certainly by event 12 the physical 
conflict has assumed a metaphysical dimension. That 
the situation is becoming morally intolerable for 
Marlow is evident in his description of the "pilgrims"
They beguiled the time by backbiting and intriguing against each other. . . . There was an air of plotting about that station, but nothing came of it, of course. It was as unreal as everything else—  . . .  as their talk, as their government, as their show of work. (53-4; pt.l )
The journey has become not merely a journey towards the 
Inner Station but also, Marlow hopes, towards 
illumination, towards "a kind of light" (32; pt. 1).
at the Central Station in the following passage: |
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As Marlow's dismay and disgust increase, he begins
to think of Kurtz more and more as an answer:
I was curious to see . . . this man, who had come out equipped with moral ideas of some sort . . . and how he would set about his work. (62; pt. 1)
Thus, he is bitterly frustrated when he believes Kurtz
has been killed.
There was a sense of extreme disappointment. . . . I couldn't have been more disgusted if I had travelled all this way for the sole purpose of talking with Mr Kurtz. . . .I couldn't have felt more of lonely desolation somehow, had I been robbed of a belief or had missed my destiny in life. (83; pt. 2)
Marlow's progress on the physical level, then, is a 
journey towards the Inner Station, and on the 
metaphysical level an escape from the Company.
However, the active question of the metaphysical 
level is difficult to formulate. Marlow never 
identifies exactly what is at stake on this level. 
Furthermore, the moral questions that bother him— the 
nature of evil, oppression, restraint, and so forth—  
are themselves fairly abstract issues. Unlike the 
decisive resolution of the active question on the 
physical level, the questions on the metaphysical 
level— the level of thought— are not resolved but end 
in contradiction.
One such unresolved problem is the question of 
restraint. Marlow wonders what it is that prevents a 
"civilized" man living in the heart of darkness from 
turning into a savage. Marlow himself finds the 
necessary restraint by keeping occupied with the
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"surface truth", that is, through his work. On the
journey upriver he sees the inhabitants dancing wildly.
Part of him is horrified, part of him is attracted:
What thrilled you was just the thought of their humanity— like yours— the thought of your remote kinship. . . . You wonder I didn't go ashore for a howl and a dance? Well, no— I didn't. Fine sentiments, you say? Fine sentiments, be hanged!I had no time. I had to mess about with white- lead and strips of woollen blanket helping to put bandages on those leaky steampipes— I tell you. I had to watch the steering, and circumvent those snags. . . . There was surface-truth enough in these things to save a wiser man. (69-70; pt. 2)
In other words, the physical struggle to keep the boat 
running keeps Marlow from the moral morass.
Next Marlow contradicts his ideas of restraint and 
surface truth with the example of the wood-cutters on 
board the steamboat. They are cannibals and outnumber 
the whites six to one, and apparently they are 
starving. Marlow wonders what prevented them from
killing and eating the whites.
'■Why in the name of all the gnawing devils of hunger they didn't go for us . . . and have a good 5tuck in for once, amazes me now when I think of it. . . . No fear can stand up to hunger, no patience can wear it out, disgust simply does not exist where hunger is; and as to superstition, beliefs, and what you may call principles, they are less than chaff in a breeze. . . . And these 1chaps, too, had no earthly reason for any kind of scruple. Restraint! I would just as soon have expected restraint from a hyena prowling amongst the corpses of a battlefield. But there was the fact facing me. (75-6; pt. 2)
Such "restraint" in "uncivilized" men who do not have a
"surface truth" of steampipes and steering to rely on j
1undermines Marlow's assertions about restraint. i
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Similarly Kurtz's complete lack of restraint— the
severed heads on spikes, having himself treated like a
god, "certain midnight dances ending with unspeakable
rites" (86; pt. 2)— contradicts Marlow's ideas. And
the issue is further clouded by the fact that Marlow
praises Kurtz:
He was a remarkable man. After all, this ["The horror!"] was the expression of some sort of belief; it had candour, it had conviction, it had a vibrating note of revolt in its whisper, it had the appalling face of a glimpsed truth. (113; pt. 3)
And it is, of course, characteristic of the problems 
expressed on the metaphysical level that Marlow both 
contradicts and reaffirms this opinion of Kurtz several 
times throughout the story. Although Marlow finds 
Kurtz, he clearly does not find a resolution to the 
metaphysical problems raised by his physical quest. 
Rather, the metaphysical quest only leads to greater 
confusion and darkness.
Interestingly enough, Marlow seems at times to 
disparage this metaphysical side of the plot in favour 
of the physical. Immediately before the following 
quotation, he has gone on at length about the 
complexity of Kurtz's character. He waxes eloquent 
over this soul which both loves and loathes "the 
mysteries it had penetrated", capable of "noble and 
lofty expression" and at the same time "avid of lying 
fame, of sham distinction" (110; pt. 3), only to 
declare :
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But I had not much time to give him, because I was helping the engine-driver to take to pieces the leaky cylinders, to straighten a bent connecting- rod. . . .  I lived in an infernal mess of rust, filings, nuts, bolts, spanners, hammers, ratchet drills. (Ill; pt. 3)
Here, Marlow literally does not have time for the great 
moral struggles (metaphysics) because he has got to 
keep the boat afloat (physics). With his detailed list 
of concrete objects— filings, nuts, bolts, spanners, 
hammers, ratchet drills— Marlow sets the gritty 
physical realities of the voyage above Kurtz's 
momentous metaphysical struggle. Marlow's metaphysical 
quest cannot proceed if he physically ends up on the 
bottom of the river. This amounts, perhaps, to an 
expression, in Marlow's terms, of the main idea of 
chapter I: however powerful the thematics of a story 
may be, they are yet dependent on its action.
To summarise this analysis of the action, then, 
Heart of Darkness tells the story of the protagonist 
Marlow's search for Kurtz. Nevertheless the action 
contains three active problems. The first of these—  
how to find work— forms the beginning of the plot and 
is resolved relatively early. However, it leads on to 
the other physical search for Kurtz and the 
metaphysical search for answers and for relief from the 
darkness oppressing Marlow. The end of the action is 
Marlow's return to Europe. The plot itself is 
essentially dramatic, with the clearly identifiable 
Aristotelian elements, complication, denouement, 
reversal, and climax.
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Unity of Effect
The unified action described above accounts for
the greater part of Heart of Darkness. And yet, as
with The Unbearable Lightness of Being, the remaining
segments of the tale play considerable roles. I have
identified these other two segments as Marlow's
commentary and narrative or descriptive passages
extraneous to the plot. They are unified with the main
action through unity of effect. This can be defined as
the unity arising from all parts of the story
functioning to re-create in the reader the emotional
effect of the ordeal on Marlow.
Hewitt has observed that "in fact, the story is
primarily concerned with the effect of the country and
of Kurtz on Marlow" (18). Indeed, Marlow himself says
the same thing, providing the key to this notion of
unity in his "prologue" aboard the Nellie. It is worth
quoting a second time in this context:
To understand the effect of it on me you ought to know how I got out there, what I saw, how I went up the river to the place where I first met the poor chap." (32; pt. 1; emphasis added)
Marlow is not only going to relate the events that 
happened to him but seek to transmit his feelings about 
them, "the effect" that is, as completely as possible.
In his Preface to The Nigger of the "Narcissus**, 
Conrad sets out this conception as the aim of his 
fiction:
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[Fiction] must be . . . the appeal of one temperament to all the other innumerable temperaments whose subtle and resistless power. . . creates the moral, the emotional atmosphere of the place and time. Such an appeal, to be effective, must be an impression conveyed through the senses; and, in fact, it cannot be made in any other way, because temperament, whether individual or collective, is not amenable to persuasion. . . . And the artistic aim when expressing itself in written words must also make its appeal through the senses, if its high desire is to reach the secret spring of responsive emotions, (xlviii-ix)
In other words, the goal of fiction ("its high desire")
is to affect the reader's emotions. It achieves this
goal by appealing "through the senses". This is
remarkably close to Tolstoy's definition of art:.
A boy having experienced, let us say, fear on encountering a wolf, relates that encounter, and in order to evoke in others the feeling he has 
experienced, describes himself, his condition before the encounter, the surroundings, the wood, his own light-heartedness, and the wolf's appearance, its movements . . . and so forth.(122; emphasis added)
In Heart of Darkness, Conrad aims not just to 
relate the action of Marlow's journey nor to reflect on 
its significance, but to evoke the feeling of "the 
encounter with the wolf", as it were. Thus, he, or 
Marlow at any rate, must render the sights and sounds—i j. ^
the "images" of the trip so as to make his audience see 
and hear, indeed experience the journey for themselyes ;
as far as possible. \  \  '
.The recreation of the effect of the journey, then, ' 
is the means by which all elements of Heart of Darknèss 
are unified. The story's structure might resemble the 
parts of.5ia wheel. The unified action described above
■ Æ .
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is the hub, the commentary and descriptive episodes are 
the spokes which are attached to it as well as 
radiating out from it, and the aim of re-creating the 
experience is the rim binding the whole together.
In the next two sections of the chapter I shall 
examine how thought and the descriptive episodes work 
to achieve this unity of effect.
Thought
The passages of Marlow's discursive commentary 
are linked to the hub of the plot in the first place 
through explicit reference to the action. (This is 
quite different from Kundera's novel, in which the 
connections between the action and abstract thought 
sometimes remain obscure for many pages.) For 
instance, Marlow's abstract thoughts about "surface 
truth" quoted above are obviously comments on the 
meaning of the wild dancing he witnessed on the trip 
upriver— an event which he has just narrated (68-9; pt. 
2). These links come very naturally because Conrad has 
made his narrator a contemplative man— story-teller and 
thinker in one.
Nevertheless, the sheer length of some of Marlow's 
commentary and its high degree of abstraction might 
threaten, at times, to divorce it from the action or to 
make of the action, in Kundera's phrase, "the mere 
novelised illustration of one grand idea" (Art 78). 
Conrad deals with this danger to unity by constantly 
emphasizing Marlow's fictionality and by undermining
■f
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the reliability and even intelligibility of his 
comments.
For instance, immediately after the very concrete
scene in which the helmsman is killed, Marlow
interrupts the action to say how disappointed he was at
the thought that Kurtz was surely dead by now. Then he
strays from the story altogether and begins to reflect
on Kurtz, whom, in the chronological order of éVënts,
he has not yet met. He concludes his discourse with
some rather high-flown language:
The point was in his [i.e. Kurtz's] being a gifted creature, and that of all his gifts the one that stood out pre-eminently, that Carried with it a sense of real presence, was his ability to talk, his words— the gift of expression, the . bewildering, the illuminating, the moêt exaited and the most contemptible, the pulsating stream of light, or the deceitful flow from the heart of an impenetrable darkness. (83; pt. 2)
As if suddenly aware that this may have become too
abstract and philosophical for his listeners, Marlow
now jumps straight back to his narrative, to a concrete
detail: "The other shoe went flying unto the devi1-god
of that river" (83; pt. 2)— only to move almost .
immediately back into the abstract as he gropes again
for what it was that Kurtz meant to him. At this point
his listeners become restless, which forces Marlow to '
break out of story-telling altogether: . ' i v
". . . Why do you sigh in this beastly way, somebody? Absurd? Well, absurd. Good Lord! mustn't a man ever— Here, give me some tobacco," There was a pause of profound stillness, thep a \  match flared, and Marlow's lean face appeared, worn, hollow, with downward folds and dropped eyelids. (83; pt. 2) . ‘ ' - " .«-H
»
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At this point Conrad has ceased trying to disguise 
the seam between plot and thought. In fact he calls 
attention to it by having Marlow's listeners fidget and 
then having Marlow break off his reminiscence 
altogether as if irritated or embarrassed, at which 
point the story's first narrator takes over and 
describes Marlow. Thus, the reader is reminded, 
through the huffs and puffs of Marlow's comrades, that 
Marlow the commentator is himself an actor in an 
action. This, in turn, works to unify comment and 
narrative.
For the same reasons, the reliability of Marlow's 
comments are continually undermined. His thoughts and 
judgments are contradictory at best, if not, at times, 
incomprehensible.9 Thus, they cannot be read as the 
keys to the meaning of the action. They do not stand 
above it but remain as ambiguous as the action itself. 
Marlow's judgments of Kurtz are the handiest example. 
They are sometimes contemptuous, "He was very little 
more than a voice" (84; pt. 2); sometimes sarcastic, 
"'My Intended, my ivory, my station, my river, ray— ' 
everything belonged to him. It made me hold my breath 
in expectation of hearing the wilderness burst into a 
prodigious peal of laughter" (85; pt. 2); and sometimes 
adulatory, "Better his cry— much better. It was an 
affirmation, a moral victory, paid for by innumerable
^ For a typical example of the numerous explanations of Marlow's verbal obscurity in terms of a supposed "extra-linguistic" nature of his subject, see Brooks 238-63.
■1
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defeats. . . . But it was a victory1 That is why I
have remained loyal to Kurtz to the last" (113; pt. 3).
The reader is left not really knowing what Marlow
finally thinks of Kurtz, because, obviously, Marlow
himself does not know. He says only, "You see, I can't
choose" (87; pt. 2). Clearly, Marlow is not an
"omniscient" narrator in any sense. He is not
presenting deliberated, final judgments but groping, as
he tells the story, for its significance.
It would be difficult to believe that Conrad was
unaware of these contradictions; like the dualities
noted in the Knight's Tale, they are deliberate. They
unify the text by allowing Marlow's thought no higher
status than that of his narrative.
This deliberate undermining of the reliability of |
a character's thought is a means of preventing
discursive comment from being interpreted as the
author's own opinions and thereby of preserving the
fictional integrity of the work. It is a technique not
by any means exclusive to Conrad. Dostoyevsky, for
example, wrote of the character Father Zosima from The
Brothers Karamazov:
It's obvious that many of Elder Zosima's teachings (or better to say the manner of their expression) belongs to his personage, that is, to the artistic depiction of it. Although I quite share the ideas that he expresses, if I personally were expressing them, on my own behalf, I would express them in different form and in a different language. He, however, could not have expressed himself in either a language or a spirit other than the one I gave him. Otherwise an artistic personage wouldn't be created. {Letters 13 0-1)
-i
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Similarly, Kundera asserts:
The moment it becomes part of a novel, reflection changes its essence. Outside the novel, we're in the realm of affirmation: everyone is sure of his statements. . . . Within the universe of the novel, however, no one affirms: it is the realm of play and of hypotheses. In the novel, then, reflection is essentially inquiring, hypothetical. (Art 78)
And Koff finds Chaucer working in the same way in the
Canterbury Tales :
Chaucer is forever giving up his magical omniscience . . . and providing a way for all performers, public and private— all readers— to give up the power they may claim for themselves to make the narrative mean in a certain way. (2)
In fact, the unreliability of Marlow's comments 
could be read as a modern application of Aristotle's 
dictum that "the poet himself should speak as little as 
possible, since when he does so he is not engaging in 
mimesis" (59; ch. 24). Thus, despite its lack of 
narrative content, Marlow's commentary remains as 
relative and fictional as the rest of the work, and 
this helps to unify it.
Further, the confusion evident in Marlow's 
thoughts provides further unity of effect, since, 
regardless of what Marlow may intend them to do, they 
do not at all function to illuminate meaning but 
primarily to convey his confused state of mind. It has 
already been shown that Marlow's passages of thought 
are frequently vague, confusing, and contradictory. 
Taken together they do not present any consistent or 
even effable conclusions; rather they give the
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impression of a great fumbling in the dark, of a
spiritual gloom in which it is impossible to make any
coherent sense out of the experiences narrated. This
is, of course, exactly the emotional and psychological
state that the experience of the journey created in
Marlow. Two quotations from the story should suffice
to support this assertion. As early as his visit to
the Company's headquarters, Marlow says;
There was something ominous in the atmosphere. It was just as though I had been let into some conspiracy— I don't know— something not quite right; and I was glad to get out. (36; pt. 1)
Later, sailing on the ship along the African coast he 
declares: "The general sense of vague and oppressive 
wonder grew upon me" (41; pt. 1).
It is just this grave and oppressive sense of 
wonder that Marlow's commentary transmits to the 
reader. If readers find Marlow's comments X
contradictory, vague, and generally not very 
illuminating, this is exactly the effect that the 
experience in Africa created in Marlow's mind. It is 
the effect of the ordeal on thought that readers re­
experience in the thought passages. It is obviously 
not the case that Conrad was incapable of writing 
clearer thought segments, but that to do so would have 
run counter to his aim of re-creating in the reader's 
mind the darkness and confusion tormenting Marlow. In 
this way Marlow's thought contributes to unity of 
effect.
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Descriptive Episodes
Action and thought have now been discussed. The 
remaining means of expression is the descriptive 
episodes lying outside the cause-and-effect sequence. 
These actually can be divided into passages which are 
mainly descriptive and those which are mainly 
narrative.10 For the sake of convenience I refer to 
both of these simply as "descriptive episodes" because 
they function in Heart of Darkness in essentially the 
same way.
Throughout the tale Marlow relates and describes 
things in the most intense, sensory detail that have no 
bearing on the action.H The vivid images they create 
in the reader's mind give them nevertheless exceptional 
e m p h a s i s . 1 2  it is precisely in the descriptive 
episodes that unity of effect becomes most apparent, 
for these frequently have no other function in the 
story than that of rendering the effect of Marlow's 
experience.
Of course each of the descriptive episodes could 
be said to belong to the story simply by being part of 
Marlow's intention to show "how I got out there" (32? 
pt. 1). They all depict things he saw or experienced 
in the various stages of his journey. However, this is
1® See Todorov's parallel division of episodes into the "static" and "dynamic"(220); and Lubbock's "picture" and "drama" (269-70).11 See, for example, the episodes on pages 34-5, 39, 41-2, 43-4, 48, and 52.12 an enlightening discussion of the impact of the image as such, see Tarkovsky 22-7, 47, and 111.
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not enough of a connection to create unity. As
Aristotle pointed out:
A plot-structure does not possess unity (as some believe) by virtue of centring on an individual. For just as a particular thing may have many random properties, some of which do not combine to make a single entity, so a particular character may perform many actions which do not yield a single "action". (40? ch. 8)
In other words, the descriptive episodes do not make a 
unified whole simply because they come from Marlow.
They must have a further aim or function in common.
For instance, one early episode is Marlow's visit 
to the Company offices on the Continent. It is 
described in minute detail. Indeed, Conrad devotes two 
distinct scenes to it: the first, the two knitting 
women in the outer room (36-7? pt. 1), and the second, 
the interview with the doctor (37-8? pt. 1). The 
relevance of the first scene might be explained as 
symbolical. The image of the two women endlessly 
knitting black wool "guarding the door of Darkness"
(37? pt. 1) has rather obvious mythic overtones. It is 
a symbol of fate, as Marlow himself recognises, and is 
thereby linked thematically to the story.
However, the episode with the doctor cannot be 
explained through symbolism. Marlow begins with the 
man's physical description: "He was shabby and 
careless, with ink-stains on the sleeves of his jacket, 
and his cravat was large and billowy, under a chin 
shaped like the toe of an old boot" (37? pt. 1). Then 
follows a bizarre dialogue with Marlow in which the
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doctor asks to measure Marlow's head. This too is 
recorded in detail.
This episode and especially the careful 
description is not an indispensable part of the plot.
How, then, does it function within the story as a 
unified whole? Of course it may characterise the 
general attitude of the Company as well as prefigure 
the heartlessness Marlow is shortly to encounter in 
Africa. But here again such an explanation does not 
account for the sheer amount of detail devoted to the 
doctor's physical appearance. Obviously, for Marlow's 
purposes, this description is important in itself. It 
is re-creating "the moral and emotional atmosphere of 
the place and time" or, in Marlow's simpler phrase,
"the effect of it on me".
Another example is the long passage about the
boiler-maker whom Marlow meets at the Central Station:
He was a lank, bony, yellow-faced man, with big intense eyes. His aspect was worried, and his head was as bald as the palm of ray hand; but his hair in falling seemed to have stuck to his chin, and had prospered in the new locality, for his beard hung down to his waist. He was a widower with six young children (he had left them in charge of a sister of his to come out there), and the passion of his life was pigeon-flying. . . ,He would rave about pigeons. After work hours he used sometimes to come over from his hut for a ftalk about his children and his pigeons; at work, |when he had to crawl in the mud under the bottom |of the steamboat, he would tie up that beard of Ihis in a kind of white serviette he brought for Ithe purpose. It had loops to go over his ears. jIn the evening he could be seen squatted on the Ibank rinsing that wrapper in the creek with great |care, then spreading it solemnly on a bush to dry. J(60? pt. 1)
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Clearly, the boiler-maker does not advance the action 
in any way; if anything he retards it. Neither is 
such a minute description of him connected to the story 
through theme, for it reveals little about existence or 
evil or the heart of darkness, little about work and 
restraint. One could perhaps attach some symbolic 
value to the white napkin— the futility of genteel 
affectation in the jungle or trying to make things 
"white" in the Congo and so forth, and there is no need 
to rule out the possibility that the image does have 
some such resonance. Yet the tone of the passage is 
gentle, not mocking or ironic; after all, Marlow likes 
the man. Furthermore such an explanation assumes that 
the purpose of description is to illustrate "meaning"—  
an assumption which Mieke Bal, for instance, has 
vigorously challenged (109-45).
In any case, calling the napkin a symbol does 
nothing to explain the length or detail of description
I.
in the passage. It does not account for the attention 4 j
paid to the boiler-maker's appearance, his family, and 
his pigeon flying, or the fact that the napkin had 
earloops. If Conrad did indeed believe that "every 
word set on paper must carry the story forward" why are 
these details important enough to be included?
They are not perfunctory, novelistic ballast, not 
"filler". They are in fact essential to a re-creation 
of the experience. Without this re-creation the goal 
of the story— "to reach the responsive emotions"— could 
not be realised. It is precisely the oddity, the
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irrelevance of details such as pigeons and earloops
that transmit the absurdity, the mundanity and the
sense of extreme alienation from ordinary, European
life that Marlow feels. The descriptive episodes do
this much more forcefully than his thought or a bare
narrative ever could. They reveal, in Conrad's phrase,
"the stress and passion of each convincing moment"
{"Narcissus"f Preface xlix).
As a final example consider Marlow's description
of the voyage down the African coast:
Once, I remember, we came upon a man-of-war anchored off the coast. There wasn't even a shed there, and she was shelling the bush. It appears the French had one of their wars going on thereabouts. Her ensign dropped limp like a rag? the muzzles of the long six-inch guns stuck out all over the low hull? the greasy, slimy swell swung her up lazily and let her down, swaying her thin masts. . . . There she was . . . firing into a continent. Pop[,] would go one of the six- inch guns? a small flame would dart and vanish, a little white smoke would disappear, a tiny projectile would give a feeble screech— and nothing happened. . . . There was a touch of insanity in the proceeding, a sense of lugubrious drollery in the sight. . . .  We gave her her letters (I heard the men in that lonely ship were dying of fever at the rate of three a-day) and went on. (40-1? pt. 1)
Once again it is the sensory details— the pop of the 
gun, the "little white smoke", the "feeble screech", 
and the soldiers dying three a day which convey the 
hopelessness, the futility, and sadness of the 
situation far more than Marlow's abstract 
generalizations: "the touch of insanity", and the 
"lugubrious drollery". The details enable readers to 
feel these themselves.
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The descriptive episodes are thus unified with the 
action in that all work to convey a total effect, the 
ultimate aim of which is to reach the "responsive 
emotions" of the reader. Naturally, individual, 
concrete details, e.g. earloops, are not essential to 
the success or failure of the tale in the way 
individual events of the plot-structure are. Rather it 
is the steady build-up of these details, their 
cumulative effect on the senses, that makes the reader 
seem to "see and hear" the action almost as if he or 
she were present in it.
To summarise the discussion of unity in Heart of 
Darkness, then: the novel as a whole is unified by its 
aim to re-create the effect of the experience for the 
reader. This aim unites the three different parts of 
the book: plot, thought, and descriptive episode.
The heart of this structure is the strong, unified 
action. Marlow is the protagonist and his super- 
objective is to reach the Inner Station, which in the 
course of the story takes on a metaphysical dimension. 
The plot-structure has a clear beginning— Marlow out of 
a job and looking for work— a middle— the journey up 
the river— and an end— Marlow's collapse after reaching 
the Inner Station.
In the long passages of thought, Marlow makes his 
obscure and confusing judgments about Kurtz and the 
meaning behind his story. These both mirror and help 
to infect the reader with Marlow's own confusion and
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uncertainty, that is, with the effect of the 
experiences on his mind. Likewise the descriptive 
episodes are unified to the rest of the story by their 
re-creation, through vivid sensory detail, of the 
strange world and circumstances in which the action 
takes place.
Attached to this structure is the interview with 
the Intended. It is extraneous, though not completely 
unrelated, to any of Marlow's active problems. It is 
not part of the unified action of the plot, and it does 
not function in the same way as the other extra-plot 
episodes due to its length and position in the book.
It has a thematic connection to the main action only to X
the limited extent that "lying" is a theme. Neither
could it be considered a digression in Kundera's sense
of abandoning the story for a moment in order to go at
the theme directly, for it neither goes at the story's
themes nor returns to the story. It happens after the
story is over. Consequently, it seems as if it ought
to make some type of concluding comment on the action.
Yet it does not. Instead it is about Marlow's 
character and the Intended's and about lying.
Neither can I find in it any unity of effect. It 
is not vague, confusing, or ambiguous as the rest of 
the story is. On the contrary the judgments and 
significance of the action are painfully clear: the 
Intended is hopelessly (and willingly) deluded as to 
Kurtz's character, and Marlow lies to her about Kurtz's 
death to avoid the embarrassment and pain of
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disillusioning her. Thus, it breaks sharply with the 
tone of the rest of the book. It could be read as a 
"postscript" or epilogue, but in terms of structure it 
is more accurately a new action with the beginnings of 
a new plot, characters, and themes.
To conclude, in Heart of Darkness, as in the other 
stories considered earlier, action is still the most 
important element, the hub of the total structure. 
Indeed, the action would be strong enough to stand by 
itself; the plot's ironic reversal alone is no doubt 
capable of generating release. And while Conrad does 
indeed seek to release a flood of powerful emotions, 
or, as he puts it, to reach "the secret spring of 
responsive emotions", yet he does so not through a 
single cathartic shock brought on through the dramatic 
resolution of an active problem, but rather through a 
complete and convincing reproduction of an entire 
experience. The experience itself is important, 
indeed, is the goal. Thus, in Heart of Darkness Marlow 
is free to express whatever thoughts and details will 
most powerfully render the experience's effect.
To employ a different metaphor, the action is a 
base of operations for Marlow the story-teller. He 
makes plenty of sorties from this base out into 
thought, description, and episode, yet he always 
returns to it, since his thought and descriptions have 
little impact in isolation from the events of the plot.
As this discussion of unity in both The Unbearable 
Lightness of Being and Heart of Darkness has shown, the
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unified action can serve the same function for the 
story-reader. Once the action and its structure have 
been grasped, they provide a coherent, clearly 
delineated base of operations. The tasks of analysing 
the rest of the elements in the story and of accounting
for how they have been unified can proceed from this
base.
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Conclusion
As I first stated in the introduction, to 
understand a story would mean, ideally, knowing all its 
elements and how they function to form a whole. The 
concept of the unified action provides a key to three 
of the most important elements of the story: plot- 
structure, theme, and unity. The first of these, plot- 
structure, is most important. To understand a story we 
must comprehend its plot above all. To comprehend the 
plot-structure of a story means to know what the main 
problem is, who the protagonist is, and what it is that 
he or she actively wants. It means to know what the 
resolution of the problem is and especially how this 
resolution is brought to pass.
Following Aristotle's lead, I have approached 
unified action in the simple yet very functional terms 
of beginning, middle, and end. Action begins with the 
introduction of an active problem through some sort of 
disturbance (e.g. a Green Knight). The attempts of the 
protagonist to solve the active problem constitute the 
action's middle, and the resolution of the problem 
brings the action to an end. Thus, action is the 
answer to perhaps the most fundamental question one can 
ask about a story: What is this story about?
Indeed, it is the answer to this ambiguous 
question in both its senses; it is both what a story
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tells and what it has to say or, more often, what it 
has to ask. Theme, that is, what the story has to ask, 
the ideas that it explores, results from the active 
problem posed by the disturbance. Indeed, as the 
discussion in chapter I demonstrated, the range and 
direction of a story's themes are determined to a 
considerable extent by the conditions governing its 
situation. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that 
theme equals the sum of situation and active problem.
In this way, understanding the plot-structure of a 
story means understanding its themes.
The unified action also provides a basis from 
which the entire structure of a long and complex story 
can be grasped. If we can identify the action, we can 
determine what parts of a story function within that 
action and which parts have functions elsewhere. This 
makes analysis of the story's total structure much 
easier and the principle(s) upon which it is unified 
much clearer.
Genette has sensibly warned against the temptation 
"to seek unity at any price and in that way to force 
the work's coherence" (266). Action provides a sound 
and sensible foundation for an unforced understanding 
of unity because it is undeniably unified through the 
plot structure. Aristotle took relevance to the action 
as the acid test for every episode's inclusion or 
exclusion from a story. If many authors, such as 
Kundera and Conrad, have found other, less exclusionary 
ways of unifying stories, action has nevertheless
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tended to remain at the centre as a hub onto which 
episodes are fastened and upon which the story as a 
whole turns. It is in this sense that action can also 
be called the "soul" of a story.
The importance of the models of action and plot- 
structure as outlined in this thesis are their 
applications to literary study in general. The plot- 
structure of many works is still frequently neglected 
as if it were too obvious to bear much thought or 
perhaps too obvious to say much about. I have tried to |
show, on the contrary, how plot-structure is a rather 
complex subject, worthy of the most careful study in 
itself. In addition, an accurate grasp of a story's 
themes is virtually impossible without a clear 
understanding of the structure of the story's action.
Although much work in this area remains to be done, the 
analysis of action clearly has the potential for 
providing a sophisticated and effective method or 
"approach" to stories in teaching and research.
Of course, such an approach would not have 
unlimited relevance to all fiction. The so-called 
"minimalist" American fiction of the 1980s, and the 
older "slice-of-life" genre, to name but two instances, 
characteristically contain slight action if they 
contain an action at all. In such cases a study based 
on action and plot-structure is not likely to yield 
many insights. Still, if the relevance of action as 
the basis for a critical approach is doubtful in the 
case of stories that eschew the "narrative core" of
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action, so too is the extent to which fiction without 
action can be called a story. As I stated in my 
introduction, the rather unassuming model of action 
established in this thesis cannot serve as a grand, 
general theory of literature but applies, rather, to 
those stories in which action and plot play the leading 
roles.
A more difficult and, indeed, fundamental problem 
with the concept of action is the structure of events—  
the subject of chapter II. According to Aristotle, 
events must be structured so as to exclude non-human 
causes, such as chance, if the plot is to achieve the 
greatest effects of which it is capable. In 
Aristotle's view, as Halliwell explains, "it is the 
total coherence of a work . . . which will be disturbed 
by even a single chance event within the sequence of 
action" (Aristotle's 210).
The discussion has shown that coherence is indeed 
necessary so that the audience can perceive the 
protagonist's own fallibility in bringing about the 
transformation of fortune. Yet, as any number of plot- 
structures demonstrate, coherence does not mandate the 
utter exclusion of the non-human cause from the action.
An action with non-humanly caused events can be 
coherent enough to bring about the release of powerful 
emotions as long as the essential fallibility of the 
protagonist is maintained. Utter lucidity is not an 
end in itself; rather, a certain degree of lucidity is 
necessary to create the conditions for fallibility. It
'i
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is only when the use of non-human causes eliminates 
these conditions that the ability to release is at 
risk.
My discussion of the causality problem above is an 
attempt to forge a kind of compromise between the human 
and non-human poles of causality in plot-structure by 
centring on fallibility. Yet this compromise leaves 
many of the most fundamental questions about action 
unanswered. The problem of causality raises questions 
which lie at the heart of plot-construction and perhaps 
even of story-telling itself— the "constitutive 
questions" of fiction according to Kundera (Art 58);
What are the causes of action? What makes the 
revelation or concealment of causality emotionally 
compelling and why? In what precisely does the power 
of action to cause the release of emotions lie? To 
conclude, I would like to indicate a few of the 
directions which further research into these questions 
might take.
I have claimed that the great advantage of 
lucidity is that it allows for fallibility. However, 
Aristotle suggested, with characteristic insight, that 
the power of the lucid, unified action came precisely 
from the fact that it was more coherent, more lucid, 
and therefore more significant than the unorganised 
commotion of everyday life (Halliwell, Commentary 107).
In other words, the lucid plot-structure seems to 
possess remarkable force itself quite apart from 
fallibility.
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To return briefly to the Reeve's Tale for an 
illustration, it is undeniably much funnier that the 
Miller's wife gets in bed with John because he moved 
the cradle to the foot of his bed than it would be if 
she got into the wrong bed accidentally, even though in 
either case she would still bring her fate down on 
herself. Consequently, fallibility cannot be the 
decisive factor here. On the contrary, the humour 
seems to lie in the reader's very perception and 
understanding of the connections to previous events.
The reader "sees" John moving the cradle, "sees" the 
wife groping for it and finding it at the foot of the 
wrong bed, and comprehends why she then gets into the 
wrong bed. For some reason we find this funny in a way 
we would not have had she made the mistake just by
chance. Thus, we are left with the question; What is
so funny about seeing connections?
The explanations by Lessing and Dürrenmatt which I
cited earlier are enlightening but still incomplete.
They do not fully explain the effect of the lucid plot- 
structure on our emotions. Lessing and Dürrenmatt 
claimed that lucidity of plot-structure allows the 
members of the audience to "identify", to see how the 
same fate could befall them, and certainly we are able 
to identify, to a degree, with the acts of John and 
Alayn and the miller's wife. Nevertheless, it is hard 
to imagine that a reader, especially a modern reader, 
of the Reeve's Tale could really feel that the same 
things might well happen to him or her. Considered
%
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soberly, the whole action seems ludicrous and virtually 
impossible. Yet the modern reader still laughs. It 
seems equally unlikely that a production of Oedipus the 
King grips modern spectators because they feel that the 
same misfortunes might actually befall themselves.
Thus, the appeal of the completely lucid plot-structure . 
must go beyond the process of audience affinity with 
the characters and events portrayed.
Aristotle, on the other hand, accounts for the 
affinity of the audience with the characters by 
asserting that the extent of its emotional response to 
the fate of the protagonist depends on his or her 
ethical status (44-5; ch. 13). But is it not true 
that, in fact, we identify with the acts and objectives 
of characters both wicked and good, with an lago or 
Raskolnikov just as much as with an Odysseus or 
Iphigenia? The sympathy of the audience with the 
plight of the characters seems to have more to do with 
the situations in which they act and with the fact that 
they act than with their qualities. But again: Why is 
this so? What is it that makes action itself 
compelling?
As if this did not make the nature of action 
mysterious enough, not being able to make sense of 
events also releases the emotions. For example, the 
plot-structure of O'Connor's "A Good Man Is Hard to 
Find" releases emotions through the very opposite of 
lucidity, that is, through ambiguity and 
inexplicability— The Misfit coming out of nowhere
^ For a short but cogent speculation on this subject, see Kundera's "Beyond Causality" {Art 57-9),
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precisely at the time and place of the family's 
accident. Here, the reader perceives no connection 
between the events and cannot explain why things have 
happened in just this way. The cause of the crisis is 
mysterious, but it still powerfully affects the 
emotions. One has to conclude, then, that both 
lucidity and obscurity of cause possess the capability 
of releasing powerful emotions. This paradox certainly 
calls for further investigation.^
Equally challenging and unexplored is the question 
of the role of action in stories outside the dominant 
dramatic-type plot-structure, that is, in stories which 
do not have the release of emotions as their primary 
purpose. How does action function in fables? How does 
it function in stories which lie somewhere between the 
dramatic plot-structure and the plot-structure of the 
fable such as, for instance, "The Happy Man's Shirt" or 
Kafka's short Erzahlungen or Borges's fictions?
Finally there is the question of action's staying 
power itself. Why has plot survived at all? Indeed 
why, after so many centuries, is the dramatic, action- 
based plot-structure still so enormously popular? That 
it is enormously popular is evidenced, for instance, 
by the massive annual trade in "formula" fiction: the 
detective, spy, western, and romance paperbacks. s
Whatever their literary shortcomings may be, they do 
contain dramatic actions full of suspense, which finds
 ^ " • • r , % - ' ' '.T - •• •• j f » -..’.-s.. -v-.. . ' - i  ^ f . ■• ••.if;-' fy ' v, - -• - t , --t t  ^
■. -^ r
conclusion\ 194 u
I
considerable approval from the public. Even more :
massive, of course, is the film industry, which seems
to have virtually taken over the job of story-telling
in the modern world. That so many films should contain i
what are essentially variations on the same type of ÿ
plot-structures described by Aristotle testifies again
to a very deep and abiding appeal of the unified |
action.
Even in the realm of the "literary" story, even 
after Dada, after the theatre of the absurd, after j
metafiction, after the vast history of western story- 
telling would seem to have exhausted plot's every |
possibility, plot and action are still alive and well #
in writers as conscious of that history and their own 
place in it as Milan Kundera. Even in the works of the 
most "intellectual" writers action continues to 
fascinate, excite, and perplex.
In this light it is no wonder that action is often 
said to be connected on a deep and perhaps even primal 
level with needs or desires in the human psyche.
However, such connections still exist largely in the 
realm of speculation. Here, above all, more research 
needs to be done. Is the appeal of the unified action 
indeed "timeless"? Is it indeed universal, that is, 
trans-cultural? Does something like Aristotle's 
unified action exist in non-Western story-telling 
traditions? Propp provided a morphology of Russian 
folktales, but many more such studies would be needed, 
particularly in the non-Western traditions, before any
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serious discussion of such topics as universality can 
begin.
It is clear that the answers to these questions 
will have to be sought in the sciences that study human 
beings— above all psychology, history, and 
anthropology— as well as in action-based analysis of 
story structure itself.% A focus on action itself in 
isolation from the response of the reader, while 
perhaps necessary in the analytical stage of study, as 
in this thesis, is ultimately artificial and rather 
limiting. However, further combined study in these 
areas promises new and extremely valuable insights into 
the nature of the story.
2 For interesting work on action incorporating anthropological and psychological findings see Lepan and Bruner respectively.
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